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ABSTRACT 
This research study investigates the extent t!,, which participatory 
schemes determine member participation and control in industrial co- 
operatives in Ghana. 
Recent studies on co-operative organizations in developing countries 
have indicated that the problems of self-management in co-operatives 
are due to low member participation in decision making and control over 
the afflairS of co-operatives. These studies, (, --ming from mainly 
sociological and anthropological studies, have fu, ther suggested that 
the low meniber participation and control in co-opevatives are due to the 
prob: emc,. in the implementation of the principle: ý and ideals of co- 
-')[)0j-,, -jtives in developing countries. The studies ',. ave fuither argued 
tjý,, jt principles and ideals of co-operatives are -. ifficult to implement 
because the are incompatible with the traditional :,, )cial structures and 
norms in deve! oping countries. 
A central argument of this study is that the problems of member 
participation and control in co-operatives should not be attributed solely 
to the influences of environmental 
factors in developing societies. The 
study points out that the degree of member particip: iriion and control in a 
co-operative will also be related to - properties of the participatory 
schemes in the co-operatives. That is, the structures and processes 
along which participation takes place. 
The findings of the research study indicate that fundamental 
determinants of member participation and control are the structural 
attributes of participatory schemes in the co-operatives. The findings of 
the study also suggest that the participatory schemes in the co- 
operatives are influenced by the organizational conditions in the co- 
operatives. 
On the,. basis these findings, the research has contributed to our 
knowledge of the organization and the functioning of co-operatives in 
developing countries. Furthermore, the research has demonstrated the 
possibilities of the extension of modern organization theory to the study 
self-help and related self-managed enterprises in developing countries. 
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Chapter I 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background of the Study 
Over the past few decades, the activities of industrial co-operatives in 
developing countries have gained considerable attention in development theory 
and practice. This comes after a long period of time during which the activities 
of co-operatives were concentrated in the agricultural sectors of those 
0 countries. 
For instance, in Ghana, the first industrial co-operatives was 
established almost 20 years after the introduction of co-operatives; into 
0 
% agriculture. 1 It is the organisation and management of these industrial 
co-operatives which is the focus of this study. 
& Recent interests in industrial co-operatives in developing countries come from 
the realisation that as socio-econornic organisations, co-operatives can be used 
to mobilise the resources of small scale businesses for development. 
The attraction of co-operatives as an instrument for the development of small 
scale business stems from their character as a self-help and self-managed 
organisation. Co-operatives are considered as self help and self-managed 
organisations because their members are themselves owners/managers and at 
1 Co-operatives were first introduced to Ghana, formerly the Gold Coast, in 1928 by tile Department of 
Agriculture of the Colonial Government. -17he purpose of the introduction was primarily to use the co- 
operatives as a mechanism to group farmers for the introduction of measures intended to improve tile 
quality of their cocoa. Later, these groups of farmers were used to facilitate tile purchasing and 
transportation of cocoa by tile Department of Agriculture. A detailed history ofthe development of Co- 
operatives in Ghana is provided by J. C. de Grift Johnson. The A 1rican Experi-nent. London, 1968. 
2 the same time patrons/workers of the enterprise . 
Furthermore, all members, 
whatever their level of skills or level of contributions to the resources of the co- 
operative, have an equal right to participate in decision making within the co- 
operative. In co-operative theory, it is anticipated that members' participation in 
decision-making within the co-operative would lead to their overall control over 
the affairs of their organisation. This would then ensure that they are able to 
set its goals and determine the direction of its operations in order that the 
prime objective of co-operatives, namely, the promotion of their members' 
interests is realised. 3 
In development theory and practice, a number of roles were therefore assigned 
to co-operatives. Co-operatives were to offer the institutional framework 
through which local communities could gain control of the institutional and 
productive activities from which they derive their livelihood. In a wider political 
I sense, co-operatives were to promote self-reliance and self-help among the 
local population. They also were to become the means through which the 
resources of local artisans, traders and craftsmen could be mobilised for 
development. Furthermore, through co-operative action, local entrepreneurs 
were to acquire new technology for joint production workshops. 
2 The concepts self-help and self-management are quite synonyrnous. For instance in the studies in 
organization democracy, self-managlernent is conceived of as the management of organization by the 
elected representatives of the total work force themselves. Also in tile literature of development studies, 
the concept self-management has been associated with self help organizations. For instance, Bodenstedt 
explains that "self-help" occurs where people take initiative to organize themselves to deal with their own 
problems. In this sense, the influence of a higher authority outside the organization is non existent. A. A. 
Bodenstedt, Self-help: Reflections on the Strategic Utility of an Organized form of Joint Social Action for 
Development, in: A. A. Bodenstedt (ed. ) Self-help: Instrument or Objective in Rural Development, 
Saarbrucken, 1975. M. Rosner, Democracy, Equality and Change, Tile Kibbutz and Social Theory, r, 
Norway Derby Editions, Pennsylvania, ! 983. E. Dulfer, 
3 R. Henzier, Betriebswirtschaftliche problem des Genossenschaftswesens, Wiesbaden, 1962. 
4 Such ideas have come from the various development strategies proposed in the 1970's by development 
theorists. These theorists called for "popular participation' in development as a rneans to redress the 
increasing marginalisation of the larger section of tile society in the developing process in developing 
2 
Since the introduction of co-operatives to the developing countries, a number of 
social scientists have shown considerable interest in their activities. 
In particular, sociologists and anthropologists have concerned themselves with 
self-management in co-operatives. Their concern with self-management stems 
from the reports of low member participation and control in the activities of co- 
operatives in developing countries. 
For most sociologists and social anthropologists, there has been a general 
belief that the problem of low member participation and control in co-operatives 
stems from the difficulties in implementing the egalitarian ideals and democratic 
principles of co-operatives. It has been asserted that the ideas and concepts 
of co-operatives reflect certain Western European values and ideological beliefs 
which are incompatible with the social norms and value systems of existing 
5 
social structures in developing countries. 
For instance, sociological and anthropological studies have led to the 
identification of a number of conflicts between traditional social system and the 
co-operative democratic principle of "one person, one vote". Dore has pointed 
countries. As a development strategy popular participation calls for self reliance through tile use of 
existing resources in developing countries, especially tile use of human resources through their 'physical 
and intellectual efforts'. Co-operative organizations and other related self-help and participatory 
organizations have been proposed as a means for the institutionalization of popular participation. For 
detail literature on these studies see for instance, D. I-lap1good, The Role of Popular Participation in 
Development, Report of a Conference on the implementation of Title X of the Foreign Assistance Act, 
Cambridge, MIT Press, 1969. A. Pearse and M. Stiefel, Inquiry into Popular Participation, A Research 
Approach, U. N. R. I. S. D. 79/c, Geneva, 1974. United Nations Organizations (UNO), Popular Participation 
as Strategy for promoting community level action and national development, UN Publications No. 
13.8i. W. 2 1975 
5A. C. Felder, Adapting Co-operatives to underdeveloped areas, in K. R. Anschel , R. 1-1. Braiinon and 
E. 
D. Smith (eds. ) , Agricultural Co-operatives and Markets in Developing Countries, London, 1969. 
3 
out that the dominance of traditional leaders in the social affairs of their 
6 communities has been transferred to the management of co-operatives. He 
contends that this has caused the inability of co-operative members to exercise 
their individual rights during decision making owing to the fear of contradicting 
the opinions of their traditional leaders. This in turn has reinforced the 
domination of local elite in the affairs of co-operatives. 
In addition, Munkner has argued that participation in a co-operative demands a 
number of responses from individual members, such as solidarity in the group 
and loyalty to the co-operatives. 7 Individual members are also expected to 
abide by the obligations and role prescriptions of the co-operatives. He has 
noted that since the individual members are also members of several 
traditional organisations, their traditional allegiances to those other 
organisations will prevent them from conforming to the co-operative rules and 
principles. 
Though the sociological and anthropological studies provide important 
contributions to the understanding of the problems of member participation and 
control in co-operatives, they both fail to deal with the co-operative 
organisations themselves. The sociological and anthropological studies provide 
important information on social factors as member loyalty and the differences 
between co-operatives and existing social structures in developing countries. 
However, there has been no attempt by these studies to investigate the 
6 R. Dore, Modern co-operatives in traditional communities, in P, Worsely (ed. ) Two Blades of Grass, 
Manchester University Press, 1971 
7 H-H. Munkner, (ed. ) Credit Union in Africa, Mainz, 1976. 
4 
influence of the internal organisation factors of co-operatives on self- 
management. 
The failure to take into account the internal organisational factors and their 
relevance to self-management in co-operatives can be traced to the perception 
of co-operatives adopted by most sociologists and anthropologists. Their 
perception of co-operatives has been based on the ideal classical co-operative 
model as transferred from Western Europe to the developing countries. The 
classical co-operative model provided a blueprint for establishing co-operative 
organisations. It considered the principles and ideals of co-operatives as the 
means by which member participation and control in co-operatives could be 
achieved. 8 
Certainly, the principles and ideals of co-operatives are important for member 
participation and control in co-operatives. However, we are arguing that in order 
to obtain an adequate understanding of the problems of member participation 
and control in co-operatives in developing countries, we need to go beyond the 
narrow conceptualisation of co-operatives in terms of the classical model. 
Participation in decision making in co-operatives, as we pointed out earlier, 
should lead to members' control over the affairs of the co-operatives. 
According to Dachler and Wilpert, participation is "a central concept of 
gThe ideal classical model of co-operatives originates frorn the Indian co-operative model. This model 
was designed as an instrument to help eliminate poverty in India in the 1920's. The model was based on 
the Western European co-operative organizational model from Raiffeisen and Rochdale Pioneers in 
Germany and Great Britain, respectively. For a thorough discussion of the ideal classical model of co- 
operatives and its problems in Ghana see H-H. Munkner, Die Organization der eingetragene 
Genossenschaft in den zum englischen Rectkreis gehorenden Landern Schwarzafrikas, Dargestellt am 
Beispiel Ghanas, Marburg\Lahn, 1971 
S 
organising" and is related to other organisation attributes as division of labour 
and responsibility, hierarchy of authority and the rational co-ordination of 
activities for some common goals in organisations. 9 In addition, they have 
pointed out that these can bring about differences in participatory schemes in 
organisations. The scheme of participation involves the structures and 
processes along which participation takes place in organisation. This suggests 
that self-management in a co-operative cannot be attributed to the ideals and 
principle of co-operatives alone. 
Any study of member participation and control in co-operatives should, 
therefore, take into account the properties of the scheme of participation in 
different co-operatives. It should be expected that the different social problems 
that co-operatives are designed to solve, and the various economic ventures 
they undertake will necessitate the adoption of different participatory schemes 
in co-operatives. Hence, a study of the participatory schemes in co-operatives 
should provide a better understanding of problems of members participation 
and control in co-operative problems in developing countries. 
Already, a number of co-operative theorists have given thought to these 
considerations. For example, Larson has pointed out that: 
By definition, co-operatives regardless of location adhere to similar principles, ... because of 
differing physical, political, social, and environmental restraints, co-operatives must be 
9 H. P. Dachler and B. Wilpert, Conceptual Dimensions and Boundaries of Participation in Organizations: 
A critical evaluation, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 23,1978. 
6 
organised with particular structure resources, operational techniques best suited to reaching 
their objects. 'o 
Anschel has also provided a similar argument by suggesting that 
"The practical application of principles of co-operation is not a matter of transfer of co-operative 
forms, but a systematic interrogation to identify which forms are appropriate to suit particular 
situation. "" 
1.2 The Problem of the Research and its Significance 
The discussions above suggest that for a better understanding of the problems 
of member participation and control in co-operatives, there is the need to study 
also the participatory schemes of the co-operatives. The assumption here is 
that the degree of member participation and control in co-operatives will depend 
not only on the application of the principles and ideals of co-operatives but also 
nature of its scheme of participation in co-operatives. This means that we 
should have to go beyond co-operative organisational blueprint suggested by 
the ideal classical model of co-operatives and search for possible variations in 
their participatory schemes in co-operatives. 
The aim of this research, therefore, is to conduct a comparative study of the 
different participatory schemes in industrial co-operatives in Ghana. 
Specifically, the objectives of this research are as to: 
1. Identify the types of industrial co-operatives in Ghana. 
10 Ian W. Larson, Co-operative theory and implications: A selected review, in: K. R. Anschel et al, op. cit. 
I K. R. Anschel, Universality of Co-operation, in K. R. Anschel et al., op. cit. 
7 
2. Investigate the degree of member participation in decision making 
within the co-operatives. Since in a co-operative, member participation 
in decision making is expected to lead to control over the affairs of the 
co-operative, our interest-will also be focused on the amount of control 
exercised by decision making bodies in the co-operatives. 
3. Identify the properties of the participatory schemes in the 
co-operatives. That is, the structures and processes along which 
participation takes place in co-operatives. Furhtermore, we shall 
determine how the participatory schemes influence member participation 
and control in the co-operatives. 
4. Investigate the organisation conditions in which the co-operatives 
operate and how these conditions influence their schemes of 
participation. 
In particular, we are interested in the extent to which the co-operatives 
structurally reflect socio-cultural and institutional elements in their 
environments in Ghana. 
5. Identify the patterns of organisational development in the co-operatives. 
Our interest here will be to assess the implications of the patterns of 
organisational development on self-management in the different types 
of co-operatives. 
Significance of the Study 
This research provides the opportunity to examine the participatory schemes in 
industrial producer and service co-operatives in Ghana. The research also 
8 
seeks to develop new theoretical perspectives and methodology in the study of 
co-operatives in developing society. As we argued earlier, sociological and 
anthropological studies on co-operatives have only concerned themselves with 
examining those socio-economic factors that are directly or indirectly related to 
co-operatives. The internal organisational factors of co-operatives have seldom 
been the focus of such studies. This has contributed to a lack of information on 
how different participatory schemes in co-operatives affect member 
participation and control in co-operatives. 
Furthermore, our objective to focus our attention on industrial producer and 
service co-operatives offers a unique opportunity to provide new information on 
co-operative, activity outside the agricultural sector. Present knowledge of co- 
operatives in developing countries has come mainly from studies of 
agricultural co-operatives. This has led to the development of theories which 
only seek to explain problems of co-operatives in the agricultural sector. Our 
research interest should, therefore, provide information on the development of 
co-operative in the industrial sectors. 
1.3 Research Approaches 
The objectives of this research study suggest a comparative study of the 
schemes of participation in industrial co-operatives in Ghana. In order to 
conduct an empirical study into the research objectives, it is first essential that 
we develop a conceptual scheme for the study. Co-operatives differ in a 
number of ways and if we are to organise information about them, we need 
9 
some framework to do that meaningfully. Hence, the conceptual scheme 
should provide the basis for a common standard or measures for comparison. 
Furthermore, the scheme should lead us to establish a framework of significant 
variables and their relationships-. For instance, Berry has pointed out that: 
to compare two phenomena, they must share some features in common, and to compare them 
to some advantage, they should usually differ on some feature. That is, it must be possible to 
place two phenomena on a single dimension in order to judge them validly in relation to each 
other, and for comparative judgement to be of value, they should not be identical in all respects. 
12 
1.31 Theoretical Models of Co-operatives 
Though the study of co-operative organisations has gained widespread 
research interest in both developing and industrialised countries, there is still a 
conspicuous absence of a common framework from which one can conduct a 
comparative study Existing literature on co-operatives has led to different 
models of co-operatives. Two major theoretical postulations have emerged in 
such studies: they are the theoretical models of the worker co-operatives and 
the service co-operatives. 13 
The service co-operatives are described as co-operatives aiding independent 
craftsmen with services. This means that the activities of service co-operatives 
12 1. W. Berry, Introduction to Methodolog . In: H. C. Triandis & J. W. Berry, (eds. ) Handbook of r'y 
Cross-Cultural Psychology, Vol. 2: Methodology, Boston, 1980. 
13 Literature provides various class ifications of forms of co-operatives. These classifications are normally 
based on the extent to which ownership of assets, production and marketing activities are organised 
collectively or individually. We have followed Dulfer's approach in classifying co-operatives in two 
basic types, the classical worker or production co-operatives and the service co-operatives. For more 
information on this issue. See for instance, E. Dulfer, Operational Efficiency of Agricultural Co- 
operatives, FAO, Rome, 1974., F. C. I lelrn, Economics of Co-operation, London, 1968. 
10 
are restricted to market oriented functions such as marketing members' 
products, the supply of raw materials, and the provision of credit facilities and 
managerial services. In this spnse, the service co-operative enterprise is seen 
as an organisation, separate from the autonomous enterprises of its members. 
The prime objective of the service co-operatives is the promotion of members' 
enterprises. Hence, individual members are considered as patrons of the co- 
operatives. 
14 
In studying such co-operatives, co-operative theory has merely described them 
as an "association of fellow workers who provide initial risk capital 
themselves". 15 This description gives no recognition to the co-operative, 
enterprise as an agent for the marketing and supply of raw materials to 
members. In addition, it disregards the existence of any decision making 
structure in the co-operatives. Co-operatives are narrowly conceived as an 
aggregate of economic units of members who contribute resources for their 
operations. These co-operatives are again described as "non acquisitive" 
organisations. According to Emalianoff the service co-operatives are "non 
acquisitive" organisations, because their objective is to provide service at cost 
to their members and they do not seek profit for its own sake. He argues that 
profits are rewards for the efforts of entrepreneurs. 16 
14 R. Hcnzler op. cit. 
151van V. Emalianoff, Economic Theory of Co-operation, Washin( gton, D. C. 1942. See also Frank 
Robotka, A Theory of Co-operation, Journal of Farm Economics, Vol. XXIX, No. 1 Feb., 1947, E. Dulfer, 
Betriebswirtscafslehre der Co-operative, Gotting 
., en, 
1984. 
16 Ivan V. Emalianoff op. cit. 
A distinguishing feature of the worker co-operative is that individual members 
are themselves workers and managers of their co-operatives. This comes from 
the fact that members of the co-operatives are both the contributors of 
resources (capital) and labour to the production workshop in which they work. 
Hence, in contrast to the service co-operatives, there exists no autonomous 
individual member enterprise, but a production workshop which is jointly owned 
by the members. 17 
At the theoretical level, Vanek's economic model of labour-managed firm has 
provided the conceptual tool for their study. 18 The labour-managed model 
considers co-operatives as similar to the Kibbutz enterprise and the self- 
managed enterprises of the former Yugoslavia Republic. The objective of the 
labour-managed firm is to maximise the income of its workers. Hence, the 
wages of the workers in a worker co-operative are considered as rewards but 
not costs to it. This is in contrast to a traditional capitalist firm which seeks to 
maximise the returns on capital employed. 
We can see that the theoretical conceptions of co-operatives described above 
do not provide a common model for a comparative study of different forms of 
industrial co-operatives. While the worker co-operative is conceived of as a 
labour-managed industrial organisation with a decision making structure, the 
service co-operative has been considered as an association of individual 
17 C. E. Gunn, Worker Self-management the USA, Cornell University Press, 1984 and S. E. Perry and 11. 
C. Davis, The Worker Owned Firm, The Idea and its Conceptual Limits, Economics and Industrial 
Democracy, Vol. 6 p275-297,1985. 
18.1. Vanek, The General Theory of Labour Market Economics, Cornell University Press, New York, 1970 
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members. 19 However, our research objectives require a conceptual scheme 
that will enable us to establish similarities and differences by identifying clusters 
of factors characteristic of different types. of co-operatives. In order to achieve 
this objective it is necessary to develop a common framework for the study of 
the different types of industrial co-operatives. 
1.32 Formal Organizational Theory and Co-operative Organizations 
To find a common ground for the study of the different types of industrial co- 
operatives in Ghana, this research study will orient itself to modern organisation 
theory. With its multi-disciplinary approach, modern organisational theory has 
conceived of organisations as a "collection of interacting and independent 
individuals who work toward common goals and whose relationships are 
determined according to a certain structure v12o Blau has also pointed out that 
organisation theory is "a theory of organisation, whatever its specific nature and 
regardless of how subtle the organisation process it takes into account, has as 
its central aim to establish the constellation of characters that develop 
organisation of various kindS. "21 
In studying organisations, organisation theorists have concerned themselves 
with the individual organisation members, groups and power relations in 
organisations. Attention has also been given to the relationship between 
19See for instance, R. Robotka op. cit. 
20W. J. Duncan, Organizational Behavior, Boston Mass., Houghton Mifll in, 1981. 
21 p. M. Blau, The Comparative Study of Organizations, Industrial and Labour Relations Review, Vol. 18, 
No. 3, p323-38, April 1965. 
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organisational structure, its performance as well as its environment. 22 The 
results of such studies have been used as bases of investigation into a wide 
range of organisations including, industrial and commercial firms, social clubs, 
churches and voluntary organisationS. 23 
Since the 1960's, there has been a special concern by organisation theorists 
with the structure and functioning of formal organisations. In a considerable 
number of studies, they have developed empirically testable hypotheses and 
concepts for the study of organisational structures. This has made it possible to 
develop organisation profiles for a comparative stud Y. 
24 
The importance of this to our study can be best understood from the 
conceptualisation of organisation structure in modern organisation theory. 
According to Selznick, organisation structure is the "institutionalised patterns 
and procedures bringing resources to bear on goal attainment processes and 
,, 25 regulating the commitments of participants to the organisation. Badran has 
also indicated that the importance of structure "lies in the fact that structuring of 
activities of organisation is an institution alisation of the control process in 
organisation" He argues that the function of structure is to "hold together in an 
22 See for instance, R. H. Hall (cd. ), Complex Organ izat ions: History of Management Thought series, 
Aldershot, England. W. W. Cooper, H. J. Leavit and M. W. Shelley, (eds. ), New Perspectives in 
Organizational Research, New York, John Wiley, 1964. Gary G. Hamilton and Nicole W. Biggart, cl-ý 
Market, Culture and Authority, A Comparative Analysis of Management and Organization in the Far 
East, American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 94, Supplement, 1988. 
23 D. S. Pugh and C. R. Hinnings (eds. ), Organization Structure: Extensions and Replications, Saxone 
House, Hampshire, 1978. 
24 R. H. Hall, op. cit. 
25 Cited from M. Badran and C. R. Hinnings, Strategies of Administrative Control and Contextual 
Constraints in a lees developed Country: The Case of Eg ptian Public Enterprise, Organizational Studies, I'y 
vol. 1, no. 4,1980. 
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authoritative manner the whole entity of organisation rather than randomness, 
to give it consistency and stability". 26 
The definition of formal organisation structure as given above has primarily 
been associated with the authority structure of bureaucratic organisations. In 
such organisations, the authority structure specifies the functional relationship 
between superiors and subordinates. At the various hierarchical levels of the 
authority are, e. g. managers, supervisors and group leaders. Authority is 
exercised downward through a hierarchy of full-time officials who influence the 
behaviour of lower level participants in the organisation. That is, the direction of 
the initiation of orders is from a higher level to a lower one. 
From the conceptualisation of organizational structure given above, a 
framework from a system's point of view has been developed for the study of 
organizations. This framework, mainly developed by the Aston Group, provides 
a framework of significant variables and their relationshi PS. 27 
According to Pugh, the framework for the study of organisations suggests that 
the pattern of authority relationships in organisations will be related to the 
structuring of activities. The structuring of activities implies the degree to 
28 
which behaviour is overtly defined. This involves the degree of 
specialisation in task allocation, the degree of standardisation of 
26 Ibid. 
27 D. S. Pugh, D. J. Hinnings, C. R. Turner, C. MacDonald, K. M. Lipton and T. Lupton, A Conceptual 
Scheme for organizational analysis, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 8, p289-315,1963 
28D. S. Pugh, D. I Hickson, C. R. Hinings and C. Turner, Dimensions of Organization Structure, 
Administrative Science, Quarterly, V1.13,1968. 
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organisational routines and the degree of formalization (extent to which rules 
in organisations are written down). 29 Pugh has further suggested that the 
study of the structure and actMties of organisational structure must be 
conducted in relationship to its other contextual variables. The contextual 
variables describe the circumstances or conditions under which an 
organisation operates. Research has highlighted a number of crucial 
contextual variables which appear to influence the structure of organisations;. 
These contextual variables include; the characteristics of organisations such 
as technology, origins and history, social functions, and ownership control and 
the socio-economic context in which the organisation operates.. 30 
Our study is based on the paradigm of relationship developed in the Aston 
conceptual scheme. This is because the conceptual scheme provides some 
universalistic propositions on the relationships between the structural and 
contextual variables of organisations. In addition, it provides comparative data 
that can be used to study co-operatives. 
The nature of co-operatives as self-managed organisations will, however, 
necessitate some modifications in the conceptual scheme discussed above. In 
a co-operative, the accountability structure represents the hierarchical structure 
of the co-operative organisation. In this hierarchical structure, the general 
assembly of members has the highest authority. Theoretically, this means that 
authority is exerted from the lower to the higher levels in a co-operative. The 
29 
Ibid. 
30D. S. Pugh, D. J. Hickson, C. R. Hinings, and C. Turner, The Context of Organization Structures, 
Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 14,1969. 
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accountability structure, therefore, presents two forms of participation in 
decision making. The forms of participation can be direct or indirect in a co- 
operative. In the direct participation, there is a personal and immediate 
involvement of members in decision making. Whereas in the indirect form of 
participation, there is a mediated involvement of members through some form 
of representation. That is, the general assembly appoints the management 
committees as the elected officers of the co-operatives. 31 
The exercise of the will of members in co-operatives can also be done through 
an administrative body of full time officials. The administrative component is 
the hierarchical structure of full time officials for the implementation of the 
policies of the co-operatives. According to Champion, the administrative 
component is "that part of an organisation charged with co-ordinating , 
Pv32 facilitating and supporting the activities of the rest of the organisation. He 
points out further that it consists of " all administrative, clerical, technical, 
professional and kindred employees of the association" referred to as "staff' . 
33 
The discussions above provide us with two components of the organisational 
structure of co-operatives. These components are the accountability structure 
and the administrative components. The accountability structure, as we pointed 
out earlier, provides the structures along which participation in decision making 
takes place in the co-operative. The accountability structure also provides the 
basis for distinguishing co-operatives as self-managed organisations from other 
3 'See D. C. Jones and Jan Svejnar (ed. ), Participatory and Self-managed firms, Toronto, 1982. 
32 Dean Champion, The Sociology of Organizations, McGraw Hill, London, 1975. 
33 Ibid. 
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organisations. The accountability structure, therefore, serves us as a general 
model for the study of the participatory schemes in the different types of co- 
operatives in this study. The administrative component, on the other hand, 
exists for the implementation of the policies of a co-operative. 
Though the accountability structure serves as a common basis for a 
comparative study of participatory schemes in co-operatives, it does not mean 
that all co-operatives would have similar accountability structures. Certainly, the 
wide variety of co-operatives, their various tasks and the different socio- 
economic context in which they operate would lead to differences in their 
accountability structures. 
A survey of the literature on co-operative management for the major sources of 
differences in the accountability structure in co-operative suggests the 
following dimensions along which accountability structures can differ: 34 
The substitution of direct participation in decision-making with indirect forms of 
participation can lead to the establishment of representative bodies. This will 
bring about the division of labour among members and consequently role 
specialisation in the different roles in the co-operatives. 
The introduction of indirect form of participation can further affect access to 
decision making by individual members or groups. Consequently, the amount 
34 For details on structural factors in co-operatives see, E. Dulfer, Betriebswirtscliaftsiclire der. op. cit.. For 
other related self -managed organizations see for instance, M. Rosner op. cit.. and also H. 111. Dachler and 
B. Wilpert, op. cit. 
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of control individual members or groups will have over the affairs of the co- 
operatives will differ. 
Even if all members had equal access to decision making, the application of 
different decision making rules can influence the degree of member 
participation and exercise of control in the co-operatives. For instance, in co- 
operatives, it is expected that the application of co-operative principles would 
provide the basis of democratic management. However, the adoption of other 
decision making rules to regulate the activities of co-operatives may create 
other sources of influence in the co-operatives. Co-operatives also differ in a 
number of ways, for instance, they differ in their use of technology, the degree 
of co-operation in the use of economic resources and their social functions. 
Furthermore, the relation of members to their co-operatives will differ according 
to the type of co-operatives. We pointed out earlier in this chapter that 
members in a worker co-operative are fully integrated in their co-operative 
whereas in a service co-operative members own their individual enterprises. 
This means that a combination of the different, physical and socio-economic 
factors would lead to major differences in the way each co-operative is 
organised. 
We have up to this point illustrated the bases for a comparative study of co- 
operatives. This was based on our reliance on modern organisation theory. 
This provides the basis for establishing the commonalties and possible sources 
of differences in the participatory schemes in co-operative organisations. 
19 
Attempts at the development of a common framework for the study of different 
types of co-operatives have come from few quarters. In recent times, some co- 
operative theorists have conceived of co-operatives as a distinct form of 
35 business co-operation based on self-help and self-ad ministration . 
Bergman, 
for instance, has defined co-operatives as "an institutionalised collaboration of 
members with equal right in co-operative forms of enterprise. vj36 He points out 
that his aim is not to consider the service co-operatives and the worker co- 
operatives as an antithesis, but "to establish a continuum of main forms, which 
coexist synchronically and list. them according to their degree of integration". 37 
In this sense, various types of co-operatives are considered as steps of 
progressing integration. At the one end is the service co-operatives and at the 
other end is the fully integrated co-operatives. 
Dulfer has also provided a model of co-operatives which seeks to identify 
common features shared by all co-operatives, irrespective of the type or form of 
organisation. In his model, he specifies the following characteristics of co- 
operative organisations: 38 
a. Individual members as a group, 
b. The membership group bound together by a common interest, 
C. The co-operative enterprise, set up by the collective resources of 
the members, and 
35 This follows attempts to consider co-operatives as a business undertaking and apply modern 
management theories to their study. For details of such studies see for instance, G. Draheim, Zur 
Okonomisierung der Genossenschaften, Gesammelte Beitrage zur Gennossenchaftstheorie und 
Gennossenchaftspolitik, Gottingen, 1967, P. G. Helinberger and S. Hoos, Co-operative Enterprise and 
Organization Theory, Journal of Farm Economics, Vol. VXLIV No. 2 May 1962, 
36 T. Bergman, K. Bartolke and L. Ludwig, Integrated Co-operatives in Industrial Society, The Example 
of Kibbutz, Van Goran, Assen, Netherlands, 1980 
37 T. Bergman et al, op. cit. 
38E. Dulfer, Betriebswirtschaftlehre der-op. cit. 
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d. The task of the enterprise is to provide service to the 
co-operative members. 
According to Dulfer, these make up the basic structure of a co-operative. He 
has explained that there exists an identifiable or unique structure and 
membership group which together form the co-operative organisation. 
Though the examples from Dulfer and Bergman make efforts to provide a basic 
scheme for the study of co-operatives, they do not go far enough to produce 
the basic dimensions upon which a systematic study can be done. Bergman, 
for instance produces a broad conceptual isation of co-operatives, but does not 
give any directions for its study. Dulfer, in his work does go farther by applying 
organisational theoretical models, but limits them to only the service co- 
operatives. 
The efficacy of our approach, that is, our use of modern organisation theory to 
develop a conceptual scheme, can be seen in its ability to help us identify the 
structural factors of the scheme of participation in co-operative organisations. It 
also recognises the influence of contextual variables on the co-operatives. 
Although research studies by organisation theorists tend to produce conflicting 
findings, they have produced directions of relationships between structural and 
contextual variables of organisation to help in any meaningful analysis. 
Moreover, they have developed measures to guide us in the collection of 
information on the structural and contextual variables. 39 
"' See for instance, W. W. Cooper et at. op. cit.. D. S Pugh and C. R. Hinnings, op. cit. and also R. H. Z> Zý 
Hall 
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This is in contrast to the sociological and anthropological approaches to the 
study of co-operatives mentioned earlier. As we pointed out, these have failed 
to consider the influence of the internal organisational factors of co-operatives 
on member participation in decision making within co-operative organisations. 
The sociological and anthropological studies have rather concerned themselves 
with environmental factors which are only tangential to the structure and 
functioning of the co-operatives. In addition, they have adopted a narrower 
perspective of the organisation of co-operatives. This perspective has 
considered the ideal classical model as a blueprint for the establishment of co- 
operatives. The sociological and anthropological studies have not sought to 
consider possible variations in the participatory schemes of co-operatives and 
how this can determine the degree of member participation in decision making 
in co-operatives. 
Notwithstanding the advantages of our approach, we should also exercise 
some caution in its use in the study of co-operatives in developing countries. 
We have to point out that the organisational framework offers only general 
theoretical framework for the study. However, we would still have to rely on 
the different co-operative theories to explain individual cases. This is essential, 
because empirical evidence suggests that different types of co-operatives tend 
to experience distinct organisational problems. For instance, relationship 
between members of a worker co-operative and the co-operative enterprise is 
22 
different from that of members of a service co-operative and their co-operative 
enterprise. While the members of workers co-operatives are fully integrated 
into their co-operative organisation, members of the service co-operatives are 
quite independent from their organisation. That is, they own their individual 
enterprises and the co-operative only provides auxiliary services to them. 
Hence, it should be expected that structural differences in the participatory 
schemes would havp different consequences for member participation and 
control in the two types of co-operative. Below we have given an outline of the 
major hypotheses of the research and the conceptual scheme for the study. 
1.33 Major Hypothesis of the Research 
The major objectives of this research include an investigation into member 
participation in decision making and control over the affairs of the co-operatives 
and the extent to which the participatory schemes in the co-operatives affects 
member participation and control. It is also our objective to examine the 
influence of the organisational conditions under which the co-operatives 
operate on the participatory schemes in the co-operative. In order to 
investigate these objectives, we shall test some empirically accepted 
hypotheses in organisation theory. Our intention of doing this is to obtain 
external validity for the study. Hence, the study should be seen as an attempt 
to extend the feasibility of formal organisation theory in the study of co- 
operative organisations in developing countries. 
The following hypotheses are proposed for the study: 
23 
1. The maintenance of the character of co-operatives as a self-managed 
organisation will be associated with the degree of member participation 
in decision making and control over its affairs. This will be enabled by 
principles and ideals of co-operatives and participatory schemes in the 
co-operatives. 
2. Although co-operatives follow similar principles and ideals, their 
participatory schemes will vary in terms of the structuring of activities 
in the individual co-operatives. Such variations will occur along the 
following dimensions; 
a. forms of representation; direct or indirect participation in decision 
making 
b. division of labour and role specialisation in the co-operatives 
C. kind of decision-making rules used to regulate activities in the 
co-operative. 
3. Since co-operatives operate in different circumstances and undertake 
different activities, it is hypothesised that their given objectives as well 
as technological and socio-economic factors will determine the way 
activities are structured in the co-operatives. 
4. Hypotheses (2) and (3) suggest a range of factors that are directly or 
indirectly related to participation and control in co-operatives. It is 
therefore, expected that a certain pattern or clusters of variables, both 
structural and contextual, would tend to be associated with certain types 
of co-operatives and their participatory schemes. 
Below is the conceptual framework underlying our hypotheses. This is 
illustrated in figure 1 
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Altogether, four classes of variables can be identified from the model: they 
include the contextual variables describing the organisational conditions and 
the societal environment in which the co-operatives operate, the properties of 
participatory schemes in the co-operatives, and the degree of member 
participation in decision making and control in the co-operatives. 
The contextual variables describe organisational conditions in the co- 
operatives. The contextual variables act as extraneous variables which must 
be controlled before it would be possible to identify the differences and 
similarities between the participatory schemes of the co-operatives. 
The properties of the scheme of participation are the attributes of the 
accountability structures. The accountability structure provides access to 
members of a co-operative to participate in decision making within the co- 
operative. Hence, they provide the dimensions along which participation and 
control in a co-operatives may vary. The accountability structure can, therefore, 
be considered as a dependent variable in relation to the contextual variables 
and as an independent variable in relation to the degree of participation and 
control in co-operatives. 
Self-management is considered as the result of member participation in 
decision making and control over the affairs of co-operatives. This variable also 
indicates the distribution of controi between various decision-making bodies in 
co-operatives. It is, therefore, considered as the major dependent variable in 
the study. 
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The external environment of the co-operatives involves those socio-cultural and 
institutional elements which influence the structuring of activities and decision 
making in the co-operatives. Appendix 1 provides a summary of the variables 
and their measures used in the study. 
1.34 The Comparative Method 
The objectives of this study stress the need for a comparative study of co- 
operatives. The comparative method has been adopted not only to test our 
hypothesis, but also to provide a basis for indicating the conditions determining 
the differences or similarities in the participatory schemes in co-operatives. 
According to Kast and Rosenzweig, the comparative method deals with the 
evaluation of variations in organisation design, management practices, 
employee attitudes and behaviour in different organisations. They contend that 
it is "a shift from concentrating on unique organisations toward seeking 
generalisations about patterns of relationship in a variety of setting S,,. 40 
Blau has also pointed out that the comparative method involves "a systematic 
comparison of a fairly large number of organisations in order to establish 
41 
relationships between their characteristics". He has further indicated that 
theoretical significance of the method is "not only to test hypothesis implied by 
such theory, but also to provide an initial exploration and refinement of the 
40 
F. E. Kast and I E. RosenzweiCg', Organization and Management, A Systems and Contingency 
Approach, New York, 1985. 
41 P. M. Blau op. cit. 
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theory by indicating the conditions under which relationships, originally 
assumed to hold universally, are contingent. " These are achieved by the use of 
42 
systems approach and contingency views of organisations . 
The theoretical importance of the comparative method to this research lies in 
our objective to investigate the conditions that generate different participatory 
schemes in co-operatives. It also comes from our aim to bring new explanations 
of the behaviour of co-operative organisations within the socio-economic setting 
in which they operate in Ghana. 
There have been a considerable number of studies adopting the comparative 
method. For instance, there has been a systematic attempt to use the 
comparative method as a basis for refining Weber's theory of bureaucraCy. 43 
Research has sought to refine this theory by indicating conditions under which 
the concurrence of the various bureaucratic characteristics are contingent to 
44 
clarify variations in organisation structures . 
Woodward also carried out research to find out the relationship between the 
complexity of technology and organisation structure. By grouping organisations 
on the basis of their production technologies, she was able to establish the 
42 According to Kast and Rosenzweig, the systems approach provides a framework for comparative 
analysis by suggesting the key variables for consideration. Contingency views are based on the systems 
concept. it lays emphasis on specific characteristics of organizations and patterns of interrelationships 
among subsystems. F. E. Kast and J. E. Rosenzweig, op. cit. 
43 This was his general theory of types of political order and authority in which he provided prescriptions 
of possible modes of action and the ideal type organization. See Max Weber, Theory of Social and 
Economic Organization, New York, Free Press, 1947. 
44 P. M. Blau op. cit. See also J. T. Tobby, (ed. ), An Introduction to Social Research, New York, 1967. 
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relationship between technology and structural factors as the span of control in 
organisation. 
45 
Pugh and associates also studied the activities of work organisations in relation 
to their structural characteristics and the social context in which they operate. A 
comparative factorial approach was adopted to establish the effects of various 
46 
patterns of interrelationships among different organisational variables . 
In our study, co-operatives will be compared with respect to the degree of 
member participation and control over their activities, their participatory 
schemes and the organisational conditions within which they operate. That is, 
the co-operatives will be compared on factors we believe to lead to different 
degrees of participation and control. It is expected that co-operatives in which 
members have similar degrees of participation and control will also exhibit 
similar structural properties in their participatory schemes. That is, such co- 
operatives are expected to have similar structural attributes. The knowledge of 
these structural properties will be based on our theoretical understanding of the 
factors discussed in our theoretical framework above. This should help us 
determine impact of the participatory schemes in co-operatives on member 
participation and control. 
45 See D. S. Pugh et al A Conceptual Scheme ... op. cit. 46 See Pugh et al., The Context of .. op. cit. tý 
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The approach discussed above will involve the construction of co-operative 
types of participatory schemes. There will not be an a priori classification of the 
co-operatives in construction of the typologies. The classification will be 
derived from empirical data. 47 
In spite of the apparent usefulness of the comparative method, it has 
encountered some criticisms in the literature. Much concern has been 
expressed over its ability to control threats to the internal validity of research 
studies. Internal validity is a problem, because the comparison of different 
groups in comparative studies is based on the theoretical knowledge of factors 
that are assumed to lead to certain outcomes . 
48 Critics of the method have 
pointed out that incomplete knowledge of the factors describing the 
organisation conditions and the different environments in which organisations 
operate means that the results of a comparative study cannot be attributed to 
only those variables identified in the study. 
Another source of threat to internal validity comes from the fact that groups 
selected for comparative studies tend to be non-randomised. Because 
selection is not randomized, there is the possibility that results of the study can 
be attributed to other characteristics of the particular grou P. 49 
47 See J. R. Tobby op. cit. 
48S 
. E. 
Seashore, E. E. Lawler, (eds. ) Assessing Organizational Change, A guide to methods, measures 
and practices, New York, 1980. 
49 In random assignments individual population elements are identified and are randomly assigned. The 
method ensures that the groups are equivalent on average with respect to all characteristics observed and 
unobserved. For further discussions on this issue see, for example, J. B. Grossman, Evaluating Social 
Policies: Principles and US Experiences, The World Bank Research Observer, Vol. 9, No. 2 (July 1994) 
p159-180, J. Newman, L. Rawlings and P. Getter, Using Randomized Control Designs in Evaluating 
Social Sector Programmes in Developing Countries, The World Bank Research Observer, op. cit. C, 
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Seashore has, however, pointed out that these problems can be confronted to 
some extent if it can be demonstrated that the groups are comparable in 
several areaS. 50 According to him, this can be done by using a broad range of 
measurement packages and analytic techniques. In fact, our attempt to 
achieve the external validity of the study by investigating empirically tested 
hypotheses indirectly contributes to the improvement of internal validity for the 
study. This is because, those hypotheses not only inform us of the major 
variables and the theoretical relationships between them, but also provide 
empirical evidence of their impact on organisational behaviour. 
The comparative method has further implications on the nature of data to be 
used. In comparative research, data is restricted to records of activities in 
organisations. The collection of data also involves interviews with key 
informants without any intensive investigation of internal social processes in 
organisations as in a case study. In this sense, comparative research sacrifices 
depth of information to acquire sufficient breadth. This may set limitations on 
validity of our study but then it allows us to focus on other contingent factors. 
In the discussions above, we referred only to threats of extraneous variables to 
the validity of the research findings, however, another set of disturbing factors 
should to be taken into account. This refers to measurement errors resulting 
from variations in responses to questionnaire items.. These can undermine the 
reliability of measures developed for the study; that is, the accuracy of the test 
50S. E. Seashore and E. E. Lawler, op. cit. 
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scores. Such errors can only be reduced by increasing the reliability of our 
measurement instruments so that the scores obtained during field work do not 
fluctuate randomly. 
1.35 Types of Analysis 
The method of investigation outlined above illustrates how the hypothesised 
relationship between the various variables can be analysed in this research 
study. The major aim of our research methodology, as outlined above, involves 
the test of various hypotheses as a means of finding answers to our research 
questions. To understand how the co-operatives differ among thernselves, the 
units of analysis will be at the organisational level. The reason for analysing the 
data at the organisational level comes from our intention to study how structural 
elements in the co-operative affect membership participation and control. We 
shall therefore distinguish between the different decision making bodies in a co- 
operative, namely, management committees membership group and external 
interest groups. Data will be aggregated to determine the patterned distribution 
of control among decisions making bodies in the co-operatives. At the 
organisational, level we shall distinguish between global variables and 
aggregated variables. The global variables are variables of the organisation, 
for example, size of the organisation, which are independent of individual or 
group behaviour. The aggregated scores are scores of member participation 
and control. They will be based on group means and will be used to determine 
total amount of control in a co-operative. 
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Cross tabulations will be used to elaborate the relationships between specific 
variables. This is a mechanism for matching groups and will involve the 
division of the our sample into sub-groups, e. g. according to patterns of control. 
Cross tabulation can be expanded to allow the elaboration of relationships 
between the variables. The objective is to examine variables that might interfere 
with the results of our analysis. The procedure also involves the division of the 
sample into sub-groups according to categories of the controlled variable. 
1.4 The Survey Design 
The population for the study includes all the industrial producer and service co- 
operatives operating in the Greater Accra Region of Ghana. As we indicated 
earlier on, this involves co-operatives operating outside the agriculture sector. 
The Greater Accra Region has a population of approximately 1,400,000 which 
is 11.6% of the total population of Ghana. The region consists of the city of 
Accra, the Tema township and three rural districts. The rural districts have a 
total population of 234,612, which is 16% of the total population of the Greater 
Accra Region. The two towns together have a population of 1,854,454, about 
83.5% of the population of the region. 
The region also offers a vast contrast in its ethnic composition and in the level 
of economic development. There is the city of Accra, the capital of Ghana, with 
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a cosmopolitan characteristic and a higher level of development. In contrast, is 
the rather homogeneous ethnic character of the outlying rural districts. 
1.41 The Sample 
The sample of co-operatives was derived from a list of co-operatives operating 
in the Greater Accra Area. This list was obtained from the Department of Co- 
operatives in Accra.. Out of the total number 87 of co-operatives, 31 were 
selected for the study. This accounted for 36% of the total population of 
industrial producers and service co-operatives in the Greater Accra Region. 
The sample of 31 co-operatives included co-operatives operating in 9 different 
economic sectors. These co-operatives are: gin distillers (10), taxi drivers (10), 
salt winners (1), tie and dye (1), block makers (2), rattan weavers (1), herbalists 
(1), grain millers (2), and electrical workers (3). The numbers in the brackets 
represent the total number of co-operatives in the sample. (Appendix 2 
provides information on the total number of co-operatives in our sample). 
Two approaches were adopted for the selection of the sample for the study. 
For the taxi co-operatives and the distilleries, a random selection of ten co- 
operatives was made from each group. From the remaining co-operatives, our 
only choice was to select the total number of co-operatives available in their 
respective industrial field. In the case of salt co-operatives, the local union was 
selected in place of the primary co-operatives, because all decision making and 
activities of the co-operatives took place at the secondary level. The five 
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photographers' co-operatives shown in the list of co-operatives were left out 
because they had virtually become private enterprises. They had lost their 
committees and therefore would not have been able to provide any 
respondents. 
1.42 Data CoHection Methods 
The collection of data for the study took place from September 1992 to January 
1993. The following methods were used to collect the data: informant 
interviewing, observation of meetings and review of existing documents. 
1. Informant interviewing 
The major respondents were the management committee of the co-operatives. 
They were asked to answer questions from a standardised questionnaire about 
the characteristics of the co-operatives, properties of the participatory schemes, 
social functions and the relationship of the co-operative with the external world. 
We interviewed only the members of the management committee because 
most of the information sought required precise knowledge of records and 
events which we assumed ordinary members of the co-operatives would have 
no clear idea about. These interviews were conducted at the premises of the 
co-operatives in the presence of all members of the committees of 
management. 
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In addition to the interviews, discussions on individual co-operatives were held 
with Co-operative Officers of the Department of Co-operatives who supervise 
the activities of the co-operatives in their respective districts. Altogether, the 
number of people interviewed were 372. Appendix 3 provides the key 
respondents in the survey. We must express some concern here on the effect 
on the validity of our research results in restricting our respondents to the 
members of the management committees and officers of the department of co- 
operatives. This relates particularly to the measures of control in the co- 
operatives. It might be stated that in collecting information in this way the views 
expressed will be attributed to the management committees only. However, the 
approach we took had sought to ensure the validity of research in the sense 
that it is able to identify possible sources of measurement errors. The 
questionnaire used for the research is provided in Appendix 4. 
2. Official Documents and Reports 
We anticipated that not all information could be collected by informant 
interviewing. Other types of information had to be obtained from documents. 
Such information included: 
a. Information from inspection and audit reports on the activities of the 
co-operatives 
b. Minutes of the meetings of the management committees. In particular, 
we were interested in the types of decisions issues the management 
committees dealt with at such meetings. 
C. Characteristics of the co-operatives, e. g., size, technology, etc. 
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3. Observation of meetings 
The data sources given above have been restricted to records and the 
interviewing of key informants. It was considered essential also to observe the 
way in which participation in. decision making takes place in the co-operatives. 
This was to help us understand the social processes involved in decision 
making within the co-operatives. Hence, we attended three annual general 
meetings of the Gin Distillers co-operatives. These were not randomly 
selected, they were meetings which took place at the time of the survey. 
Outline of the Study 
The rest of the study is conceived in the following parts: CHAPTER TWO 
examines the different types of industrial co-operatives. This is to gain an idea 
of the activities of our sample of co-operatives. In CHAPTER THREE we 
discuss the conceptions of participation in the management literature and 
identify the basic scheme of participation in co-operatives. CHAPTER FOUR 
examines the degree of member participation and control in the co-operatives. 
The participatory schemes in the co-operatives and their influence on member 
participation and control are investigated in CHAPTER FIVE. In CHAPTER SIX 
we examine the organisational conditions of the co-operatives. Especially, this 
chapter examines the extent to which the structural factors in the co-operatives 
reflect the elements Of sOcio-cultural and institutional environment in Ghana. 
CHAPTER SEVEN examines the patterns of organisational development in the 
co-operatives. CHAPTER EIGHT sets out the conclusions of the research. 
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Chapter 2 
THE TYPES OF CO-OPERATIVES 
In order to study self-management in the industrial co-operatives, it is first 
essential that we gain an idea of the nature and types of industrial co-operatives 
in our sample. This chapter, therefore, investigates the origins of industrial co- 
operatives in Ghana, their forms of organisation, their economic activities, their 
markets and the economic sectors in which they operate. 
2.1 origins of Industrial Co-operatives in Ghana 
The first recorded industrial co-operatives in Ghana were the timber production 
co-operatives. The timber production co-operatives were initially organised to 
meet increased overseas demand for timber products after the end of the second 
world war. The members of these co-operatives were not actually the "pit 
sawyers" or the workers themselves, but their supervisors. 
By organising their workers into co-operatives or gangs of workers, it became 
easier for the supervisors to increase their production and manage their 
enterprises. ' It was not until 1959 that these co-operatives were able to extend 
their membership to the workers. Through the initiative of the government of 
Ghana, a number of industrial co-operatives were also established in several 
'Dept. of Co-operatives, History of Co-operatives, 1928-1985. 
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fields of industrial activity in the country. These early forms of industrial co- 
operatives included :2 
1. The Association of Labour Co-operatives (LACO) 
Founded in 1959, this co-operative association was intended to act as an 
investment trust for member co-operative organisations. Hence, its tasks were to 
obtain funds, in particular, from the Trades Union Congress in Ghana and other 
sources and channel them for the development of co-operatives. Its members 
were the main apex organisations of industrial co-operatives in Ghana. 
2. The Industrial Co-operative Society 
The aim of this co-operative society was to establish a series of industrial co- 
operatives in the country. It, therefore, operated a consumer retail shop, motor 
repair workshop, oil processing plant and building projects. 
3. The Diamond Co-operative Winners 
These were established in 1956 to organise diamond winners in the diamond 
mining areas of Ghana. Among its major objectives was to market members' 
diamond winnings at the government diamond markets in Ghana. 
H. H. Munker, Die Organisation der... op. cit. 
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4. Co-operative Investment Trust 
To secure the financial stability of the industrial co-operatives, a co-operate 
Investment Trust was established in 1961. The trust was formed to ensure that 
funds granted by the Government reached needy societies. 
The co-operatives described above were mostly established as national apex 
bodies. Their immediate tasks were to initiate the establishment of pirimary co- 
operative societies. The development of co-operatives has also been associated 
with political developments in Ghana. Four different periods of time in the 
development of co-operatives in Ghana can be identified. 
The first period, 1961-66, marks the era of the first republic. All the co-operatives 
established within those years were considered as part of the political wing of the 
ruling government party. For instance, the government caused the formation of 
several agricultural and industrial co-operatives as part of its development 
programme. After 1966, co-operatives operated mostly in the agricultural sector 
dealing in food production and cocoa marketing. The second period, 1966-1972, 
refers to the second republic in which liberal market policies were experimented 
in Ghana. During this era, co-operatives rarely featured in the government's 
development programmes. The third period was from 1972-1985 and involved 
mostly years of military rule and economic and political instability in Ghana. The 
post 1985 co-operatives emerged in a period of relative political stability and 
Ghana's experimentation with free market policies. In contrast to the previous 
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years, most of the co-operatives established in our sample did not originate from 
explicit government policy but developed out of the initiative of the members 
themselves. 
2.2 The Organization of the Co-operatives 
The principal economic activities of our sample of co-operatives cover industrial 
sectors including, salt winning, gin distilleries, textiles, block makers, rattan 
weavers, taxi drivers, corn millers, herbalists and electrical workers. Below is a 
brief account of how they are organised. 
1. The Salt Winners Co-operatives 
The salt winning co-operatives cover the whole of the villages around the rural 
Songhor lagoon in the Ada district of the Greater Accra region. In an area where 
farming and fishing are the dominant traditional economic activities, salt winning 
offers an extra income for the people during its main season from October to 
February. 
The formation of the salt winners co-operatives was a result of competition and 
conflicts between the villagers and private entrepreneurs. Hence, the formation 
of the co-operatives was not only to organise the salt winners to bring harmony in 
the area, but also to strengthen their competitiveness. Each of the ten villages in 
3 See Dept. of Co-operatives, op cit. 
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the Songhor lagoon has its own co-operative society. , 
The membership of the 
ten co-operatives in the community is mostly drawn from the heads of families in 
the villages. In turn, the ten co-operative societies formed a local union. 
It is essential to note that each co-operative society is an autonomous 
organisation with its own secretary and a management committee. However, 
many managerial functions of the societies are centralised at the local co- 
operative union. This is a development which has perhaps been necessitated by 
the closeness of the villages. The co-operative union is made up of a 
management, committee comprising the president of each of the co-operative 
societies. In reality, it is the co-operative union which collects all the levies, sets 
prices for the salt and negotiates with contract buyers. Furthermore, it co- 
ordinates the whole salt winning operations and represents the industry. The co- 
operative societies are left with the provision of welfare services to the. ir 
respective members. 
The co-operative societies and the co-operative union have been organised for 
the sale of the members' salt. The individual family groups work independently, 
on their own. After winning the salt, the members sell it to itinerant buyers. The 
major duties of the union are to supervise the sale of salt and collect levies from 
the workers. These levies are the major sources of finance for the co-operatives. 
At the end of the financial year, the disposable surplus obtained from the 
economic return are distributed to the individual co-operative societies. 
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2. The Gin Distillers 
The gin distillers co-operatives are the oldest industrial co-operatives in the 
country. They also represent the largest co-operative sector not only in the 
Greater Accra Region, but also in the whole economy of Ghana. From their very 
beginnings, the distilleries co-operatives have maintained a complete monopoly 
in the production and marketing of the Akpeteshie Gin in Ghana. This is due to 
legislation instrument, the Sale of Spirits Act of 1962, which made the 
membership of a distilleries co-operatives in the country a condition for the issue 
of apketeshie gin distillery license to any producer. 4 The main objectives of the 
Act were to ensure that the distillation of the apketeshie gin was carried out under 
hygienic conditions and that the distillers paid duties and taxes to the 
government. 
The present organisation of the gin distilleries co-operatives in the Greater Accra 
region appears to have derived its character from these objectives. The actual 
duties of the societies have involved the inspection of the payment of levies by 
the individual member in their areas of operation. These payments are made 
during the issue of way-bills to the members. The way bills must accompany the 
transportation of every akpeteshie gin distilled in the country. The levies paid by 
the members form the major source of income for the societies. Part of this is 
paid to the regional union and as income tax to the central government. 
Ibid. 
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The gin distillers co-operatives operate in most cases as tax collecting agents. 
There is virtually no functional co-operation between them and the membership 
group. Members actually carry out their gin distilling individually in their family 
enterprises. In many instances, richer members with production facilities allowed 
their fellow members to use their facilities for some fees. Though the distilling of 
the gin occurred within the same workshop, very little co-operation between the 
members was observed.. 
3. The Taxi Drivers Co-operatives 
The taxi drivers co-operatives are the only recent addition to the co-operative 
sector in the country. Although there has already been co-operatives in the 
transport sector, they differed from the taxi drivers co-operatives in that they were 
organised by the transport owners themselves. The taxi drivers co-operatives 
were formed by taxi drivers who were themselves the workers. The idea of these 
co-operatives originated from two sources. The increasing competition in this 
sector had led to demand for more taxi stations or ranks for passengers. The 
organisation of such stations were originally part of the duties of the taxi drivers' 
union, a branch of the national drivers' trades union, the Ghana Private Roads 
Transport Union (GPRTU). The dissatisfaction with their trades union leaders, 
the belief by some drivers in self-management and accountability and the quest 
for more efficient ways of organising these stations had led to the formation of 
these co-operatives in the capital, Accra. 
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The main objective of these co-operatives is, therefore, to acquire more stations 
and to manage them efficiently for their members. The co-operatives also seek 
to bring discipline and order in taxi driving. Furthermore, the society provides 
legal aid for individual drivers involved in traffic offences. 
4. The Grain Millers Co-operatives 
The Grain Millers' co-operatives represent some of the few remaining grain 
milling co-operatives which were established in the nineteen seventies and 
eighties in Ghana. The societies consist of individual grain milling entrepreneurs 
whose main aim is to foster unity between members. In particular, the fixing of 
prices by the society to avoid conflict and competition. In addition, members hope 
that through the society they could have a local representation on matters 
concerning their industry. The sources of finance of the society are the entrance 
fees and monthly levies collected from members. 
5. The Rattan Weavers 
The rattan weavers belong to the tourist industry in Ghana. The winning of more 
customers from abroad for its members, therefore, forms the major objective of 
this co-operative. The formation of this co-operative stems from the need to 
secure a workshop where the products of members could be more accessible to 
their foreign customers. In addition, the society has been used as a means of 
appealing to governmental organisations to offer them a place in local exhibitions. 
The society has managed to bring members to work together in the same 
workshop. However, members work as autonomous work groups, which include 
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apprentices who cannot be members of . the co-operatives until 
they have 
graduated from their apprenticeship. In addition, 'the sale cý the products is done 
by individual members, except for products submitted fo, * exhibitions. Like the 
0 
other co-operatives, its main sources of funds are the rT-. onthly levies paid by 
members. 
6. Electrical Workers Co-operatives 
The electrical workers co-operative are, in the true sense, tie classical Labour co- 
partnership co-operatives, where the aim of members is to sell their labour. The 
origins of these societies come from the retrenchment of technicians from a major 
fishing company in Ghana. The company, while needing the services of these 
technicians in its ships, did not however, want to give thew full time employment. 
Three worker co-operatives, therefore, emerged to take on the contracts from 
the company. The formation of the three worker co-operatives was based on the 
fields of specialisation of the workers, namely; refrigeration, mechanical and 
electronical repairs. The societies which consist of only the former employees of 
this shipping company derive their income solely.. frorn the contracts given to them 
by the company. 
7. The Herbalists Co-operative,., 
Established in 1990, the herbalists co-operative! aimSto transform traditional 
forms of medicine production into a modern scientific production process. By this 
the society not only hopes t6 improve the quality of herba I medicine, but also to 
dispel the mysticism associated with herbal medicine and to improve its image in 
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Ghana. Hence, the society has set up a laboratory to carry out scientific 
experiments to determine the efficacy of herbal medicine. In addition, the society 
has obtained a license to produce herbal medicine and set up a pharmacy. The 
organisation of the society is, therefore, built around the production, marketing 
and the dispensing of medicines to patients. Furthermore, the members have 
acquired a farm on which to grow their herbs collectively. 
8. The Co-operative Block Makers 
The block makers block makers consists of individual block makers whose aim is 
to co-operate in the procurement of the raw materials at lower costs for their 
respective enterprises. In addition, the co-operative acts as an occupational 
association by taking interest in the general welfare of its members. Like the 
members of the Grain milling co-operatives, the members of these co-operatives 
are mainly businessmen or local entrepreneurs. 
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9. Textiles (Tie and Dye) Co-operatives 
The textiles co-operatives share similar objectives and forms of co-operation as 
the Block Makers co-operatives. Consisting of membership of mainly women, the 
society's main concern is the supply of textile materials to its members. The 
society also advises members on issues such as taxation and marketing of the 
products. 
2.3 The Forms of Co-operation 
The form of co-operation is a dominant feature of a co-operative or any joint 
social action. It describes the social range of activities the co-operatives 
undertake on behalf of the members and the degree to which individual members 
are integrated into the co-operatives. The form of co-operation has also 
implications for the choice of organisation form and the management of a co- 
operative. This is because it can determine the intensity of activities within the 
co-operatives and the autonomy of the individual members' enterprises. 
To assess the form of co-operation adopted by each co-operatives, we identified 
three areas of activities. These were, production, marketing and supply activities. 
In addition to this, we considered the form of ownership of assets in the co- 
operative as a crucial element which can determine the form of co-operation in 
each of the above mentioned areas of co-operation. The form of co-operation in 
the four areas stated above was measured by simply asking the members of the 
management committees to describe the form of co-operation in their co- 
48 
operatives either as "individually" or "collectively". When an area of co-operation 
is described as "individually", it means the activities in that area were carried out 
independently by individual members. The activities carried out by the co- 
operatives on behalf of the members were described as "collectively". In 
Appendix 5, we have provided the forms of co-operation in the four areas, as 
reported by members of the management committees in the co-operatives. In 
Table 2.1, we also present the number and percentage of co-operatives in each 
of the four areas of co-operatives. The Table also provides information on 
whether the form of co-operation was based on individual member activities or 
collective. 
Table 2.1 
Areas of Co-operation in the Co-operatives 
Individually Collectively 
No. of Percent No. of Percent 
Areas of Co-: )peration Co-ops of Co-ops Co-ops of Co-ops 
Production 27 87 4 13 
Marketind 27 87 -6 19 
Supply of resources 25 81 8 26 
Ownership of Assets 27 87 4 13 
Co-operation in Production 
Out of the 31 co-operatives in our sample, it was only in four co-operatives where 
co-operation in production took place on collective basis. These co-operatives 
were the three electrical workers and the herbalists co-operatives. The rest of the 
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co-operatives did not show any evidence of joint activity in production. Even in 
cases where members were seen to be working in one production estate, there 
was virtually no form of co-operation between them. Especially, amongst the gin 
distillers and rattan weavers, we observed that their production activities actually 
took place within the individual member groups which were independent of each 
other. These groups consisted of family members and sometimes apprentices. 
A particular example was the Rattan Weavers who found it essential to acquire a 
strategic outlet to demonstrate their export oriented products but preferred to 
work individually. In the gin distillers co-operatives, it was the practice of the 
richer members to rent their production facilities to other members. 
Co-operation in Marketing 
There was very little joint marketing in the co-operatives. In the gin distillers co- 
operative, the ideal method of marketing would have been for members to bring 
their products to the co-operative store room, where they were to be sold to 
retailers by the co-operative management for distribution. Since most co- 
operatives had no store rooms, the members undertook to sell their products 
themselves. The duty of the co-operatives' management was, therefore, to issue 
waybills for the transportation of the products and to collect levies from the 
amount sold. 
Marketing at the salt winners co-operatives was done in a similar manner but at 
the level of their co-operative union. The co-operative union supervises the sales 
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of salt by issuing way bills and collects levies on the amount of produce sold by 
the members. 
Marketing at the rattan weavers co-operatives has both elements of collective 
and individual marketing. Individual members sold their products as and when 
they wanted without any supervision from the society. Collective marketing most 
often takes place when they have to sell at exhibitions and trade fairs. 
A joint approach to marketing of products could be observed only at the 
Herbalists co-operatives. This was due to the fact that the society had set up a 
pharmacy where drugs are sold and dispensed at the same time. 
Co-operation in the Supply of Resources 
Supply of resources is mostly an individual member activity. In fact, the Tie and 
Dye co-operative has as its major objective to supply its members with cheaper 
fabrics for cloth-making, but this function was abandoned when the raw fabrics 
became abundant on the market in later years. 
The Rattan Weavers also engaged in joint acquisition of raw materials on a 
number of occasions. This occurred whenever there was a sudden shortage of 
canes, their major raw material, in the market. The Distillers, Salt winners and 
Taxi drivers reported no form of co-operation in the supply of resources. 
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Co-operation in the Ownership of Assets: 
The form of co-operation in the ownership of assets forms a major constituent 
element of a co-operative. In most cases, it has been associated with the 
ownership of technology and production facilities where members work. 
Table 2.1 shows little co-operation in the ownership of assets. Again, it is the 
electrical workers and Herbalists co-operatives who collectively own their assets. 
In the rest of the societies, members own their work tools. 
The above Table shows that there exists very little co-operation in any of the four 
areas of co-operation. Practically, only four of the co-operatives, the Herbalists, 
and the three electrical co-operatives, show very high degree of co-operation in 
all four areas as indicated above. 
2.4 The Types of Industrial Co-operatives 
In chapter one of this study, we identified two major theoretical models of co- 
operatives: the worker and service co-operatives. This classification should help 
us to pay special attention to the peculiarities of the different types of co- 
operatives in our study. 
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The worker co-operatives were described as co-operatives in which there is no 
individual autonomous individual enterprise. The individual members are 
considered as both workers and managers of the co-operatives. According to 
Abell and Mahony, two variants of labour co-partnership can be identified in the 
5 
worker co-operatives. 
These are; 
a. Co-operatives contracting for the hire of their members labour, 
and 
b. Co-operative workshops or factories owned and controlled by 
members themselves. 
The service co-operatives are those co-operatives aiding individual members 
who have their own enterprises with auxiliary services. These auxiliary services 
are, for instance, provision of credit, managerial services, and market related . 
services such as, supply of resources and marketing of products. 
The distribution of the co-operatives according to the types of co-operatives is 
shown in Table 2.2. 
5 P. Abell and N. Mahony, The economic and social potential of Industrial Co-operatives in the 
Developing Countries, International Co-operative Alliance, Special Report, 1980. 
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Table 2.2 
The Types of Co-operatives and their Industry Groups 
Co-operatives Co-operatives with Service 
Co-operative Contracting collective workshops Co-operatives 
Industry Group members'labour 
Gin Distillers 
Taxi Drivers 
Rattan Weavers 
Block Makers 
Herbalists 
Electrical Workers 3 
Tie and Dye 
Grain Millers 
Salt Winners 
1 
10 
10 
1 
2 
1 
2 
1 
Total 31 27 
The Table shows that the service co-operatives are the most predominant type 
co-operatives. These are a loose federated systems of co-operatives in which the 
membership comprises autonomous groups of individual and their family 
businesses. Here, only the owners of the enterprise are the registered members 
of the co-operatives. The co-operatives act as an umbrella organisation for such 
local groupings. 
Only one co-operative, the herbalists, conform to the classical worker co- 
operatives based on the collective ownership of a production facility where 
members work together. The three electrical co-operatives can be distinguished 
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from the herbalists co-operatives, because of their aim to contract or hire 
members' labour for income. In this study, these co-operatives will altogether be 
considered as workers co-operatives. 
The service co-operatives can further be classified as single-purpose or multi- 
purpose co-operatives. As single-purpose co-operatives, the co-operatives 
undertake individual functions such as marketing or the supply of sources to 
members. Multi-purpose co-operatives, on the other hand, combine a number of 
functions such as marketing and supply of resources. Table 2.3 shows the 
different types of service co-operatives. 
Table 2.3 
The Types of Service Co-operatives 
The Types of Service Co-operatives 
Co-operatives Supply Marketing Classification 
1. Salt Winners Single Purpose 
2. Gin Distillers Single Purpose 
3. Tie And Dye Single Purpose 
4. Grain Millers + Single Purpose 
5. Rattan Weavers ++ Multi-Purpose 
6. Block Makers + Single Purpose 
In the Table, the co-operatives are further classified as single- or multi-purpose 
co-operatives according to the number of market related functions they 
undertake. The information showing the distribution of the co-operatives was 
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derived from the description of the activities and organisation of the co-operatives 
in section 2.2. 
The Table shows that the dominant type of service co-operatives is the single- 
purpose marketing co-operatives. Such co-operatives are established to market 
the products of their members. It is possible, however, that such co-operatives 
might take on other functions such as the provision of financial assistance and 
managerial advice to members. The supply co-operatives include the tie and dye 
and the block makers co-operatives. 
Of the 31 co-operatives studied, 
- 
only the 10 distilleries are affiliated'to secondary 
and tertiary co-operatives. The primary societies were affiliated to district or local 
unions who are in turn part of a regional and national set-up. The salt winners 
co-operatives and the taxi drivers co-operatives had just established their 
secondary or district unions at the time of the study and have, therefore, no 
national association. We also observed other forms of affiliation by some co- 
operatives with other organisation, which were not registered as co-operative 
organisation. These co-operatives were, in particular, the grain millers, rattan 
weavers and herbalists co-operatives. These were members of a regional or 
national trading or occupational associations. The rest of the co-operatives 
existed as individual economic entities without any affiliations. 
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2.5 The Membership Group 
We have in the above sections discussed the various types of co-operatives and 
their activities. The membership group in co-operatives have been regarded as a 
major component of any co-operative. While they act as recipient of its services, 
they are also the contributors of its resources. In this section, we shall consider 
the types of membership in the co-operatives. 
There were two predominant types of members in the co-operatives, the workers 
and the business entrepreneurs. Members were characterised as workers on the 
ground that they were paid employees who have formed co-operatives to further 
their common interests. (Appendix 5 provides the types of membership groups in 
the co-operatives). About 45 per cent of the co-operative fall into this category. 
These were mainly the taxi drivers co-operatives and the electrical workers. The 
taxi drivers served as employees to private transport owners and the electrical 
workers were previously workers of a fishing company. 
The other group of members, the co-operative entrepreneurs were represented 
by the majority of co-operatives accounting for 55 per cent. These co-operatives 
were the gin distillers, block makers, the rattan weavers and herbalists. They are 
described as co-operative entrepreneurs because their members own and 
manage their own businesses. 
It can be observed above that the members of the herbalists co-operative which 
was classified as a worker co-operatives, have been described as entrepreneurs. 
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Theoretically, these members should have been described as workers since they 
are members of a worker co-operatives. However, it was observed that members 
of the herbalists co-operatives were themselves herbalists who own their private 
business enterprises. 
In all, the co-operatives membership was open and voluntary. However, there 
were instances where we observed that membership was restricted to particular 
ethnic groups. This was not due to any deliberate policy, but was caused by the 
concentration of a particular ethnic group in particular communities. 
Such co-operatives included the grain milling co-operatives whose membership 
comprise the same ethnic group, because they had settled in the same 
community in Accra. The salt winners also by virtue of their geographical location 
in the rural Songhor lagoon, consisted of the same ethnic group. 
2.6 The Co-operatives and their markets in Ghana 
The previous sections of this chapter furnished us with some information on the 
activities and the organisation of the industrial co-operatives in our sample. In 
this section, we extend our discussions to the markets and the economic sectors 
in which the co-operatives operate in Ghana. The aim of this is to provide us with 
information on the position of the co-operatives in the economy of Ghana. 
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The position of co-operatives in the economies of developing countries has been 
described in a number of ways. Generally, co-operatives have been associated 
with the informal economies of those countries. According to Andrea, the most 
common characteristics of the informal economies include: 
ease of entry into the sectors 
reliance on indigenous resources 
labour intensive and adapted technology 
4 acquisition of skills outside the formal school system 
an unregulated and competitive market. 
Co-operatives are associated with the informal economies because the individual 
members' enterprises or the co-operative enterprise themselves operate as 
small-scale businesses. These small-scale businesses use, for instance, 
indigenous technology, employ workers with lower skills and tend to operate in 
the informal markets. In appendix 5, we have assembled some of these 
characteristics of the co-operatives. They include technology and size of the co- 
operatives, 
In addition to their association with the informal economy, it has been argued that 
co-operatives operate mostly in unprofiTable sectors in developing economies. 
Such sectors are those disregarded by private enterprises because they consider 
them unprofiTable. Furthermore, co-operatives, enterprises, as small scale 
G. Andrae, Industry in Ghana, Production Form and Spatial Structure, 198 1. 
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businesses, are considered to be appendages of the large scale business in the 
formal economies of developing countries because they engage in sub- 
contracting, 
Not all the 31 co-operatives we studied fit into the market situations described 
above. For instance, the distillers have almost a 100% monopoly of their market. 
The salt co-operative also possessed a complete monopoly of the salt reserves 
in the areas of operation and commandeered a ready market of salt both in the 
country and the neighbouring West African countries. In spite of the abundance 
of taxis in the country, the taxi drivers co-operatives operated in a thriving sector. 
In reality, competition in this sector was not so much on passengers, but rather 
with their former mother organisation, the Ghana Private Road and Transport 
Union (GPRTU), over fixing of locations for taxi stations. 
Most of the co-operatives operated in the traditional sectors where raw materials 
were secured from local resources and production. Furthermore, almost all the 
co-operatives marketed their products through the local traditional markets. This 
was with the exception of the salt and gin distillers co-operatives where some 
bulk purchasing took place on contractual basis. For instance, most members of 
the distillers co-operatives delivered their produce directly to retailers who may be 
either member of a similar co-operative or private retailers. 
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Summary 
The objective of this chapter was to provide some information on the types of co- 
operatives under study. We began by outlining the origins of industrial co- 
operatives in Ghana. We also discussed the major characteristics of the co- 
operatives including their activities, membership group, forms of co-operation and 
the economic sectors in which the co-operatives operate. 
All the co-operatives we studied were engaged in some form of production 
activity, except the taxi driver co-operatives. There was, however, little collective 
or joint activity in production, supply of resources, marketing and the ownership of 
resources. 
In general, we distinguished between two major types of co-operatives namely, 
the service and the worker co-operatives. The majority of the co-operatives, 
twenty-seven in number, fall under the category of service co-operatives. These 
were co-operatives whose members owned their private enterprises and had set 
up joint co-operative enterprises for the promotion of their economic activities. 
There were only four worker co-operatives. 
The sectors in which the co-operatives operated were confined to the informal 
sector of the Ghanaian economy. Hence, links with suppliers and consumers 
were by single orders and with outlets through small scale retailers. The 
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electrical workers appeared to be the only co-operatives which obtained contracts 
from the formal economy. 
In general, the discussions in this chapter outlined the organisational conditions in 
which the co-operatives operate. In our theoretical model, they were considered 
to contribute to variations in the participatory schemes in the co-operatives. 
Before this is investigated, the following chapter will first examine self- 
management and control in the co-operatives. 
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Chapter 3 
THE SCHEME OF PARTICIPATION IN CO-OPERATIVES 
This research study is designed to investigate member participation and control in 
industrial co-operatives in Ghana. The research also seeks to provide an 
empirical description of participatory schemes in the industrial co-operatives. 
This is to help determine how participatory schemes in the industrial co- 
operatives influence member participation and control. 
As a first step in conducting this investigation, it is essential that we understand 
the conceptions of participation and control in organisations. In particular, the 
various theories that explain the relationship between the participatory schemes 
and participation and control in organisations. 
3.1 Conceptions of Participation and Control in Organizations 
The concepts participation and control have gained widespread use in the 
political science, sociological and management literature. This has come about 
because of their use to describe various social events and behaviour of people in 
different organisations. A common feature of the use of the two concepts is the 
interpretation of participation in terms of control or influence and power. 
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In the management literature, especially in the studies of organisation 
democracy, similar approaches have been used for their interpretation. 
For instances, French has defined participation as; 
a process in which two or more parties influence each other in making plans. It is restricted to 
decisions that have further effects on all those making the decisions and those represented by 
them. ' 
Lammers in reference to the calls by human relations movements for power 
equalisation in organisations has also defined participation as . 
the totality of fonns of upwards exercise of power by subordinates 
in organisations as are perceived by themselves and their superiorS2 
In traditional weberian terms, participation is described as: 
the chance of a unit in a social system to put through its own interest in the process 
of determining the needs or goals in the production and distribution of means for the 
fulfilment of what this chance is based on. ' 
It is clear from the definitions of participation above that participation involves the 
exercise of influence or control in organisations. According to control theory, 
increased participation in decision making in organisation by its members should 
1J. R. P. French, J. Israel and D. As, An Experiment in Participation in a Norwegian Factory, Human 
Relation 13, (3-19) 
2C J Lammers, Power and participation in Decision Making in formal organisations, American Journal of 
Sociology, 73: 210-217,1967. 
3 Cited for K. Bartolke et al., Participation and Control, A comparative study of Industrial Relations in Israel, 
Kibbutzim and Federal Republic of Germany, Bamberg, 1985. 
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lead to a greater amount of control and fairer distribution of influence within 
organisations. 
Tannenbaum has further defined control as "any process in which a person or 
group of persons determines, that is intentionally affects, the behaviour of 
another person, groups or organisation"s 
In the literature of organisation democracy, control is further associated with 
power in organisations. Tannenbaum has pointed out that "to exercise control is 
to determine outcomes and that is the essence of power"6 . According to Follet, 
"power (is) simply the ability to make things happen, to be causal agent, to initiate 
change"7 
Central to the relationship between participation and control is the concept of 
organisational democracy. According to Tannenbaum, organisation democracy 
describes a situation in which there is a more or equal distribution of power 
among interest groups. Tannenbaum, therefore, describes a democratic 
organisation as one in which the rank and file members can "legitimately 
determine outcome, makes 
things happen, act as casual agents, initiate changes". 8 
4 A. S Tannenbaum (ed. ) Controversies about Control and Democracy in Organisations, in R. N. Stem and S. 
MaCarthy, (eds. ) Organisation Practice and Democracy, New York 1986. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
71bid. 
Ibid. 
65 
It is quiet clear from the various statements above that participation in decision 
making can be conceived of as the exercise of control in organisations. That is, 
involvement in decision-making makes it possible to put through ones' interest in 
the processes of determining "needs and goals" in organisations. It is also a 
process that makes it possible for individuals to "intentionally affect the behaviour 
of others". Hence, a measure of the amount of control exercised by members of 
an organisation describes their degree of participation in decision making. 9 
The conceptual isation of participation as the exercise of control in organisations 
has been seen in terms of relationships between employers and workers. In co- 
operatives organisation, participation is part of the processes to ensure self- 
determination and self-management by individual members and groups who are 
themselves owners and managers of their enterprises. 10 
9 In literature it is also assumed that worker participation in decision making within org-anisation will lead to 
increased satisfaction and commitment in organisations. This has, however been subject to a number of 
criticisms. It has been argued that effects of participation and control on the motivation well being of 
organisation members might be subject to certain organisational conditions. These include, for example, the 
size of the organisations, climate group characteristics etc. For a detail literature on these criticisms see, T. D. 
Wall and LA. Lischeron, Worker Participation. A critique of the Literature and sorne Fresh Evidence, 
London, McGraw Hill, 1977. 
10 T. L Whistler et al, An Empirical Study of its Meaning and Measurement, in A. S. Tannenbaum (ed. ) 
Control in Organisation, New York, 1968 
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Furthermore, the definitions of control above suggest that control can be exerted 
through formal and informal mechanisms. The two are not distinctively separate. 
According to Smith and Ari, the basic elements and functions of control in 
organisations include; 
formal aspects, such as formulating policy and making decisions, exercising 
authority in implementing decisions, and applying rewards and sanctions for 
conformity and deviance. It may include informal mechanisms and techniques, 
such as non legitimated pressure, informal discussions, and decision making. 11 
Tannenbaum has also pointed out that one does not have to be physically 
present at meetings to exert influence. Informal participation through discussion 
that takes place outside meeting halls makes it possible for organisation 
members to influence discussions. 12 
3.2 Social Theories of Participation 
The relationship between participation and control in organisations has been 
fundamental to the design of schemes of participation in organisations. The 
major objective of participatory schemes is to enable organisation participants to 
have access to decision making within organisations. The design of participatory 
schemes has also been associated with various social theories underlying 
11C. G. Smith and 0. N. Ari, Organization Control Structure and Member Consensus. In: A. S. 
Tannenbaum, Control in Organizations, op. cit. 
12 A. S. Tannenbaum, Controversies about ...... op, cit. 
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participation in organisation. In order to appreciate the various participatory 
schemes in co-operatives, it is first essential to examine the social theories of 
participation. These are the socialist and the democratic theories. 
The democratic theories of participation come from social and political theories 
about the involvement of ordinary citizens in decision making. Since in capitalist 
economies and societies, workers do not manage organisations, the idea of 
worker participation in decision-making is considered as a means of extending 
democracy to the industrial field where they earn their livelihood. 13 
In contrast with the democratic theories, the main concern of socialist theories is 
the wider implication of social class systems and the relationship of people to the 
means of production in organisation. The socialist theories point out that, "there is 
no inherent right of capital to participate in management. " 14 They argue that "all 
who contribute to the production at whatever level of skills or scope of 
competence have the fundamental right to manage that production". 15 Hence, 
the socialist theories rather assign the right to participate in management of 
organisations to the workers themselves, but not to the owners of capital. 
The social theories of participation have led to the development of different 
participatory schemes in organisations. A salutary example of participatory 
schemes which have evolved from socialist theories of participation is the former 
13H. P. Dachler and B Wilpen, op. cit. 
14 C. E. Gunn, op. cit. 
" Ibid. 
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Yugoslavian self-managed enterprises. It is a scheme of participation in which 
the workers of the enterprises elect their management who are given the 
authority to make policy and implement them. The control of enterprises is 
considered as delegated to the workers by society. Hence, the enterprises are 
not legally the property of workers, but are managed by them on behalf of 
society. 
Another example of a socialist conception of self-managed organisation is the 
kibbutz movement in Israel. These are communal organisations existing in a 
society of private property and market economy. The kibbutz movement consists 
of individual enterprises engaged in various fields of economic activities. 
The basic philosophy underlying the kibbutz movement is the idea of mutual help 
and responsibility in the satisfaction of the personal needs of their members. 
Participation in the enterprises occurs both directly through the worker assembly, 
and indirectly, by elections to the different committees and the management 
board 
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In capitalist societies, legislation has sought to increase the participation of 
workers through a number of schemes. 16 
They include: 
a. Interest groups democracy: collective bargaining through which 
organised labour gains power to take an independent role vis a vis 
management. 
b. Representative democracy: A system whereby those at the lower 
levels of an organisation can influence policies decided at higher 
levels e. g., workers on management boards, works councils. 
C. Work-linked democracy: participation of those directly involved in 
decisions about how work shall be done at their level e. g. 
autonomous work groups. 
3.3 The Scheme of Participation in Co-operatives. 
The conceptions of participation in co-operative have been mostly derived from 
the socialist theory. In particular, worker co-operatives have been built on the 
rationale that collective ownership of enterprises would ensure worker self- 
determination and self-management. 17 
16 E. L. Trist, The Sociotechnical Perspective, in A. H. Van de Ven and W. F. Joyce (eds. ), Perspectives in 
Organisation Design and Behaviour, New York, John Wiley, 198 1. See also ILO Participation of Workers 
in Decision Making within Undertakings, Labour Managed Series, No. 33 and S. Cleg , 
Organisation 0 ý(T ZP 
democracy, power and Participation, in T. Crouch and F. Heller, (eds. ), Organisation and Democracy and 
Political Process, New York, 1983 
17 P. Abell, The Viability of Industrial Producer co-operatives. In: T. Crouch and Heller, op. cit. 
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The idea of a worker co-operative enterprise originally stems from Robert 
Owen'sconcepts of "self-governing industrial communities" and Charles Fourier's 
"Phalansters" in Great Britain and France respectively. These industrial 
experiments were set up as a reaction to the break down of old craft and artisan 
trade owing to the exploitation of craft men by the early industrialists during 
industrial revolution in the 18th century. Hence, workers co-operatives were set 
up to relieve the poor workers from the exploitation of the early industrialists. 
Though the service co-operatives share the same ideological and social values of 
participation and self-management with the worker co-operatives, in practice they 
have developed different goals. That is, the individual member entrepreneurs of 
the co-operatives seek participation and control in a jointly owned enterprise in 
order to improve their bargaining power in market economies. 18 
Underlying the basic scheme of participation in co-operatives is the -accountability 
structure. As we pointed out earlier, the accountability structure is the 
hierarchical structure in co-operative organisations. The accountability structure, 
therefore, represents the structural relationship between the members of the co- 
operative and their organisation. This relationship comes from the fact that in a 
co-operative members are both owner/managers and patrons or workers of their 
is See for instance, P. G. HeImberger, Co-operative Enterprise as a Structural Dimension of Farm Markets, 
Journal of Farm Economics, Vol., XLVI No. 3, August 1964 
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organisation. This places the co-operatives members in the position of decision 
makers in their enterprise. 
The members of a co-operative, as decision makers, can be grouped into two 
major decision making bodies. They are the general body of members, that is 
the membership group, and the management committee. These are the major 
decision making bodies empowered to make decisions on behalf of the 
members. 
The membership group, that is general body of members, is the "policy making" 
body in a co-operative. 1 9 They therefore have the ultimate authority in the affairs 
of the co-operative. In Ghana, their duties are contained in NLC Decree No. 252 
of 1968 and the co-operative model bye-laws as follows: (See model bye-laws in 
Appendix 6) 
1. Expulsion of members 
2. Consideration of reports of the committee 
3. Election of the members of the committee 
4. Authorisation of the committee to raise loans and set interest on 
Loans to members. 
5. Approve any amendments to the bye laws of the co-operative 
6. Approve the Annual Budgets of the co-operative. 
According to section 30 (ii) of the model co-operative bye-laws, the duties of the 
19E. Dulfer, Betriebswitschaftlehre der, op. cit. 
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management committee include: 
1. Ensuring that the regulations and laws of the co-operative society 
are complied with by the members 
2. Conducting the business of the co-operative society, e. g. raising 
loans and making investments. 
3. Representing the co-operative society in its dealings and 
transactions with outsiders. 
4. Employing and determining the salary of secretary of the society. 
5. Overseeing that businesses of the co-operative society are duly 
recorded in its accounting books by the secretary. 
6. Carry out the resolutions of the General Assembly 
The model bye-laws are quite flexible in assigning tasks to the decision making 
bodies. For instance, they consider both direct and indirect representation in the 
management of the affairs of co-operatives. Direct representatiPo is concerned 
with institutional matters as, election of officers and approval of annual accounts. 
This occurs through general meetings and special general meetings. 
The duties of the management committee are managerial and involve the day to 
day administration of the co-operatives. In Ghana, the model co-operative bye- 
laws stipulate a minimum of seven members on the committee. The principal 
office holders in the management committee are the President, Vice President 
and Treasurer of the co-operatives. 
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The President of a Co-operative plays more or less an executive role. He does 
not only supervise the administrative staff but also transacts most of the business 
of the society. The treasurer also plays quite a significant role in co-operatives. It 
is a convention in Ghana that the treasurer and the secretary of co-operative 
each keeps one of the keys to the society's safe. It is also required that the 
treasurer receives moneys paid to the society. 
In addition to the distribution of control between the various decision making 
bodies as specified in the bye-laws, the Co-operative Decree Number 252 of 
Ghana reserves some powers for the Registrar of Co-operative Societies. These 
are actually supervisory powers and involve the inspection and audit of the 
accounting books, arbitration of disputes and the approval of annual accounts of 
a co-operative. 
Furthermore, officers of the department of co-operatives are allowed to attend 
meetings of the co-operatives in order to make sure that members adhere to the 
standing orders and procedures of meetings. 
The structural arrangements laid down in the model bye laws for co-operatives 
seek to give the co-operatives stability and continuity in their organisation. It also 
imposes some bureaucratic features on the co-operatives by stipulating the roles 
of decision making bodies and well defined positions. 
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Table 3.1 provides a summary of the roles of the decision making bodies in co- 
operatives. 
Table 3.1 
Decision Making Bodies and their Normative Roles in Co-operatives in Ghana 
Decision Making Bodies 
Membership Management External 
Decision Issues Group Committee Interest 
Groups 
1. Disposal of 
Surplus Decides 
2. Amending 
Bye-laws 
3. Election of 
Officers 
4. Compliance of 
Rules 
5. Admission of 
Members 
6. Salary of 
Office Staff 
7. Book-keeping 
& Accounts 
Amends Approves 
Elects 
Ensures 
Compliance 
Admits new 
members 
Appoints staff 
and fixes salary 
8. Interest Rate Keeps accounts Audits and 
on Savings Approves of 
Annual 
Accounts 
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In the Table are the three decision making bodies empowered to participate in 
the decision making within the co-operatives by the bye-laws. They are the 
membership group, management committee and the external interest groups, 
e. g. the Registrar of Co-operative Societies. The table also contains a list of 
decision issues and the types of roles assigned to the various decision making 
bodies. The description of the accountability structure given above provides a 
common basis for studying the scheme of participation in co-operatives. 
There are, however, a number of options available for individual co-operatives to 
design their organisation. For instance, co-operative regulations do not regulate 
all economic activities in the co-operatives. Activities such as the market 
relations of co-operatives and technical matters concerning the production of 
goods and services are not mentioned in the. bye laws.. The model bye-laws are 
more concerned with institutional and administrative issues such as election of 
officers and admissions of new members. 
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Summary 
The major aim of this chapter was to provide an understanding of the basic 
scheme of participation in co-operatives. To do this, we examined the existing 
literature on participation and control in organisations. We also explored the 
social theories underlying the design of various participatory schemes in 
organisations. 
The participatory schemes in co-operatives are derived from the socialist theories 
on participation in organisations. The socialist theories seek to give workers the 
ultimate authority in the management of organisations. The accountability 
structure served as a basis for studying the scheme of participation. We also 
looked at how co-operative regulations in Ghana have helped define the pattern 
of authority relationships between the different decision making. bodies. It was 
observed that the co-operative regulations did not cover the whole universe of 
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activities in co-operatives. They were more concerned with institutional and 
administrative issues. 
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Chapter 4 
SELF-MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL IN THE CO-PERATIVES 
It is a major assumption of this research study that the character of co- 
operatives as self-managed organisations is associated with the degree of 
member participation in decision making and control over their affairs. Our 
conceptualisation of participation and control in the previous chapter suggested 
that the study of control in co-operatives should provide the indicator to the 
participatory potentials of the co-operative members. 
Hence, in this chapter, our attention will be focused on the exercise of control by 
the various decision making bodies in the co-operatives. Our interest will also be 
centred on the exercise of control by the various decision making bodies over the 
decision issues in the co-operatives. Furthermore, we shall examine patterns of 
control in the co-operatives, That is, the distribution of control among the 
decision making bodies in the individual co-operatives. Before we investigate the 
tasks set out for this chapter, it is first essential that we examine the 
methodological issues associated with the measurement of control in 
organisations. 
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4.1 Methodological Issues in the Measurement of Control 
Measuring control in organisations has gained a great deal of controversy in the 
management literature. Literature indicates three major approaches to the 
measurement of control in organisations. They are: 1 
a. The use of documents as organization charts, statements of rules and 
other records. 
b. Ratings by researchers and experts; observation of and judgements about 
the organisation by researchers, experts and key informants, 
The use of the survey method, that is, a sample survey of organisation 
members' perceptions of control. 
The Use of Documents 
The use of organisation charts and documentary records provides concise 
information from organisation records. However, there is a tendency to miss out 
decisions that have for one reason or the other been kept out of records. 
b. Ratings by the researcher and experts 
The reliance on judgements through experts and ratings from researchers are 
supposed to provide enough information and theoretical understanding of 
"control". A major problem with this approach is that it tends to involve only a few 
key informants. However, a large number of people are exposed to the entire 
events in an organisation and measuring control from a few key informants 
misses out a considerable amount of information. 
1A. S Tannenbaum, Controversies about Control, op. cit. 
2 Ibid. 
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In spite of this, this approach has been employed in most studies. For instance, 
the international research group on industrial democracy in Europe, (IDE) made a 
comparative study of organisation democracy in Europe and adopted this 
approach. They relied mostly on experts and "when the researchers felt that (on 
the basis of their observations and interviews) averaging experts' ratings could 
provide a biased picture, they substituted the researchers rating for that of the 
experts". 
C. Sample survey of respondents 
By the survey method it is assumed that a large number of people are exposed to 
the formal and informal activities of the organisation and it is therefore essential 
to obtain some information on their perception of control. In effect, this approach 
seeks to rectify the defects of the two approaches stated above. The 
measurement of control from a sample of organisation members is based on 
their reports on the amount of control they perceive themselves and others to 
have exercised. 
Three major limitations have been associated with the survey method. The 
judgements of respondents on control only describe their perception of control. 
The assumed relationship between participation and control might come from the 
respondents' illusions of control. This has also been described as "psychological 
31ndustrial DemocracY in Europe Research Group, (I DE). Industrial 
Demociacy in Europe- Oxfbid, Chailton press, I gs I. 
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participation". That is, the idea that individual members might perceive 
themselves to be exercising control through participation though they are not. 4 
A second problem relates to the perceptual distortion of the concepts. 
Respondents are also expected to have a reasonable knowledge of the events 
that define control in the organisation. The lack of information about activities of 
other groups in the organisation by respondents can lead to response errors. 
Pennings has indicated that where an organisation has a great number of 
hierarchical levels, respondents might find it difficult to know how much control a 
hierarchical level actually possesses. 6 
A third limitation of the method comes from the possibility that respondents' 
interpretations of control might not correspond with the technical definition of the 
researcher or experts. The IDE studies on industrial democracy in Europe 
suggested that some respondents might attach positive meanings to it while 
others might view it negatively, or even include non decision making activities in 
their interpretations. They further showed that such differences in respondents' 
perceptions of control might even be due to the different cultural settings in which 
they find themselves. 7 
4 See B. M. Staw 986. Beyond the control Graph; Steps towards a Model Perceived 
Control in organisations in R. N. Stem and S. MaCarthy (eds. ). The Organisation Practice 
of Democracy, New York 1986, and A. S Tannenbaum and S. G. South, Effects of 
member. Influence in an Organisation Phenomenology versus organisation Structure, in 
A. S Tannenbaum (ed. ) Control in Organisation, op. cit. 
5J. M Permings, Dimensions of organizational influence and their effectiveness correlates, 
Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 21,1976 
61bid. 
7 IDE, op. cit. 
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Despite the above mentioned sources of threats to the internal validity of the 
research findings of the survey method, it has gained a more widespread use 
than the other two methods. Researchers who have employed the method have 
gone on to suggest a number of solutions to alleviate its limitations. 
For instance, a number of researchers have argued that the "average" response 
of respondents is close to the actual control exercised in an organisation. This, 
therefore, eases out the difference between technical definition and respondents 
interpretations of control. 8 
Another strategy ad. opted by researchers to help solve problems of perceptual 
distortion of control and discrepancies in the interpretations of control is to test 
the reliability of the answers to the questionnaire items. This is done by using 
"replication of coefficients". 9 Replication of coefficients can be done by 
computing product moment correlation coefficients between aggregate ratings of 
the different groups of respondents to determine the degree to which they 
replicate themselves. 10 
4.2 Methodology for the Measure of Control in the Co-operatives 
Our approach to the measurement of control in the co-operatives leans mainly on 
the IDE methods. It was based on observation of and judgements about the co- 
operatives by the researcher, key informants and local experts. The key 
8 A. S Tannenbaum, controversies about control.... op. Cit. 
9 See S. E. Seashore et al, op. cit. and IM Pennhigs, op. cit. 
"J. M. Pennin,, S, op. cit. 
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informants were the members of the management committees in the co- 
operatives. The local experts were the secretaries to the co-operatives and the 
officers of the Department of Co-operatives. 
The researcher's ratings were based on conversations and observations of 
activities during interviews with key respondents. The ratings were also 
supported by the use of records from: 
a. Minute books. These provided information on the number 
of decisions taken during committee meetings. 
b. Audit reports from the officers of the Department of 
Co-operatives. This provided information on the auditors 
comments on the expenditure and investments in the 
co-operatives. 
The ratings of the researcher and key informants were related to a 21 decision 
making issues designed to cover the different activities of the co-operatives. 
Respondents' responses were rated on a5 point likert scale, ranging from: 
1. Noinfluence 
2. Little influence 
3. Quite a bit of influence 
4. A great deal of influence 
5. Avery great deal of influence 
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In the ratings of influence, both the researchers and key respondents' ratings 
were averaged to obtain a score for a decision issue for a decision making body. 
We have to point out here that our measurement of control involves both formal 
and informal forms of control. As we pointed out earlier, our conception of control 
as perceived influence or reports from key informants underscores both forms of 
control. 
Following IDE, an influence-information matrix for each co-operative, was 
constructed. 11 This contained three decision making bodies: The Membership 
Group, (MG) management committee (MC), and External interest groups (EX). 
These are decision making bodies explicitly recognised in both co-operatives 
bye-laws and national regulations on co-operatives as bodies legally mandated to 
exercise control over the affairs of the co-operatives in Ghana. 12 A score of 1-5 
on the likert 5 point scale was recorded in each cell to indicate the degree of 
influence exercised by a decision-making body on a decision issue. 
4.21 The Selection of Decision Making Areas 
The selection of decision making areas provided quite a problem. This is because 
researchers have not been able to provide a satisfactory guidance to determine 
which decision issues are necessary. Available information does not show any 
consensus on this issue so far. 
13 
11 IDE op. cit. 
12 See NLC Decree No. 252 of 1968, Ghana 
13 In factý what we have are various choices. For instances, in the IDE Studies sixteen 
decision issues were adopted, Bartolke et al, also considered 12 for their cornparative 
study of participation and control in German firms and the Kibbutz. Tannenbaurn also 
85 
Following Epizona and ILO, we used twenty-one decision issues which 
distinguished between three domains of activities in the co-operatives. These I 
are, social and administrative decisions, production and technical decisions and 
economic decisions. 
14 
o SOCIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS deal with institutional functions 
involving formulating and legitimating of procedures and rules about the 
organisation: for example, decisions about the elections of officers, the 
recruitment of members and the formulation of the objectives of the co- 
operatives. 
* PRODUCTION AND TECHNICAL DECISIONS deal with the joint production 
activities of the co-operatives: for instance, the ways in which members are 
organised to do their work. 
4, ECONOMIC DECISIONS relate to managerial functions of resources 
allocation, investment and market relations of the co-operatives. 
Our choice of twenty-one decisions was intended to capture as much as possible 
the universe of activities and events in the co-operatives. It was also an attempt 
adopted 13 decisions for the study of control in Yugoslavia self-managed enterprises. See 
K. Bartolke et al, op. cit, IDE op. cit. and A. S. Tannenbaum and J. Zupanov, The 
distribution of control in some Yugoslavia Industrial organisation as perceived by 
members, in A. S Tannenbaum (ed. ) control in organisations, op. cit. 
14 J. G Episona and A. S. Zimbalist, Economics Democracy, Work Participation in Chilean 
Industry 1970-1973, Academic Press, New York- 1978 and ILO (International Labour 
Organisation, Participation of Workers... op. cit. 
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to remove possible biases in our measures that might come from the different 
sets of activities in the co-operatives. 
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4.22 The Adequacy of our Methodology 
The methodology adopted to measure control in the co-operatives uses mainly 
key informants and the researchers' evaluations. This has the inherent 
weaknesses and strengths discussed earlier. Firstly, the measurement was 
associated with a few individuals. These were the management committees of 
the co-operatives. This means that the perceptions of control from the 
membership group were not taken into account. Hence, it s possible that the 
measure of control adopted here may not encapsulate the whole universe of 
activities in the co-operatives. 
We adopted this approach for a number of reasons. During the collection of the 
data, we experienced some differences in our technical definition of control and 
respondents' interpretations of the concept. Respondents did not know actually 
what constitutes influence or control in the decision making in a co-operative. In 
addition, our interview schedule was not translated into any of the Ghanaian local 
languages to allow for a uniform interpretation of control. For this reason, we 
reckoned that adopting the survey method can lead to severe distortions in our 
measures. 
A further problem was with obtaining a sample of respondents. Most of the 
measures of control had involved organisations whose members can be found in 
the organisation at a particular point in time. Most of the co-operatives we 
studied, especially the co-operatives whose members owned their own 
enterprises, were scattered over different communities. Drawing a sample from 
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them was time consuming and expensive. This made it impossible to conduct an 
interview with them. 
Certainly, the relatively small number of our participants should be a major cause 
for concern. As we pointed out earlier, the use of only the members of the 
management committees, local experts and the researchers' ratings of influence 
may not encapsulate the whole of the organisation life in the co-operatives. 
Especially, when control involves both formal and informal activities which tend to 
embrace the whole of organisation members. 
However, there are some advantages of the method that contribute to the validity 
of measurement of control. By sacrificing in depth information, we are able to 
obtain sufficient amount of information as is required by comparative studies. An 
example of this is our choice of a lager number of issues to obtain adequate 
representation of the universe of activities in the co-operative. The validity of the 
measures are also improved by our use of questions that focus on a considerable 
number of issues in the co-operatives instead of asking global questions. 15 
Having discussed the theoretical and methodological issues involved in the 
measurement of control, the next sections analyse the results of our findings on 
participation and control in the co-operatives. We shall be interested in the 
following issues: 
15 A more detailed discussion on improvements of internal validity by using specific 
questions instead of global questions is given by P. Gundelach and H. Tetzcher, 
Measurement of Influence in Organisations, Critic of the Control Graph Method, Acta 
Sociologica, No. 19 vol. I p49-63,1976. 
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a. The total amount of control exerted by the decision making 
bodies in each of the decision issues and areas of joint decision 
making in the co-operatives, 
b. The patterns of control, that is, the distribution of control among 
the decision making bodies in the co-operatives, 
C. The patterns of control in the different types of co-operatives. 
The investigation into the issues mentioned above implies that our analysis will 
be done at the organisational level. At the organisational level, scores of control 
exercised by the decision making bodies will be aggregated to reflect the 
distribution of control in each of the co-operatives. 
4.3 Participation and Control in the Co-operatives 
The above section outlined our methodology for the measure of control in the co- 
operatives. This section brings our findings on member participation and control 
in the co-operatives. That is, the total amount of control exercised by the 
decision making bodies over various decision issues of the co-operatives. In 
addition, we intend to establish the extent to which joint decision making in the 
co-operatives occurred. 
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4.31 The Distribution of Control across Decision Making Issues in the 
Co-operatives 
The total amount of control exercised by the decision making bodies over the 
various decision making issues in the co-operatives is presented Table 4.1. The 
decision making bodies are: the membership group (MG), the management 
committee (MC) and the external interest groups. (EX). The three decision 
making bodies were chosen because they were the only decision making bodies 
mandated by the co-operative regulations and bye-laws to take decisions on 
behalf of the co-operatives. 16 
The data in table 4.1 was computed from the influence-information matrix 
developed for each co-operative for the scoring of the ratings of influence. In the 
table are the total amount of control exercised by the different decision making 
bodies over the decision issues in the co-operatives. The total amount of control 
is the average score of a decision making group over the number of decisions 
made in the co-operative. 
16 See Chapter Tbree 
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Table 4.1 
Distribution of Control Across Decision Issues in the Co-operatives 
Decision Issues Membership 
Group 
Managemen 
t Committee 
External 
Groups 
Total 
A. Social, Administrative and member 
problems 
1. Recruitment and dismissal of members 2.61 3.39 1.00 2.33 
2. Rules and discipline 1.81 3.92 1.54 2.42 
3. Provision of social services 1.83 3.89 1.50 2.41 
4. Education 2.33 2.83 1.83 2.33 
5. Member relations 1.36 3.73 1.27 2.12 
6. System of participation 2.18 4.18 1.09 2.48 
7. Incentive systems 2.11 4.11 2.00 2.74 
8. Election of officers 4.70 1.22 1.35 2.42 
B. Technical and production problems 
9. Improvement of work conditions, 
problems of industrial safety 1.75 4.25 1.50 2.50 
10. Research and development 1.00 2.05 4.00 2.33 
11. Changes in work organisation and 
administration 1.91 4.00 1.27 2.39 
12. Maintenance of equipment 2.60 3.20 1.00 2.27 
13. Quality control 2.18 3.00 2.45 2.54 
14. Raw material supplies 2.00 2.31 1.08 1.79 
15. Selection of technology 2.33 3.67 2.67 2.89 
C Problems of economic and financial 
management 
16. Marketing of products 2.09 2.73 1.45 2.09 
17. Investment and growth 2.31 4.31 1.54 2.72 
18. Production planning 3.00 4.25 1.50 2.92 
19. Financing and operating 1.96 3.62 1.54 2.37 
20. Pricing policy 2.40 2.75 2.30 2.48 
21. Budgeting and annual accounts 3.30 3.45 2.35 3.03 
A. Social, Administrative and member 2.36 3.40 1.47 2.40 
problems 
B. Problems of economic and financial 1.77 3.36 2.00 2.53 
management 
C Problems of economic and financial 2.51 3.52 1.78 2.60 
management 
Total 2.28 3.52 1.74 2.51 
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In the table, the influence scores are taken to mean the exercise of control. The 
management committees have more control over eighteen decision issues than 
the rest of the decision making bodies. The membership group exercise a 
greater amount of control only- over the election of officers (8). The external 
interest groups has a great deal of control over only research and development 
(10), 
The control of the external groups over research and development is due to their 
participation in this specialised activity. This was in the herbalists co-operatives 
where research on the production of medicine is supervised by an external 
research institute. Other decision issues where external interest groups had a 
little control was in budgeting, technology selection and quality control. The 
control of the external interest group over these areas comes from the officers of 
the department of co-operatives, This is through auditing and inspection of their 
books, and the sanctioning of large investment projects. 
4.32 Joint Decision Making in the Co-operatives 
Participation in decision by implication involves joint decision making. The 
number of decision issues included in joint decision making in the co-operatives 
will have some implications for the authority of the co-operatives and the 
autonomy of the individual members. An adequate explanation of this is offered 
by Katz in his study of informal groups in complex organisation. He suggests that 
the number of decisions which organisation members delegate to the 
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management is related to the extent to which the organisation has control over 
their activities. 17 This presupposes that where fewer decisions are delegated to 
the co-operative management, individual members will have greater autonomy in 
the co-operatives. The number of issues involving joint decision in a co- 
operative, therefore, is an indication of the degree of authority granted to the 
management by the members. 
Table 4.2 shows data on the number of decisions where joint decisions were 
taken in the co-operatives. The data was obtained by simply counting the 
number of decision issues involved in decision making within the co-operatives. 
The table indicates that the number of joint decision in the co-operatives ranged 
from 3 to 12 in the co-operatives. This is with the exception of the herbalists co- 
operatives where joint decision making involved 17 decision issues. The mean 
number of joint decision issues in the co-operatives was 8.4 with a standard 
deviation of 2.9. 
17 Fred E. Katz, Explaining informal groups in complex organisations: The Case of 
autonomy in structure, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 10,1965 
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The social administrative decisions, with an average of 16.5 decisions per co- 
operative or 47.5% of the decisions taken, represented a major area for decision 
making in the co-operatives. Other predominant areas of activities were in 
recruitment and dismissal of members, election of members. Member education 
and incentive systems received the least attention. 
Technical and production problems were the least form of activity in the co- 
operatives. They showed an average of 7.88 per co-operatives or 20% of the 
decisions taken. For instance, the research and development only came up 
once. This was actually part of the activities of the herbalists co-operatives. 
Much of the decisions taken in this domain rather focused on material supplies, 
quality control and sales. From the table, it can be observed that these decision 
issues gained the attention of mostly the worker co-operatives. This is not 
surprising since they were also the co-operatives in which members owned 
assets collectively and worked in the same workshop. 
Decisions related to economic problems were the most frequent decisions taken 
by the co-operatives. They comprised an average of 16.6 per co-operative. 
Financing of operations, pricing policy and the preparation of annual budget 
received most attention. Moving from latitude of functions to pattern of integration 
among the co-operatives, one can see considerable semblance in the industry 
groups. 
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Similar co-operative industry groups tend to have the same number of joint 
decisions. The only sources of differences between the co-operatives were the 
intensity of decisions concerning the economic and production issues. In the 
economic decisions, pricing was the most predominant issue among them. Only 
the Gin Distillers co-operatives cared for the preparation of Annual Budgets. 
There is one possible explanation for this. These co-operatives belonged to a 
very strong Regional and National Association which insisted on obtaining proper 
records of the levies on sales. This is because these levies serve as the major 
source of income to the unions and national associations. 
The findings above lead us to conclude that in general, the members in the 
service co-operatives keep decisions concerning production in their enterprises to 
themselves. This is in spite of the fact that some of the members worked 
together within the same workshops. This independence was also extended to 
economic issues, especially issues like investment and growth and production 
planning. The decisions we have observed here are mostly those dealing with 
administrative procedures in production and technical problems. Even joint 
decisions relating to economic issues involved procedural issues as annual 
budgeting and recording of accounts and collection of levies. Hence, it can be 
assumed that the most important decision in business administration such as 
policy formulation and strategic planning in the sphere of economic matters have 
not been delegated to the co-operative management. The reliability of these 
observations is provided by their close relations with forms of co-operation 
discussed in chapter two. In that chapter, we pointed out that there was very little 
co-operation in areas of production and ownership of assets. That observation 
97 
corresponds with our findings here on the number of joint decisions involving 
production and technical problems. 
4.33 Distribution of Control in the Co-operatives 
So far, we have been concerned with the distribution of control across the 
decision making issues. In this section, our interest is in the distribution of control 
among the decision making bodies in the co-operatives. In order to investigate 
the distribution of control among the decision making bodies in the co-operatives, 
we shall first establish the total amount of control exercised by the decision 
making bodies in the co-operatives. 
The amount of control exercised by a decision making body expresses the 
participatory potential of the members of the decision making body. To obtain the 
total amount of control for a decision making body in a co-operative, the total 
number of mean scores for each decision making body was summed up and 
divided by the number of decision bodies in the co-operative. The distribution of 
control among the decision making bodies is given in Table 4.3. 
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Table 4.3 
Distribution of Control in the Co-operatives 
Co-operatives Membership 
Group 
Managemen 
t Committee 
External 
Interest 
Groups 
Total 
Amount 
of Control 
1. Gin Distillers 1.67 3.58 2.75 2.66 
2. Tax! Drivers 1.79 4.50 1.86 2.71 
3. Rattan Weavers 4.42 3.75 1.00 3.05 
4. Grain Milling 3.63 3.75 1.50 2.96 
5. Block Makers 3.00 3.50 1.50 2.66 
6. Gin Distillers 1.80 2.00 1.80 1.86 
7. Herbalists 1.88 4.76 1.47 2.70 
8. Salt Winners 1.31 3.69 3.23 2.74 
9. Electrical Workers 4.22 1.00 2.22 2.48 
10. Electrical Workers 3.55 3.73 1.55 2.94 
11. Taxi Drivers 1.71 4.14 1.64 2.49 
12. Taxi Drivers 1.67 3.92 1.58 2.39 
13. Taxi Drivers 1.00 4.71 1.57 2.42 
14. Gin Distillers 1.00 2.25 1.50 1.58 
15. Gin Distillers 2.20 2.80 1.00 2.00 
16. Textiles 3.67 3.67 1.00 2.87 
17. Gin Distillers 3.83 1.00 2.00 2.77 
18. Gin Distillers 3.30 2.10 1.00 2.13 
19. Gin Distillers 2.00 1.50 1.00 1.50 
20. Gin Distillers 1.80 1.20 1.40 1.46 
21. Gin Distillers 2.25 1.50 1.50 1.75 
22. Gin Distillers 1.55 3.27 1.37 2.03 
23. Gin Distillers 4.70 1.00 2.00 2.56 
24. Electrical workers 3.54 2.77 1.15 2.48 
25. Block Makers 3.75 2.63 2.00 2.79 
26. Grain Millers 2.00 4.00 1.00 2.33 
27. Taxi Drivers 1.86 4.43 1.00 2.43 
28. Taxi Drivers 2.33 4.00 1.00 2.44 
29. Taxi Drivers 1.80 4.60 1.11 2.50 
30. Taxi Drivers 1.67 4.33 1.00 2.33 
31. Taxi Drivers 1.00 4.60 1.00 2.20 
Total 2.45 3.18 1.51 2.39 
1 Noinfluence 
2 Little influence 
Quite a bit of influence 
A great deal of influence 
5A very great deal of influence 
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The table shows the decision making bodies in the different types of co- 
operatives -and the total amount of control exercised by each decision making 
body. The table shows that the average total amount of control exercised by the 
management committee is 3.16. - This is followed by the membership group with 
a total amount of control of 2.38 and the external interest groups with 1.54. 
There is, however, considerable variation in the total a mount of control between 
the co-operatives. This variation is within the ranges of 1.47 to 2.96. The only 
co-operative which falls outside this range is the rattan weavers co-operative 
which has total amount of control of 3.06. Low levels of total amount of control 
may mean that the co-operative management has little command over the 
activities of the co-operatives. This means there is little structural integration. 
According to Lammers, this can affect the efficient allocation of resources in the 
co-operatives. 18 
4.34 Distribution of Control and Democracy in the Co-operatives 
The exercise of control in a co-operative is not only to institute self-management, 
but also to ensure democratic management in the co-operatives. In our 
discussions of participatory theories in chapter three, we pointed out that the 
concept of democracy is central to the relationship between participation and 
control in organisations. In co-operatives, a more practical meaning is'given to 
the concept through the co-operative democratic principle of "one person, one 
vote" in decision makin process. Our task here, therefore, is to investigate how 
19 C. J. Lammers, Power and Participation in decision making in Formal organisations, 
American Journal of Sociology, 73: 201-217,1967. 
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far the distribution of control in the co-operatives can be described as fair or 
democratic. 
Participatory theory sugaests that a more democratic or participative organisation 
is characterised by a fairer distribution of control and a greater amount of 
control. 19 In the literature of participative management, two theories have been 
used to explain the relationship between the distribution of control and 
democracy in organisations. These theories are the zero-sum theory and the non 
zero-sum theory. 20 
According to the zero-sum theory, the total amount of control is a fixed sum. 
When control in the top management increases, there is a consequent reduction 
in the amount of control exercised in the lower levels of the organisation. 
The non zero-sum theory suggests that an increase in the total amount of control 
can occur independent of a change in the distribution of control. Gundelach and 
Tetzchner have indicated that an increase in the total amount of control can occur 
if there is no conflict of interests between the decision making bodies. They have 
also suggested that it is only in conflicting situations where an increase in the 
amount of control exercised by one decision making body will cause a decrease 
in the amount of control exercised by the other decision making body. 21 
19A. S Tannenbaum, controversies about control, op. cit. 
20 K. Batolke et al. op cit.. 
21 P. Gundelach and H. Tetzchner, op. cit. 
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The above mentioned theories, in a nut -shell, suggest the following relations 
between the distribution of control and the amount of control in organisations. In 
an organisation with conflicting situations, one might find a reduction in its total 
amount of control when there is an increase in the amount of control exercised by 
one decision making body. On the other hand, in an organisation where there 
exists a harmonious relations between the different decision making bodies, an 
increase in the total amount of control exercised by one decision making body will 
lead to increases in the total amount of control in the organisations. 
Table 4.4 shows the average amount of control for each co-operative, the 
amount of control exercised by the management committees (MC) and the 
membership group (MG). It also indicates the measure of inequality or 
differences in the distribution of control between the MC's and MG's. This is 
shown as MC-MG. A fairer distribution of control is where the mean differences 
is less than 1.00. 
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Table 4.4 
Distribution of Control and Democracy in the Co-operatives 
Co-operatives Membership Management MC-MG Total 
Group (MG) Committee 
(MC) 
1. Gin Distillers 1.67 3.58 1.19 2.66 
2. Tax! Drivers 1.79 4.50 2.71 2.71 
3. Rattan Weavers 4.42 3.75 0.67 3.05 
4. Grain Milling 3.63 3.75 0.42 2.96 
5. Block Makers 3.00 3.50 0.50 2.66 
6. Gin Distillers 1.80 2.00 0.20 1.86 
7. Herbalists 1.88 4.76 2.88 2.70 
8. Salt Winners 1.31 3.69 2.38 2.74 
9. Electrical Workers 4.22 1.00 -3.22 2.48 
10. Electrical Workers 3.55 3.73 0.18 2.94 
11. Taxi Drivers 1.71 4.14 2.43 2.49 
12. Taxi Drivers 1.67 3.92 2.25 2.39 
13. Taxi Drivers 1.00 4.71 3.71 2.42 
14. Gin Distillers 1.00 2.25 1.25 1.58 
15. Gin Distillers 2.20 2.80 0.60 2.00 
16. Textiles 3.67 3.67 0.00 2.87 
17. Gin Distillers 3.83 1.00 -2.83 2.77 
18. Gin Distillers 3.30 2.10 -1.20 2.13 
19. Gin Distillers 2.00 1.50 -0.50 1.50 
20. Gin Distillers 1.80 1.20 -0.60 1.46 
21. Gin Distillers 2.25 1.50 -0.75 1.75 
22. Gin Distillers 1.55 3.27 1.72 2.03 
23. Gin Distillers 4.70 1.00 -3.70 2.56 
24. Electrical workers 3.54 2.77 -0.77 2.48 
25. Block Makers 3.75 2.63 -1.12 2.79 
26. Grain Millers 2.00 4.00 2.00 2.33 
27. Taxi Drivers 1.86 4.43 2.57 2.43 
28. Taxi Drivers 2.33 4.00 1.67 2.44 
29. Taxi Drivers 1.80 4.60 2.80 2.50 
30. Taxi Drivers 1.67 4.33 2.66 2.33 
31. Taxi Drivers 1.00 4.60 3.60 2.20 
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An examination of the table shows that the following co-operatives noted below 
have a fairer distribution of influence between the two main decision making 
bodies. They are, therefore, described as Democratic Co-operatives. 
Raftan Weavers 
Grain Millers (4) 
Block Makers 
Electrical Workers (12) 
Tie & Dye (18) 
Block Makers (26) 
The differences in the distribution of influence range from -0.91 to 0.50. In the tie 
and dye co-operatives, we have a complete equalisation of power between the 
management committee and the member assembly. 
The data in table 4.4 upholds the assumption that a fairer distribution of control 
contributes to a greater amount of control in an organisation. The co-operatives 
indicated listed above recorded the highest amount of control, this ranged from 
2.48 to 3.06. 
The increases in the total amount of control are attributable to more control 
exercised by the management committee in these co-operatives: grain millers (4), 
block makers (5) and electrical workers (12). Increases in the amount of control 
attributable to the amount of control exercised by the membership group can be 
found in the rattan weaver (3) and the block makers (5). Increases in the total 
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ZkMount of control exercised by the management committees mean there is more 
hierarchical differentiation in the co-operatives. On the other hand, increases in 
the amount of control exercised by the membership group leads to the 
IIZAqualisation of power in the co-operatives. 
4-4 Patterns of Control in the Co-operatives 
Ihe above section has shown how control is distributed among decision making 
bodies in the co-operatives. In this section, we shall identify co-operatives with 
Zimilar distribution of control among their decision making bodies and place them 
in some meaningful categories. For example, co-operatives where the 
Membership groups exercise the greatest amount of control will be placed in 
-similar category. 
From the data in Table 4.2, four different patterns of control can be identified 
among the co-operatives. These were described as; the Management 
Committee Controlled co-operatives, the Democratic co-operatives, the 
Membership Group Controlled co-operatives and the Inactive co-operatives. 
The Management Committee Controlled co-operatives are those co-operatives in 
Which the management committees exercise the greatest amount of control. They 
include the following fourteen co-operatives: 
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" Taxi Drivers (2)22 
" Gin Distillers (1) 
" Herbalists (7) 
" Salt winners (8) 
" Taxi Drivers (11) 
" Taxi Drivers (12) 
" Taxi Drivers (13) 
" Gin Distillers (22) 
" Taxi Drivers (26) 
" Taxi Drivers (27) 
" Taxi Driver (26 
" Taxi Driver (29) 
" Taxi Driver (30) 
" TaxiDriver (31) 
The Democratic co-operatives represent co-operatives in which control has been 
fairly distributed among the decision making bodies. These co-operatives are; 
* Rattan Weavers (3) 
Grain Millers (4) 
Block Makers (5) 
Electrical Workers (12) 
Tie & Dye (18) 
Block Makers (26) 
22 The numbers represent the roll numbers of the co-operatives as given in the tables. See for instance, 
Table 4.4. 
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I -rhe Membership Group Controlled co-operatives are those co-operatives where 
the membership group exercise the greatest amount of influence. Such co- 
Qperatives are the following; 
Electrical Workers (10) 
Gin Distillers (19) 
Gin Distillers (20) 
Electrical Workers (25) 
Grain Millers (27) 
Another group of co-operatives that can be identified in Table 4.2 are the Inactive 
CO-operatives. These co-operatives are described as inactive because of the 
Very low scores of control shown by their decision making bodies . 
23 These co- 
OPeratives are; 
Gin Distillers (6) 
Gin Distillers (14) 
Gin Distillers (15) 
Gin Distillers (19) 
Gin Distillers (20) 
Gin Distillers (23) 
23 This term has been borrowed from Tannenbaum. In a similar way, he has used it to describe members 
With lower levels of participation in his study of Trade Unions, See A. S Tannenbaum and R. L. Kahn, 
Participation in Union Locals, Evaston, IU, 1958. 
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We have in this section endeavoured to identify the different patterns of control in 
the co-operatives. The rationale for this was to enable us compare the 
participatory schemes in the co-operatives in terms of the patterns of control 
exhibited by the co-operative. This is to help us determine the extent to which 
participatory schemes in the co-operatives influence member participation and 
control in the co-operatives. 
It can be observed that almost all the Inactive Co-operatives come from the same 
industry group of co-operatives. Does this mean that the pattern of control in a 
co-operative is determined by its industry group or the type of co-operative? In 
the next section we shall attempt to provide answers to this question. 
4.41 The Patterns of Control and the Co-operative Industry Groups 
Table 4.5 shows the distribution of the different patterns of control in the co- 
operatives across the co-operative industry groups. In the table, we have shown 
the number of co-operative industry groups which falls within each of the four 
different patterns of control. 
The distribution of control across the co-operative industry groups shows 
the management controlled co-operatives as the most predominant pattern of 
control amOng the co-operatives. This involves mostly all the taxi drivers, the 
salt winners, the herbalists co-operatives and only two of the gin distillers. 
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In a similar manner the distribution of the membership group and the democratic 
11ý0-operatives cuts across almost all the industry groups. Incidentally, the six 
Inactive Co-operatives happen to be all Gin Distiller Co-operatives. 
'rable 4.5 
'rhe Patterns of Control and the Co-operative Industry Groups ýL Patterns of Control 
Management Membership Democratic Inactive 
Industry Group Controlled Group Co-ops Co-ops 
Co-ops Controlled 
Co-ops 
Gin Distillers 2 26 
Z. Taxi Drivers 10 
ý- Rattan Weavers 
Block Makers 2 
Herbalists I 
Electrical Workers 
'ý- Tie and Dye 1 
ý- Grain MiHers 11 
ý- Salt Winners 1 
Total 14 566 
-Although all the taxi driver co-operatives fall under the management controlled 
tO-operatives, one cannot easily conclude that co-operative industry groups is a 
Oredictor of the pattern of control of a co-operative. This is because the 
distribution of the democratic co-operatives is spread over the different co- 
'Operatives industry grouPs. 
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4.42 Patterns of Control in the Worker and Service Co-operatives 
The patterns of control in the two different types of co-operatives, the worker and 
service co-operatives is indicated in Table 4.6. 
Table 4.6 
Patterns of Control and Types of Co-operatives 
Worker Co-operatives Service 
Co-operatives 
Patterns bj Co-operatives Co-operatives Co-operatives 
Control For Hire of with Collective aiding 
Members Labour Workshop independent 
Craftsmen 
Management 
Committee 
Controlled 
Co-operatives 
Membership 2 
Group 
Controlled 
Co-operatives 
Democratic 
Co-operatives 
1 13 
3 
5 
Inactive 6 
Co-operatives 
Total 31 27 
Although, the service co-operatives, that is the co-operatives aiding independent 
member enterprises, constitute the majority of our sample, there was no 
indication that it determined the concentration of power in a decision making 
bodies. Of the twenty-seven co-operatives in that group, thirteen were 
characterised as management committee controlled co-operatives, five as 
democratic co-operatives, six inactive and three as membership group controlled 
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co-operatives. Among the worker co-operatives, two of the co-operatives are 
membership controlled, one is democratic and another co-operative is 
management committee controlled. 
We have seen in this section and those above the various ways in which control 
is distributed in the co-operatives and how the different types of co-operatives are 
related to the distribution of control. In the section below, we present our 
observations on decision-making processes in the co-operatives. This is to 
provide us with a more descriptive background of the informal and formal forms of 
control in the co-operatives. 
4.5 Observation of Decision Making Processes in the Co-operatives 
Our discussions of self-management and control in the co-operatives have up till 
now been based on the - ratings of influence. This has come from our 
understanding of control as an outcome of the involvement of organisation 
members in decision making within the organisation. 
In this section, our objective is to provide an understanding of the forms of 
behaviour underlying participatory processes in the co-operatives. This is done 
by the observaton of decision making processes during annual general meetings 
in the co-operatives. Our observations are restricted to only three annual general 
meetings of three gin distillers co-operatives, numbered (1) (19) (24) in table 4.2. 
Annual general meetings are the meetings of the general body of members and 
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presents the major opportunity for members to elect officers and approve the 
annual budget of the society. 
The annual general meetings recorded here may be entirely unrepresentative of 
the number of annual general meetings that take place in other co-operatives. 
However, it was observed that a common agenda were used by the officers of 
the Department of Co-operatives in the Greater Accra Region for conducting all 
the annual general meetings in that region. Furthermore, these meetings are 
always officiated by the officers of the Department of Co-operatives responsible 
for the various districts in the Greater Accra Region. 
As a means of investigating the members behaviour and the social processes at 
the meetings, we identified the series of events in the co-operatives up to the 
annual general meeting. The Co-operative Decree stipulates that at least one 
general meeting must be held within a period of one year. In practice, annual 
general meetings take place after the co-operative has been able to prepare its 
annual accounts. Hence, the annual general meeting presented the opportunity 
to observe the direct involvement of members in the decision making of the most 
important issues affecting their society. It also presented an opportunity to 
observe a number of processes involving the application of the co-operative 
principles and ideas. 
Before the annual general meeting, the management committees conduct day 
to day administration of the co-operatives. The records of the society's business 
operations are kept by the secretary under the supervision of the management 
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committee. The Registrar of Co-operatives exercises considerable authority over 
the co-operatives at this stage. This occurs through periodic inspection and audit 
of their accounts. The results of this inspection and audit are normally given to 
management committees. At the end of the financial year, each co-operative 
society is required by law to prepare final accounts and a balance sheet. The 
management committees and the officers of the Department of Co-operatives 
decide on the distribution of any surplus accruing from the economic results. The 
balance sheet is then sent to the Registrar of Co-operative Societies for approval 
before the annual general meeting is held. Table 4.7 shows the agenda for the 
annual general meeting. 
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Table 4.7 
Agenda for Annual General Meeting of the Co-operatives 
No Event Average Time Allotted 
1. Opening Prayer 10 mins 
2. Introduction of Invited Guests 28 mins 
3. Introduction of the Chairman of the occasion 5 mins 
4. Address by the Chairman 33 mins 
5. Reading of previous minutes by the Secretary 14 mins 
6. Reading of the Balance Sheet 18 mins 
7. Address by the Regional Co-operative officer 30 mins 
8. Address by the Central Union Secretary 29 mins 
9. Address by the General Secretary 28 mins 
10. Election of Officers 14 mins 
11. Address by the newly-elected president 18 mins 
12. Chairman's closing remarks 25 mins 
13. Vote of thanks 8 mins 
14. Closing Prayer 12 mins 
Total time 32 mins 
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The agenda in table 4.7 indicates the main events or episodes of the meeting. 
Most of the speakers indicated in the table were mostly personnel from the 
secondary societies, the co-operative national apex bodies. They include the 
chairman for the occasion, the central union secretary, the general secretary (of 
the national Distillers Association of Ghana). The officers the Department of Co- 
operatives conducted the meetings in order to ensure that the co-operative rules 
were carried out to the letter. 
An examination of the processes and events at the various episodes brings out 
how much influence was exercised by the members at each stage. For instance, 
little importance was given to event 6 where members could have assumed 
authority through the discussions of the budgetary proposals. At the discretion of 
the government officer supervising the conduct of the meeting, very little time was 
allotted to this stage. An average of 18 minutes was given to this event. It was 
observed that some members had either forgotten what had been read or did not 
understand the importance of the annual report presented to the society. Hence, 
the report of the annual accounts was summarily accepted by a majority vote 
without any debate on it. Although there were reports of malpractice in some of 
the societies, these failed to come to the notice of the members. Prior 
information to members on the balance sheet would have been useful education 
of members on the actual importance of the balance sheet. 
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In event 10, the election of members was also an important episode whereby 
members could have exercised their influence. However, it was carried out with 
similar speed and treated with little significance to the society. 
The government officer again led the occasion by prompting the members to 
reinstate the old management committee. The members of the societies were 
given very little time to evaluate their performance and vote for or against them. 
As can be observed in the agenda, greater time was rather given to the speeches 
and exhortations of the guests and officers at the meeting. 
To record our observations of behaviour at the annual general meetings, we 
adopted Dill's procedures for the recording of meetings in his study of 
environmental influence on managerial autonomy. 24 To code the interactions at 
the meeting, we divided proceedings at the meetings into episodes. The main 
episodes were indicated by changes of speakers or shifts in topics according to 
the agenda given in table 4.6. For each episode, we recorded the speaker, 
apparent addressee and function of the episode. 
Following Dill, six functions were distinguished. 25 . These were: 
1. Talking Socially 
2. Giving information 
3. Questioning 
4. Offering suggestions, proposals and opinions 
24 W. R Dill, Environment as an Influence an Managerial Autonomy, Administrative 
Science Quarterly, p403443,1958. See also P. S. Goodinan and E. J. Colon, Observation 
of Meeting, in S. E. Seashore et al (eds. ) op. cit. 
25 W. R. Dill op. cit. 
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5. Stating decisions or rules of policy 
6. Giving orders, requesting action 
Each of the six functions indicate the type of behaviour shown by the people 
present at the meeting. The functions were classified as follows: Functions 1 and 
2 indicate "low influence" and 4 and 5 show "high influence". 
Appendix 7a shows details of the coding of behaviour at one of the co-operative 
meetings. It shows a break down of the meeting into twenty-one episodes. The 
speakers, address and the functions are recorded against each episode 
respectively. Appendix 7b to 7d also show the role of the decision making bodies 
at each of the 3 meetings. An aggregate of the roles of the decision-making 
bodies in the three co-operatives is presented in Table 4.8. 
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Table 4.8 
The Role of Decision Making Bodies at the Co-operative Annual General Meetings 
Membership Management External Intere 
Group Committee Group 
Co-operative No (19) (1) (24) Averagt (19) (1) (24) Average (19) (1) 
Percentage of interactions 42.1 45 52.3 46.5 10.4 10 9.4 9.9 47.2 5 
No. of Episodes in the 
Co-operatives 
19 
1 
24 
0= Talking Socially 5.2 5 4.7 4 15.8 15 
1= Give Information 5.2 5 
2= Questioning 15.8 20 28.5 21.4 
3= Offering Suggestions 10.5 10 9.5 10 5.2 5 4.7 4.9 5.2 5 
or proposals 
4= Stating Decisions or 15.8 15 14.3 15.0 5.2 10 
Rules of Policy 
5= Give Order or request action 15.8 10 
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Table 4.8 shows the roles played by the decision making bodies and the guests 
at the general meetings. The figures in the table represent percentages of the 
time given to the decision making bodies in the three co-operatives. The 
percentages of the time spent are distributed over the six functions describing the 
types of behaviour at the meetings. The percentages are derived from the total 
number of episodes recorded for each co-operative. 
Stating decisions by the membership group refer to three episodes at the 
meetings. They were, voting on the acceptance of previous minutes, election of 
new officers and voting on the acceptance of the annual budget. These are 
activities which involve the constitutional rights of members. Hence, they do not 
lead to any differences between the co-operatives. 
Raising of questions and stating decisions or rules of policy were the 
predominant activities of the membership groups at the annual general meetings. 
The raising of questions are members' responses to the reading of the annual 
budget by the officer of the Department of Co-operatives. The differences we 
see in the three co-operatives indicate the number of times members raised 
question in each co-operative. Hence, in co-operatives (24) the 28.5 percent 
means a larger number of members questioned some items in the annual 
budget. 
The management committees also had little impact on the proceedings at the 
meetings. The percentage of interactions was only 9.4 per cent. This indicates 
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that the management committees were less active than the individual members. 
One reason was that the agenda for the meeting assigned only one opportunity 
for the members of the management committee to speak at the meetings. This 
opportunity was given to the presidents-elect of the co-operative to give their 
inaugural address. 
The proportion of time spent by interest groups is almost the same as that spent 
by the membership group. A considerable amount of time, 43 per cent of the 
total time, was taken by them. Most of the contribution they made was in the 
form of speeches, exhorting members to work hard and explaining the 
punishment awaiting for disloyal members. 
The overall impression table 4.8 gives is the dominance of the external interest 
groups and of the membership groups at the meeting. This may not necessarily 
corroborate with our findings in sections 3.3 of this study. We must point out here 
that annual general meetings traditionally generate festive moments and guests 
are invited to speak to the member assembly. Two significant events, the election 
of new officers and members' approval of the annual budget, take place at 
annual general meetings. These events provide the only opportunities for the 
membership groups to exert their influence there. 
Certainly, there was considerable influence from the external interest groups, 
through the officers of the Department Of Co-operatives. This is quite supported 
by our data in Table 4.7 in which external influence on Finance and Investment 
and Budgeting is considerable. 
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summa! y 
The objective of this chapter was to investigate the degree of member 
participation and control in the co-operatives under study in this research. We 
were particularly concerned with the distribution of control between the decision- 
making bodies, that is the pattern of control in each of the co-operatives. 
Furthermore, we discussed the behavioural and social processes underlying 
decision making at three annual general meetings. 
The findings of our study showed that the management committees of the co- 
operatives had an overall dominance over the decision making issues. The 
influence of the membership group was conspicuous only in the election of 
officers of the co-operatives. The External Interest Groups showed considerable 
influence in only Research and Development and the Approval of Annual budget. 
Four different patterns of control were identified in the co-operatives. These were 
the management committee controlled, the democratic, the membership group 
controlled and the inactive co-operatives. The management group controlled co- 
operatives were those in which the management committee had exercised most 
amount of control. These consisted of 14 co-operatives. The co-operatives in 
which the membership group exercised the most controlled were also classified 
as the membership group. 
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The co-operatives which showed the least differences between the amount of 
control exercised by the decision making bodies were also classified as 
democratic co-operatives. The inactive co-operatives were those in which the 
decision bodies had little amount of control over the affairs of the co-operatives. 
Six co-operatives were therefore classified as inactive. 
A major conclusion reached after these findings was that the differences in the 
patterns of control in the co-operatives can neither be said to be related to their 
industry group or type of co-operative, that is service or worker co-operatives. 
In the study of the social processes at the three annual general meetings, we 
found that the government officers of the Department of Co-operatives controlled 
the proceeding at the meetings. There was also not enough information on the 
activities of the co-operative to allow members to follow events and take effective 
decisions. 
Even though the co-operatives can be seen to be adhering to the regulations 
guiding their activities, casting votes to elect officers or to accept the annual 
reports of the societies operations, members are in reality unable to exercise 
authority in the final decision over the annual budget of the society. They have 
become what Heller has described as "endorser' of other peoples 
recommendationS. 26 
26 Aspects of our observations have been categorised by Meacher into rules employed by 
the status quo to retain power in organisations. They include; a) Rules of the games ploy: 
this involves strict enforcement of the organisation routines as codified in organisation 
hand books and practices. This can hedge an individual's right to decision making or 
water it down through a forrn of representation of any possible interest. b) Fait accompli 
ploy, where one is restricted to a range of policy options determined by the management 
or the parameters of the decision are already fixed by them. c) Expert advice ploy, here 
specialists areas as accounting and investment lead members to depend on experts for 
advise and information because they lack the skills to decide and formulate options, and d) 
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In spite of the clarity of our findings, we have to remind ourselves of certain 
limitations expressed on our methodology for the measurement of control. We 
pointed out that the choice of management committees as key respondents to 
report on their perception of control as well as the reliance on researcher 
evaluation of control might bring some biases in our results. However, the 
general pattern of the findings and their comparability to other studies lead us to 
believe that our measures provide an accurate picture of control in the co- 
operatives. 
Timing of the papers ploy, this involves impeded access to information, because of the 
selection and the scheduling of items of information and topics for decision making. See 
S. Clegg, Organisation Democracy, Power and Participation, in: T. Crouch and F. Heeler 
(eds. ) Organisation Democracy and Political Process, New York, 1983. See also 
Robertson's report on local council meetings in Ghana. A. F. Robertson, The 
Composition and Procedure in Ahafo Councils, in J. Goody (ed. ), Changing Social C, Structure in Ghana. London 1975. 
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Chapter 5 
PARTICIPATORY SCHEMES IN THE CO-OPERATIVES 
In the previous chapter, we identified four different patterns of control in the co- 
operatives. These patterns of control indicated the different ways in which control 
is distributed among decision making bodies in the co-operatives. In this chapter, 
we shall investigate the extent to which the four patterns of control are associated 
with the different participatory schemes in the co-operatives. 
The purpose of this investigation comes from the major argument of this study 
that the degree of member participation and control is determined by the scheme 
of participation in the co-operatives. Hence, it is expected that differences in the 
properties of the participatory schemes in the co-operatives will account for the 
differences in the degree of member participation and control between the co- 
operatives. 
To study the impact of participatory schemes on participation and control in the 
co-operatives, we suggest the need to go beyond the classical model of co- 
operatives and search for possible variations in the participatory schemes of co- 
operatives. The classical model of co-operatives only provided a unitary model of 
co-operatives without suggesting the possibility of variations of structural 
variables in the co-operatives. 
The objectives of this chapter are, therefore, twofold. Firstly, the chapter will 
establish the properties of the participatory schemes in the co-operatives. This 
124 
should provide an empirical description of the participatory schemes of the co- 
operatives in Ghana. A second objective will be to investigate the extent to which 
the participatory schemes in the co-operatives determine the patterns of control 
in the co-operatives. Here, the concern of the study is to establish how 
differences between the participatory schemes in the co-operatives relate to the 
different patterns of control in the co-operatives. 
Three approaches are adopted for the tasks set out above. Firstly, both the 
accountability structure and administrative components of the co-operatives will 
be examined to provide an empirical description of the participatory schemes in 
the co-operatives. Secondly, the study will examine the pre-occupation of the co- 
operatives with regulations and rules to organise their activities. Thirdly, we shall 
establish the impact of the schemes of participation on the distribution of control 
in the co-operatives. 
5.1 The Accountability Structure in the Co-operatives 
The accountability structure in co-operatives was defined as the hierarchical 
structure of the co-operative organisations. It, therefore, represents the structural 
manifestation of the participatory schemes in co-operatives. Hence, it provides 
the basis for the comparative study of co-operatives. 
In this section, we shall first identify the major structural variables in the 
accountability structure that can be used to describe the participatory schemes in 
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the co-operatives. Secondly, we shall we use the structural variables to give an 
empirical description of the participatory schemes in the co-operatives. 
5.11 Structural Variables in the Accountability Structure 
The accountability structure suggests two forms of participation in decision 
making: direct participation and indirect participation through elected 
representatives. Out of the two forms of participation have evolved 
twocorresponding management structures in co-cperatives. Comforth has 
described them as "collective" and "representative democracies".. ' 
According to Comforth, the only structure in the collective model is "the general 
2 
meeting of all members". The general meeting of all members is also the only 
legitimate authority in the co-operatives. The representative democracy 
management structure has also been described as "dual structure" co- 
operativeS. 3 This is because it consists of both the general body of members and 
a managerial component, the management committee. The representative 
democracy management structure contains an explicit formal structure in which 
tasks are assigned to members and their main areas of responsibility delineated. 
Comforth has pointed out that this is an attempt to shape the process of power 
and influence in co-operatives. 
'in facý Comforth uses both terms to describe only the worker co-operatives. However, we consider both 
terms as applicable to also the service co-operative, since they describe the basic organisational structure 
observed in all co-operatives. 
See C. Comforth et al., Developing Successful Worker Co-operatives, Sage 
Publications, London, 1988. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
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The development from direct participation to representative democracy is 
associated with a number of problems. It may bring about division of labour and 
role specialisation in co-operatives. This in turn may lead to greater functional 
and hierarchical differentiation in the co-operatives. Hierarchical and functional f. 11 
differentiations both produce structures which may have negative effect in 
democratic control in co-operatives. 
The identification of the properties of the accountability structure above provides 
us with the major structural variables for the description of the participatory 
schemes in the co-operatives. In this regard, empirical information was obtained 
on the following structural variables: 
a. Form of representation; this was described as direct or indirect 
participation. Direct participation is the personal and immediate 
involvement of members of the co-operatives in decision making. 
Indirect form of participation represents a mediated involvement of 
members through elected representatives. The objective of this 
mea! 3ure is to determine the nature of the access to decision 
making in the co-operatives. 
b. Number of elected officers: a count of elected members in the 
management committee. 
C. Role specialisation and division of labour: the distribution of 
official duties among a number of positions. A function is 
considered specialised when it is performed by one of more 
4 der :> F. Furstenberg, Probleme Mitglieder Partizipation auf verschiedene 
genossenschaftlichen Entwicklungsstufen, in: E. Dulfer & W. Hamm, (eds. ) Die 
Genossenschaften zwischen Mitgliederpartizipation, t> Verbundbildung und 
Burokratietendenz, Gottingen, 1983 
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persons as full tim(?. 5 Hence, the measure involves a count of 
the number of roles in the management committee and the 
number of sub committees set up to deal with special issues. 
d. The frequency of meetings by the membership group and the 
management committees. The frequency of number of meetings 
was scored as follows: 
Not once 0 
Annually 1 
About every 6 months 2 
About once a month 3 
About every 2 weeks 4 
Once a week 5 
Information on these variables was obtained from interviews with the 
management committees of the co-operatives. Further discussions were held 
with the local officers of the Department of Co-operatives and the secretaries of 
the co-operatives; to ascertain their accuracy. In addition to the interviews and 
discussions with the above mentioned respondents, we obtained more 
information from the records of the co-operatives. For example, information on 
the frequency of meetings was obtained from the minutes book of the co- 
operatives. Appendix 8 provides data on the variables. 
5See D. S. Pugh et al, Dimensions of op. cit. 
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5.12 Forms of Representation and Managerial Roles in the 
Co-operatives 
Appendix 8 provides information on the structural characteristics of the 
participatory schemes in the co-operatives. Only two co-operatives, the electrical 
workers (10,25), subscribed to Cornforth's ideal type "collective" co-operatives. 6 
The rest of the co-operatives exhibited the indirect form of participation. They 
can, therefore, be described as " dual structure" co-operatives or representative 
demQcracies. 
The only specialised role in the two electrical co-operatives was that of the 
President of the society. He leads in the negotiations for contracts, and assign 
tasks to other members. He also acts as the society's secretary by making 
recording in their books. Since members of the two co-operatives had similar 
skills in radio and electrical engineering, several tasks were rotated amongst 
them. 
In the "dual structure" co-operatives, the size of the management committees 
ranged from 7 to 11 - The number of members seemed to be related to co- 
operative industry groups. The Taxi Drivers and the Sait Winners co-operatives 
had the largest number of elected officers, eleven each, in their management 
committees. 
In most of the co-operative, the major roles in the management committee were 
the tripartite roles of President, Vice President and Treasurer. These were the 
6C. Comforth et al, op. CiL 
7 Ibid. 
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basic role prescribed in the co-operative model bye-laws. The Taxi Driver co- 
operatives had more specialised roles. They had created specialist positions 
which included the President, Treasurer, Vice Treasurer, Chief Driver and 
Welfare Officer. In addition, they had established two permanent sub- 
committees, the Disciplinary and Transport committees. 
Out of these roles, the positions of Chief Driver and Welfare Officer were the 
most innovative. Traditionally, a chief driver was an esteemed position offered to 
a person who has acquired considerable experience and respect as a driver. In 
the days when trade unions were not prevalent in Ghana, this person became 
the unofficial leader of the drivers. The Chief Driver, as in the former days, gives 
his expert opinion on technical issues, resolves disputes among drivers and gives 
them guidance. The function of the Welfare Officer is to take charge of matters 
affecting the welfare of members; for instance, attendance at funerals of 
deceased members and their relatives and the giving of donations to bereaved 
families on behalf of the society. 
The disciplinary committee was established to ensure order in the co-operatives. 
Drivers were expected to conform to some rules which included, proper treatment 
of passengers, no drunkenness whilst driving and proper dressing. The aim of 
this code of practice was to enhance the image of the Drivers co-operatives and 
distinguish them from their rivals from the Trade Union. 
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The Transport Committee handled technical problems relating to drivers' 
operations. This included the provision of legal aid for drivers involved in traffic 
offences, and maintenance of order at the taxi ranks. 
In Table 5.1, we have provided a compilation of the forms of representation and 
managerial roles in the co-operatives. 
Table 5.1 
Managerial Roles and Representative Bodies in the Co-operatives 
Co-operatives Managerial Roles and Types of Representatives 
1 Gin Distillers MC: * President/ Vice President SC: * None 
I Treasurer 
2. Taxi Drivers MC: President Nice President/ SC: Transport Committee 
Treasurer/ Welfare Officer/ Disciplinary Committee Welfare 
Chief Driver Committee 
3. Rattan Weavers: MC: President, Vice President, SC: None 
Treasurer 
4. Grain Millers MC: President, Vice President, SC: None 
Treasurer 
5. Block Makers MC: President, Vice President, SC: None 
Treasurer 
6. Gin Distillers MC: President I Vice President SC: None 
/ Treasurer 
7. Herbalists MC: President/ Vice President SC None 
/ Treasurer 
8. Salt Winners MC: President/ Vice President SC None 
/ Treasurer 
9. Electrical Workers MC: Only President SC None 
10. Electrical Workers MC: President, Vice President, 
Treasurer 
11. Taxi Drivers MC. President/ Vice President 
/ Treasurer / Welfare Officer 
Chief Driver 
12. Taxi Drivers MC. President / Vice President 
Treasurer/ Welfare Officer/ 
Chief Driver 
13. Taxi Drivers MC: President, Vice President, 
Treasurer/ Welfare Officer/ 
Chief Driver 
14. Gin Distillers MC. President/ Vice President 
/ Treasurer 
15. Gin Distillers MC. President/ Vice President 
16. 'Fie and Dye MC. President/ Treasurer 
17. Gin Distillers MC: President/ Treasurer 
18. Gin Distillers MC: President/Vice 
President/Treasurer 
19. Gin Distillers MC: President/Vice 
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SC: None 
SC. Transport Committee / 
Disciplinary Committee /Welfare 
Committee 
SC. Transport Committee 
Disciplinary Committee /Welfare 
Committee 
SC: Transport Committee 
Disciplinary Committee / Welfare 
Committee 
SC. None 
SC. None 
SC: None 
SC: None 
SC: None 
SC: None 
President/Treasurer 
20. Gin Distillers MC: President/ Treasurer 
21. Gin Distillers MC: President/ Treasurer 
22. Gin Distillers MC: President/Vice 
PresidentlTreasurer 
23. Gin Distillers MC: President / Vice 
President/Treasurer 
24. Electrical Workers MC: Only President 
25. Block Makers MC: President/Vice 
President/Treasurer 
26. Taxi Drivers MC. President/ Vice President/ 
Treasurer / Welfare Officer / 
27. Taxi Drivers MC. President/ Vice President/ 
Treasurer/ Welfare Officer/ 
28 Taxi Drivers MC. President/ Vice President/ 
Treasurer / Welfare Officer / 
29. Taxi Drivers MC. President/ Vice President/ 
Treasurer/ Welfare Officer/ 
SC: None 
SC: None 
SC: None 
SC: None 
SC: None 
SC: None 
SC. Transport Committee / 
Disciplinary Committee / Welfare 
Committee 
SC. Transport Committee 
Disciplinary Committee / Welfare 
Committee 
SC. Transport Committee 
Disciplinary Committee / Welfare 
Committee 
SC. Transport Committee 
Disciplinary Committee / Welfare 
Committee 
30, Taxi Drivers MC. President / Vice President / SC. Transport Committee / 
Treasurer / Welfare Officer / Disciplinary Committee / Welfare 
31. Grain Millers MG. President/ Vice President Committee 
*MC: Management Committee 
*SC: Sub-Committee 
5.13 Meetings in the Co-operatives 
Meetings are the most important means for co-operative members to participate 
directly in decision making. They are also media for information exchange and 
consultations. 8 Appendix 8 contains information collected on two types of 
meetings. They are meetings by the membership group and by the management 
commiftees. 
The co-operatives which held meetings most frequently were the electrical 
workers, rattan weavers and the grain millers. These co-operatives held their 
meetings fortnightly. This group is followed by the herbalists, taxi drivers and 
. 
$A. S. Tannenbaum et. al, Participation in Union Locals, op. cit. 
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some of the gin distillers with monthly meetings. In the electrical workers co- 
operatives members also reported that there were no formal meetings. Issues 
arising out of their operations were casually discussed and eventual decisions 
taken. Such discussions took place at least once every week. 
The other most interesting patterns of meetings were found in the rattan 
weavers, grain millers, and the salt winners co-operatives. Meetings at the rattan 
weavers and at the grain miller were almost of a similar pattern. The usual 
pattern was that the management committees met on Fridays every fortnight. 
Decisions taken at such meetings were not final; on the following day, the 
committees would meet the general body of members to obtain their approval for 
these decisions. 
At the salt winners, there were further meetings by the management committees 
of the primary co-operatives, but these were held together with the general body 
of members to inform them of the decisions taken together with the local union. 
In the rest of the co-operatives, meetings took a common pattern in the form of 
regular monthly meetings. A few of the Gin Distillers co-operatives, however, 
rarely held committee meetings. Their management committees usually met well 
over six months' intervals. 
There was not much distinction in the two types of co-operatives, the workers and 
the service co-operatives. Two worker co-operatives, Electrical Workers, 
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maintained a direct form of participation, while the rest of the worker co- 
operatives adopted a representative form of management as the service 
co-operatives. 
The "dual structure" co-operatives, co-operatives with representative 
management structures, tend to develop administrative components. This 
feature of co-operatives is investigated in the next section. 
5.2 The Administrative Component in the Co-operatives 
The administrative component is the hierarchical structure of full-time officials for 
the implementation of the policies of the co-operatives. They are appointed by 
the management committee and governed by the rules of the bye-laws. 
The model bye-laws recognise the secretary of the society as the head of the 
administrative component. His duties are: 
a. To keep accounts of the society 
b. To summon and attend meetings as directed by the committee 
C. To prepare financial statements 
d. To record proceedings of the meetings 
The administrative component is considered as an outcome of the representative 
management system in self-managed organisations. Macdonald and Warner 
have called it a hybrid of an organisation, because it has both the legal rational 
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elements of a bureaucratic organisation and a democratic structure. 9 They have 
pointed out that in such an organisation, the management committee's authority 
is exercised downward through the administrative component. At the same, time 
the general body of members continues to express their will upwards through 
their representatives. 
To study such characteristic features of the administrative component in the co- 
operatives, we considered the following structural variables: 
a. The size of the administrative component: this is a count of 
number of people working in it. 
b. Number of hired labour; a count of the administrative staff who 
are non members. 
Percentage of hired labour in the administration. 
Information on the size of administrative component and the number of hired 
labour was obtained from the President and Secretary of the society. The 
accuracy of the information was ascertained from the records of each co- 
operatives. 
Appendix 8 contains information on the scores of the three variables. The 
Appendix indicates that the majority of the co-operatives employed only one 
person to administer their affairs. This was the co-operative secretary, whose 
employment was a basic requirement for the establishment of a co-operative. It 
9Lex MacDonald and W. Malcolm, Bureaucratic and Democratic Structures in 
occupational Associations, in D. S. Pugh and C. R. Hinnings (eds. ), Organisational 
Structure Extensions and Replications, Saxone House, Hampshire, 1978. 
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was only the Herbalists and Gin Distillers co-operatives who employed more than 
one officer in their administrative component. 
In the gin distillers co-operatives, it was observed that increasing administrative 
procedures had necessitated increases in the size of their administrative 
component. The gin distillers, as we noted earlier, had as one of their main 
functions the collection of levies and taxes on the sale of members' products. 
This has necessitated the employment of "checkers" to track down members 
who defaulted in their payments of levies. The four administrative staff of the 
Herbalists co-operatives included a secretary and three nurses. 
The number of hired labour in the administrative component ranges from 1 to 4 
persons in the co-operative. (See Appendix 8). The proportion of hired labour to 
the size of the Administrative component ranges from zero to 100 percent. The 
table shows only the Gin Distillers and Herbalists with a sizeable percentage of 
hired labour. In general, one can conclude that the administrative component 
does not play significant role in the co-operatives. 
5.3 Decision Rules in the Co-operatives 
In chapter three, it was pointed out that the major source of regulations for 
participation in decision making in co-operatives in Ghana are the co-operative 
bye-laws. It was further observed that the co-operative bye-laws do not cover the 
whole universe of activities in the co-operatives. The bye-laws provided the rule 
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for decision making mostly for the institutional and administrative decision issues 
in the co-operatives. 
In addition to the bye-laws, it is possible that the co-operatives as socio-economic 
organisations, will develop other decision rules to regulate their activities. Our 
task in this section, therefore, is to examine the pre-occupation of the co- 
operatives with any formal decision rules for the regulation of their activities. In 
particular, we are interested in the extent to which activities in the co-operatives 
are formalized. According to Pugh, formalization is the "extent to which rules, 
procedures and instructions, and communications are written. "10 The extent of 
formalization of activities should be considered in terms of the context in which 
the co-operatives operate in Ghana. Studies on small-scale industries in Ghana 
suggest that their mode of operations is based on customary practices. The 
application of written down rules in the co-operatives should, therefore, influence 
the development of formal decision making structures, the practices and ideals of 
co-operation. 
5.31 Sources of Decision Rules in the Co-operatives 
A major source of rules for the regulation of co-operatives' activities have come 
from the catalogue of co-operative principle sanctioned by the International co- 
operative Alliance (ICA). 
11 These are: 
10 D. S. Pugh et al, Dimensions oE.., op. cit. IDE researchers also use similar definition 
but limit themselves to the extent to which rules "describe a certain involvement of groups 
in organisation decision including. " See IDE, op. cit. 
"International Co-operative Alliance (ICA), Report of the ICA Commission on Co- 
operative Principles, London, 1967 
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1. Open and Voluntary membership 
2. One man, one vote in the co-operative decision making process. 
3. Fixed and limited interest on share holdings 
4. Equitable distribution of the economic results of the co-operative 
among members 
5. Education of members 
6. Co-operation among co-operators 
These principles have come out of the ideological and philosophical ideals of co- 
operatives as well as from the practical experiences of co-operatives since their 
inception. 12 According to the ICA, these principles seek to guarantee equal 
access to members to participate in decision making within co-operatives. 
In Ghana co-operative principles have been incorporated into Decree 252 of 
1968, to provide the regulations and procedures for registering and establishing 
co-operatives as socio-economic organisation in the country. The regulations 
provide specific details on certain powers granted to the co-operatives to 
formulate their own rules and draw up their own bye-laws. 
12The principles are actually derived from the original catalogue of principles developed 
by the Rochdale Pioneers. The original principles included; 1. Open and voluntary C, 
membership, 2. Democratic Control, 3. Fixed and limited interest in capital, 4. Dividend 
on purchase, 5. Building of reserve funds, 6. Guaranty of quality products and auxiliary, C, 
7. Non credit trading, 8. Education of members and 9. Political and religious neutrality. 
See E. Dulfer, Betriebswirtschocftslehie der ... op. cit. 
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In order to determine what rules and regulations exist in the co-operatives, we 
followed Dachler and VVilpert and categorisation of regulations and rules in 
organisa. tions as follows: 13 
1. Legal bases, such as Clauses in a country's constitution 
regulating the activities of economic organisation. For instance, 
industrial worker co-operatives can be subjected to existing 
industrial laws in the country of origin. 
2. Special contractual arrangements between members regarding 
e. g. resource contribution and role behaviour. 
3. Policies of the co-operative management concerning the 
organisation of work and administration in the co-operative. 
Information on the above category of decision rules was obtained from written 
documents such as the co-operative bye-laws. The 21 decision making issues 
(see table 4.1) were used to determine the extent to which decision rules were 
used in decision making in the co-operatives. A score of one was given to a 
decision issue when a document specified some regulation on that issue. 
5.32 Preoccupation of the Co-operatives with Decision Rules 
Table 5.2 indicates the sources of decision rules used in the co-operatives. In 
the table are the three different sources of decision rules in the co-operatives, 
13H. P Dachler and B. WilpeM op. cit. 
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namely: the Co-operative bye-laws, business policy and national law. We have 
also given the number and percentage of co-operatives that use a particular 
decision rule. Appendix 9 provides general information on the decision making 
issues with decision rules. 
The co-operatives bye-laws provided the major source of decision rules in all the 
co-operatives. This involves decisions dealing with social and administrative 
issues. Because the co-operatives subscribe to similar bye-laws, the number of 
rules used in the co-operatives do not differ very much from one another. There 
are quite a few exceptions to these observations. The worker co-operatives, 
electrical workers co-operatives and the herbalists, use a greater number of rules 
for decision making. The reason comes from their types of economic activities. 
These are worker co-operatives where members work together in a production 
work shop. 
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Table 5.2 
Sources of Decision Making Rules in the Co-operatives 
Decision issues No. of Bye-Laws Business National law 
Co-operatives policy 
No. Percent No Percent No. Percent 
A. Social, Administrative and member 
problems 
1. Recruitment and dismissal of 31 31 (100.0) 
members 
2. Rules and discipline 31 22 (66.7) 11 (33.3) 
3. Provision of social services 31 31 (100) 
4. Education 2 2 (6.1) 
5. Member relations 14 14 (42.0) 
6. System of participation 31 31 (100.0) 
7. Incentive systems 31 29 (93.0) 2 (6.1) 
8. Election of officers 31 33 (100.0) 
B. Technical and production problems 
9. Improvement of work conditions, 
problems of industrial safety 
10. Research and development 2 2 (6.1) 
11. Changes in work organisation and 12 12 (36.4) 
administration 
12. Maintenance of equipment 1 1 (3.0) 
13. Quality control 4 4 (12.1) 
14. Raw material supplies 3 - 3 (9.1) 
15. Sales commercialisation 18 8 (24.2) 
16. Selection of technology 4 4 (12.1) 
C Problems of economic and financial 
management 
17. Investment and growth I - 1 (3.0) 
18. Production planning 4 - 4 (12.1) 
19. Financing and operating 31 31 (100.0) 
20. Pricing policy 14 14 (42.2) 
21. Budgeting and annual accounts 31 31 (100.0) 
10 (30.3) 
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Only three groups of co-operatives have developed their own business policies 
for their operations. For instance, all the taxi co-operatives relied on similar 
instructions in the areas of changes in work organisation and disciplines. The 
transport and disciplinary committees had developed some rules on how drivers 
were to behave at the taxi ranks. Such rules spell out precisely sanctions to be 
taken against members who contravened them. 
The gin distillers had special rules for quality control and sale of members' 
control. These rules were actually designed by their national apex bodies. There 
was also a national regulation which made it obligatory for members to pay levies 
to their co--operatives. 
In fact, the gin distillers were the only co-operatives found to have such national 
regulations regarding any contractual agreements between the members and 
their co-operatives. In the rest of the co-operatives, there was no form of 
contractual agreements binding members to deliver their products or offer some 
kind of services to their co-operatives. The only form of contractual 
arrangements was found in the Bye-laws. This stipulated the type of financial 
contributions to be made by members. 
There were also quite a number of unregulated activities in the co-operatives. 
Most of these would have occurred within the individual member enterprises or 
through informal co-operation among members. In the salt co-operatives, there 
were such informal forms of activities. The beginning of the seasons for making 
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of salt was organised by the co-operatives. The co-operatives made sure that 
members performed some customary rites before the beginning and ending of 
the salt making season. These were observed by certain traditional rites which 
were organised by the co-operatives. 
5.4 Structural Factors in the Co-operatives 
The descriptions of the accountability structures, administrative components and 
the decision rules in the co-operatives in the previous sections offer a number of 
structural variables which one can use to describe the participatory schemes in 
the co-operatives. 
These structural variables are: 
a. The accountability structure 
The form of representation; direct and indirect participation through 
elected representatives 
Role specialisation and division of labour; a count of the number 
of managerial roles including sub-committees in the 
co-operatives 
Size of the management committee; number of elected officers in 
the management committee 
Number of meetings by the management committees 
Number of meetings by the General Body of members 
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The administrative component 
Number of Hired Labour 
Percentage of Hired Labour 
Size of the Administrative Component; number of full time staff in 
the co-operative 
C. Decision Rules; number of written down regulation for decision making 
in the co-operatives 
These structural variables represent the dimensions along which participatory 
schemes can vary in co-operatives. Appendix 8 provides the scores of the 
structural variables for each of the co-operatives. In table 5.3, we have an 
aggregation of the scores in terms of the co-operative industrý groupS. 14 
14The structural variables have been adopted from various sources including; H. P. Dachler /B. Wilpert, ZD 
op. cit. M. Rosner and U. Leviathan , (eds. ) Work and Organization in Kibbutz Industry, Norwood, 1980. 
E. Dulfer, Betriebswirtshaftslehre der ... op. cit. 
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Among the variables in table 5.3, size of the management committees, size of the 
Administrative component and the number and percentage of Hired Labour 
appear to be similar in all the co-operatives. This is with the exception of the 
electrical co-operatives. The electrical co-operatives have quite smaller sizes of 
management committees. This comes from the fact that two of the co-operatives 
have a direct form of representation. The other exception, the taxi drivers co- 
operatives, had as many as eleven elected officers. 
Many of the co-operatives have employed their own members to manage their 
affairs. The only exception to this were the gin distillers co-operatives and 
herbalists. In the herbalists co-operatives all the staff were non members and in 
the gin distillers as much as 75 per cent of the staff were also non members. 
Also the herbalists also had 100 per cent of their staff employed. In the herbalists, 
these officers were nurses and in the distillers they were checkers. It should be 
pointed out here that these were also the two industry group of co-operatives 
whose officers are also engaged in activities other than mere recording of 
minutes and business activities. 
The major sources of differences amongst the co-operatives were in number of 
meetings and role specialisation. The number of meetings shows considerably 
different trends. The management committee meetings varied from fortnightly 
meetings to half-yearly meetings. The meetings of the general body of members 
also ranged from yearly annual general meetings to fortnightly meetings. 
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The most striking of the differences between the co-operatives, however, is role 
specialisation in the co-operatives. These differences are shown in Table 5.4. 
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The taxi drivers co-operative exhibited different forms of role specialisation. Role 
specialisation has occurred within the management committee instead of he 
administrative component. Unlike the Taxi Drivers, the Gin Distillers co- 
operatives have kept the size of their management committees to the minimum of 
seven required for their establishment. However, they have created new 
administrative roles in the form of "Checkers". 
5.5 Patterns of Control and their Structural Variables 
We have up to this point, in this chapter, provided an empirical description of the 
various participatory schemes in the co-operatives. In this section, we shall 
investigate the extent to which the participatory schemes in the co-operatives 
determine member participation and control in them. Our approach to the 
investigation is to look for the combination of structural variables associated with 
each of the four patterns of control. The four patterns of control are: the 
management controlled co-operatives, the democratic co-operatives, the 
membership group controlled co-operatives and the inactive co-operatives. The 
four patterns of control in the co-operatives were determined by grouping 
together co-operatives with similar distribution of control among the decision 
making bodies. 
The reasons for using the four patterns of control as a basis for assessing the 
influence of the participatory schemes on participation and control comes from 
our assumption that control in co-operatives is related to organisational attributes 
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as role speculation, division of labour and hierarchy of authority. 15 Hence, we 
expect that each of the four patterns of control will be characterised by a 
particular combination of structural variables. In other words, we expect co- 
operatives with similar distributions of control among the decision making bodies 
to be characterised by a similar combination of structural variables. 
The structural variables for the investigation are derived from the structural 
properties of the accountability structure, the administrative component and 
decision rules in the co-operatives. To investigate the combination of structural 
variables characteristic with the each of the four patterns of control, we computed 
the aggregates of the scores of the structural variables of the co-operatives listed 
in Appendix 8. The aggregation of the scores was computed in terms of the 
patterns of control to which a co-operative belonged. 
Table 5.5 provides information on the combination of structural variables 
underlying each pattern of control. The data in the table represents the 
aggregates of the structural variables of the co-operatives for each of the four 
patterns of control. 
15 A. S. Tannenbaum (ed. ), Control in Organizations, New York, McGraw Hill, 1968.11. P. Dachler & B. 
Wilpert, OP. cit- 
150 
Table 5.5 
The Patterns of Control and their Structural Features 
Democratic Managemerrr Membership Inactive 
Co-ops Committee Group Co-ops 
Controlled Controlled 
Co-ops Co-ops 
Structural Factors n=6 n=14 n=5 n=6 
A. The Accountability Structure 
Size of the Management Committee 7.6 10 4.2 7 
Form of Representation 2 2- 1.6 2- 
Role of Specialization 3.8 6.9 2.0 3.6 
Management Committee Meetings 3.6 3.0 4.0 2.3 
Membership Group Meetings 2.8 1.5 2.6 0.8 
B. The Administrative Component 
Size of the Administrative Component 1- 15 1.8 1.5 
Number of Hired Labour 0 0.5 0.6 1.2 
Percent of Hired Labour 0 40.7 20.0 83.3 
C. Decision Rules 9.2 9.4 11.0 10.0 
The Accountability Structure 
The four different patterns of control in the co-operatives variables show 
considerable variations between their accountability structures. In particular, the 
size of the management committees ranges from the score of 4.2 to 10. The 
management committee controlled co-operatives have the highest score of 10. 
The size of the membership group controlled co-operatives even falls below the 
minimum number of seven required for the establishment of co-operatives. The 
reason for the smaller size of the management committee is that the two 
electrical workers co-operatives in the membership controlled co-operatives did 
not have any management Committee. 
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The form of representation is described as direct participation or an indirect 
participation. The score of one (1) represents direct participation and the score Of 
two (2) denotes indirect participation. The indirect form of participation appears to 
be the predominant form of participation in decision making. It is only in the 
membership group controlled co-operatives where indirect form of participation 
was not predominant. This is because only the direct form of participation 
prevailed in the electrical worker co-operatives. 
Role specialisation also varies considerably between the four patterns of control. 
The greatest number of roles are found in the management controlled co- 
operatives while the least number of roles are found in the membership group 
controlled co-operatives. 
Meetings in the co-operatives were of two types. The management committee 
meetings and the membership group meetings. The higher scores denote 
frequent meetings in the co-operatives. (See section 5.11) Management 
committee meetings were more frequent in the membership groups controlled co- 
operatives than the others. In these co-operatives, the management committee 
meetings were held fortnightly and on the average monthly meetings were held 
by the membership group. The co-operatives with the least number of meetings 
were the inactive co-operatives. In these co-operatives meetings the 
membership group rarely held meetings and the management committees met 
about every six months. From the table, it can be observed that in the 
membership controlled and democratic co-operatives, meetings by the 
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membership group were more frequent than those of the management 
committees. This observation suggests that the number of meetings in the co- 
operatives is one of the major contributory factors determining the patterns of 
control in the co-operatives. 
The Administrative Component 
The administrative component includes the structural variables, size of the 
administrative component, number of hired labour, and percent of hired labour. 
Table 5.5 indicates almost similar size for the administrative components in the 
co-operatives. As we pointed out earlier in this chapter, it was only in the 
distillers co-operatives that the size of the administrative component was 
observed to be up to four in number. Otherwise, most of the co-operatives 
employed only one secretary. Our discussions with the management committee 
about the implications of the employment of hired labour revealed that that they 
were completely of its implications. In co-operatives, especially the worker co- 
operatives, the employment of hired labour contradicts the ideals of self- 
management and self-administration. 
Decision Rules 
Decision rules provide the normative framework in organisations. In co- 
operatives, the bye-laws are the major source of rules for the regulation of 
activities. In table 5.5, the membership group controlled co-operatives appeared 
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to use the greatest number of decision rules. The least number of decision rules 
comes from the democratic co-operatives. 
In the above discussions, we have outlined the major differences between the 
four patterns of control in terms of the structural variables in Table 5.5. Our major 
interest in this section is to establish whether or not there is a specific 
combination of structural factors underlying the different patterns of control in the 
co-operatives. That is, the extent to which the levels of the scores of the 
structural variables are related to one another. 
To investigate relationships between the patterns of control and the structural 
variables in the table, we followed the congruency theory. The theory, according 
to Brown, suggests that "organisations which are internally consistent as to their 
structure, process and ideology will be more effective in meeting designed 
outcomes. 06 She suggests further that "an internally consistent participatory 
democratic organisation is decentralised, has low levels of task specialisation, 
makes use of consensus decision making procedures .. uses more information 
channels and has a participatory democratic organisation and leader ideology. 
07 
The relationships between the structural variables as posited in the congruency 
theory can be observed in the democratic co-operatives. These show lower 
scores in their structural variables. This is indicated by the average score of one 
16 L. H. Brown, Democracy in Organization, Membership Participation and Organization Characteristics 
in U. S. Retail Food Co-operatives, Organizational Studies, Vol. 64 p313-334. 
17 Ibid. 
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for the administrative component. The size of the management committee is 
seven and just up to the basic requirement for the establishment of co-operatives 
in Ghana. However, they have considerably higher score for their meetings. 
The Management Committee controlled co-operatives have higher scores for 
their structural variables than the democratic co-operatives. This is indicated by 
higher levels role specialisation and an average number of ten for the size of their 
management component. The frequency of meetings in these co-operatives is, 
however, relatively low. The score of meetings by the management committee is 
only three, which suggests a meeting about once a month in the co-operatives. 
On the other hand, meetings held by the membership group are about once in 
every six months on the average. 
The Inactive Co-operatives exhibited also low scores for their structural variables. 
This may explain why there is little control exercised by the decision making 
bodies. 18 The score of the meetings by the management committees indicates 
that they were held about once in six months. The score for the meetings of the 
membership group also indicates their meetings were held about once a year. 
These scores suggest considerably lower levels of activity in these co-operatives. 
The Member Controlled co-operatives also portray low structuring of activities. 
To some extent, they even have lower scores for their structural variables than 
'$Similar findings by Pugh suggests that lower structuring of activities does not tý 
necessarily indicate a chaotic situation in an organisation. It suggests that their structures 
might be implicit. That is, they may be run by implicitly transmitted custom and that they 
tend to be small organisations. See D. S. Pugh, Empirical Taxonomy of Structure of 
Work Organisations, Administrative Science Quarterly, pp. ] 15-126,1958 .... op. cit. 
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the Democratic co-operatives. The size of the management committee falls even 
below the minimum of seven. On the other hand, they exhibit higher frequencies 
of meetings than all the other co-operatives. 
Although our study did not investigate thoroughly all the factors suggested by 
congruency theory, the analysis above suggest some clear consistent 
relationship between the structural variables underlying each pattern of control in 
the co-operatives. For instance, the combination of structural variables 
associated with the Democratic Co-operatives and Membership Group controlled 
co-operatives comes close to Brown's congruency theory. In these co- 
operatives, the combination of structural variables indicates lower levels of role 
specialisation, decentralisation of decision making. That is, control over the 
affairs of the co-operatives is either shared or concentrated in the hands of the 
membership group. 
In contrast, the management committee controlled co-operatives exhibited higher 
levels of role specialisation, division of labour and increases in the size of their 
administrative component. The management committees also held more 
meetings than the membership group. It can be also be observed in the table 
that meetings by the membership group occurred about once in a year. This is 
considerably less than the number observed in the Democratic Co-operatives 
and the membership group controlled co-operatives. This is an indication of the 
prevalence of indirect forms of participation in the co-operatives. 
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The consistency in the combination of structural variables underlying the patterns 
of control suggests that the participatory scheme in a co-operative can influence 
its pattern of control. We saw in our analysis of the data in Table 5.5 that there 
was a characteristic combination of structural variables associated with each of 
the four patterns of control. These findings also suggest that irrespective of the 
type of co-operatives and the industry group to which they belong, differences in 
the structuring of activities in the co-operatives, can lead to variations in their 
patterns of control. Hence, the combination of structural variables provides us 
with some explanations of the major differences in the patterns of control among 
the gin distiller co-operatives. 
Summary 
This chapter had two key objectives. Firstly, the first objective was to provide an 
empirical description of the participatory schemes in the co-operatives. 
Secondly, the objective was to determine the extent to which the participatory 
schemes in the co-operatives influenced patterns of control in the co-operatives. 
To pursue the two objectives, we first investigated the accountability structure, 
the administrative component and decision rule in the co-operatives, The 
investigation of the three structural dimensions provided us with nine structural 
variables for a comparative study of the participatory schemes in the co- 
operatives. The structural variables included, size of the management 
committee, form of representation, role specialisation, meetings by the 
management committees and the membership group, size of the administrative 
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component, number of hired labour, percentage of hired labour and decision 
rules. 
The study of the structural dimensions of the co-operatives provided us with the 
empirical descriptions of their participatory schemes. It also provided us with 
some structural variables for comparative study of the participatory schemes and 
their impact on the patterns of control in the co-operatives. 
In studying the accountability structure, the administrative component and 
decision rules in the co-operatives, we found out that most of the co-operatives 
still adhere to the basic scheme of participation given in the ideal classical model. 
This was indicated by low levels of role specialisation and division of labour, the 
size of the management committee and the size of the administrative component. 
There were some basic similarities in the score of the structural variables across 
the co-operatives. Most of these similarities can be traced to certain practices in 
the industry groups to which the co-operatives belonged. These similarities were 
mostly from the decision rules used in the co-operatives. We observed that some 
industry group of co-operatives tends to develop similar rules to regulate their 
activities. 
Among the structural variables, role specialisation and the frequency of meetings 
presented the greatest source of variation in the co-operatives. While some co- 
operatives restricted themselves to the basic normative roles stipulated for the 
members of the management, others have developed new roles. Some of the 
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co-operatives have also used meetings as a device to obtain a mixture of direct 
and indirect form of participation. 
The structural variables offered the means to investigate the extent to which 
participatory scheme in the co-operatives influenced the patterns of control. In 
our investigations, we observed that there was a certain combination of structural 
variables underlying each of the four patterns of control we studied. The 
combination of structural variables was indicated by a certain pattern of relations 
found in the level of their scores. For instance, we found that in the membership 
group controlled co-operatives, there were lower scores of the size of the 
management group, little or no role specialisation, but higher score for meetings 
by the membership group. In contrast, the management committee controlled 
co-operatives showed considerable higher scores for role specialisation, size of 
the management committee and lower score for meeting of the membership 
group. 
Our findings indicate that the greater the division of labour in the management 
committee, the more influence the management committee gains in the co- 
operatives. On the other hand, the frequency of meetings by the membership 
group in a co-operative seem to contribute to a greater amount of control on their 
behalf. 
These findings in this chapter lead us to the conclusion that the participatory 
schemes in co-operatives vary in considerable number of ways. Hence, one 
cannot speak of an ideal model Of co-operatives that all co-operatives can 
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subscribe to. Furthermore, member participation in co-operatives is dependent 
more on the type of participatory scheme adopted by the co-operatives. 
These conclusions must, however, be accepted with some concern. The 
structural variables for characterising the co-operatives have been developed out 
of the conceptual scheme of this study. Literature in organisational theory and 
co-operative theory presents a great variety of structural variables for the study of 
self-managed organisations. Hence, it is possible that some other variables than 
those used in this study can also explain the variations in the patterns of control. 
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Chapter 6 
Organizational Conditions in the Co-operatives 
The previous chapter showed the various ways in which participatory schemes in 
co-operatives can be structured. The chapter also showed that under different 
patterns of control, it is possible to have a different combination of structural 
variables depicting the scheme of participation in a co-operative. In the 
management literature, it has been pointed out that differences in the structure of 
organisations are related to the contextual variables of the organization. 
According to Pugh, contextual factors describe the circumstances or the 
conditions under which organisations operate. ' Hence, to explain the differences 
in the structuring of activities in the co-operatives, it is essential that we 
investigate the organisational conditions under which the co-operatives operate. 
A considerable number of studies in organization behaviour have provided 
indicators for the study of the conditions under which organisations operate. 
They include contextual variables such as, technology, ownership and control, 
location, size, history and origins, objectives. 
In this chapter we shall examine the extent to which the objectives, membership 
size and the technology used in the co-operatives affect the participatory systems 
in the co-operatives. Furthermore, we shall examine the extent to which socio- 
1 D. S. Pugh et al, The context of ... op. cit. 2 D. S. Pugh et. al the context of op. cit., Dachler and W. Wilpert, op. cit., M. Rosner op cit. 
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cultural factors in Ghana have influenced the design of participatory schemes in 
the co-operatives. These variables were chosen, because they are variables 
which previous research has shown to have consistent relationships with 
participative schemes in organisations. 3 
6.1 The Objectives and Services of the Co-operatives 
The character of co-operative organisations has more or less been associated 
with their objectives. Co-operatives are characterized as participative or self- 
managed organisations because they seek to promote the interest of their 
members through self-administration, mutual aid and democratic management. 
The relationship between objectives of an organization and its structure has been 
explained more clearly in the management literature. Management theorists 
have related the authority systems in organisations to the underlying values, 
objectives and tasks for which they were designed to serve. For instance, Max. 
Weber suggested that forms of social action would conform to the bases of 
authority and each type of authority also would imply a particular type of 
organization to implement its aims. 4 
Following Pugh et al, the objectives of the co-operatives were translated into 
5 
quantitative form by characterizing them in terms of their outputs or services . 
3 See for instance, H. P. Dachler and B. Wilpert, op. cit. M. Rosner, op. cit. 
4 M. Weber, op. cit. 
5Literature does not present an uniform operationalisation of organization objectives. Objectives arc 
generally derived from organization goals and serve as purposes and tasks. Pugh brings the various concepts 
together under the concept "charter". 'Mis is interpreted to wear an organization" social function, goals, 
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In co-operative theory, the services or outputs of co-operatives form the "basic 
charge" of the members to the management. 
The basic charge represents the common objectives, needs and desires of the 
membership group for which the co-operative was designed to serve. This would 
have evolved out of decision making and goal formulation in the co-operatives. 
The management of the co-operatives is charged with the implementation of this 
"common interest" to promote members' intereSt. 7 
The services of the co-operative may also be seen as a social control 
mechanism. In return for offering them, the co-operative may receive various 
kinds of commitments from members. 8 Uphoff and Eastman have described this 
relationship as "the degree of control that an organization, in effect, its leadership 
can have over its membership. It represents the converse of accountability, the 
control that members can exercise over their leaders". 9 
ideology and value systems in influencing structure and functioning" The purpose of an organization is then Zý 
characterized in terms of its "output" i. e. its products and services. D. S. Pug , et al Dimension of.. op cit. gh 6 R. Henzler, op. cit. and E. Dulfer, Operational Efficiency ... op. cit. 7 R. Henzler, op. cit 
8TIie underlying tenets of this relationship have also been examined in social exchange theory. The theory 
attempts to describe the behaviour of individuals in social situations involving collective actions. That is, the 
judgment of people about how much they are putting in ag , ainst what they may be receiving 
in terms of 
rewards compared with another party. Tannenbaum for example, has considered the exercise of influence as 
"an exchange of some valued resources dispersed by one person in return for compliance on the part of the 
other". In this sense, he has related the total amount of control in an organization to the amount of involving 
the compliance of the organization members to its imperatives. For a thorough discussion of this, see 
Homans, G. C- (1950) The Human Group. New York: Harcourt, Brace., 1950, B. M. Staw, op. cit., E. Chell, 
participation and Organization, London 1985. AS Tannenbaum (1986) op. cit. 
9N. T. Upholf and M. J. Easman, Local Organization and Rural Development, Comell University Press, 1984 
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In the following sections we shall investigate: 
1 The types of services offered to members by the co-operatives. 
2. The primary orientations of services of the co-operatives 
3. How the services are related to the types of co-operatives and 
their participatory schemes. 
6.11 The Co-operatives and their Services 
In order to develop a list of items to identify the types of services offered by the 
co-operatives, we followed Knoke and Isak's categorization of organization 
incentives into utilitarian, normative and affective incentives. 10 
The utilitarian, affective and normative incentives can be described as follows: 
a. Utilitarian incentives, refer to goods or activities which permit 
the calculation of benefits and costs. They allow members to 
carry out a rational calculation of the expected utility gained in 
exchange for their resource contributions. They include material 
goods which can be translated into monetary values as: 
10 D. Knoke and Wright Isak, Individual Motives and Organization Incentive Systems, in S. B. Bacharach 
(ed. ) Research in Sociology of Organisations Vol. 2.1982. Other alternative forms of classification have 
been constructed, among tile best known is that of Elzioni's compliance theory. This includes, normative 
sanction, the allocation ad. manipulation of social symbolic rewards and deprivations; coercive sanction, the 
application of physical force and; utilitarian sanctions - the application of economic incentives. 
Arnatai 
Etzioni, A comparative analysis of complex organisations, New York, 1975. See also M. Olson, Die Logik 
des Kolleltiven Handels, KollektivaUter und die Theorie der Gruppen, Tubingen. 1968. 
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Use of financial rewards 
Status perks 
Discount on members' purchases 
Guarantee of higher income 
Lowered tax rate and material goods 
Social Status and prestige 
Access to public services 
b. In contrast to utilitarian incentives, normative incentives see 
organization values and ideal as relevant bases for a person's 
involvement in a joint social action. Knoke and Isak have 
suggested a number of organizational activities involving the 
following: " 
Civic duties 
Activities involving global purposes proclaimed by the 
organization, e. g. Self-help and mutual aid, mobilization 
of local resources. 
C. Affective incentive involves services to foster emotional 
attachments among members and individuals to the organization 
as a whole. It includes: 
social parties 
joint recreational activities 
/ 
Knoke and Wright Isak, op. cit. 
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personal contact with charismatic leaders 
formal ceremonies to confirm loyalties 
Below is a list of items developed for the measure of services and tasks in the co- 
opera ives. 
12 
12 The list was developed from a comprehensive study of literature including the following sources: M. 
Patchen, Participation Achievement and Involvement on the job, Englewood Cliffs, N. J., Prentice Hall, 1970 
G. Graen, Role Making Processes within Complex Organization, in: M. D. Dunnette (ed. ) Handbook of 
Industrial and Organizational Psychology, Chicago. 1975. For similar motivational approaches to study co- 
operatives and related self-help and self-managed enterprises, see also N. Oliver, Commitment in Producer 
Co-operatives, A Perspective from Social Psychology of Organisations, and A. I lanel and J. 0. Mueller, 
improving the Methodology for Evaluating the Development of Rural Co-operatives with reference to 
Developing Countries - Case Study Iran, FAO, Rome 1978. Pinnard, M. and Hamilton, R. (1986) 
Motivational Dimensions in the Quebec Independence Movement: A Test of new Model, in: Research in 
Social Movements, Conflicts and Change, vol. 9 p225-280 Morss, E. R., Hatch, J. K. Micklewait & Sweet, 
C. F., (1976) Strategies for Small-scale Farmer Development, vol. IA Study prepared by Development 
Alternative Inc., Colorado 
1G6 
Table 6.1 
List of items for the measure of Services in the Co-operatives 
Category of Services 
Utilitadan Services Normative Services Affective Services 
1. Financial Rewards Mutual aid and Self-help Joint Recreational Facilities 
(e. g. guarantee of wages) 
2. Physical plant facilities 
(e. g. provision of workshops) 
3. Access to Public Services 
4. Secure employment 
5. Social Security and 
insurance 
6. Marketing 
(storage and distribution) 
7. Credit facilities 
8-. Training and development 
of skills 
9. Supply of resources 
Members Welfare 
Support for other workers 
Mobilization of Local Resources 
for development 
Civic duties 
Education of members 
Social Parties and ceremonies 
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Information on the items in table 6.1 was collected from interviews with the 
management committees of the co-operatives. During the interviews, the 
respondents were asked to indicate from a list of items, as in table 6.1, the 
services the co-operative offered its members. Additional information was also 
collected from the income and expenditure accounts of the co-operatives. The 
information collected on the types of services offered by the co-operatives is 
shown in Table 6.2 
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Table 6.2 shows the distribution of the services across the co-operatives. The 
table shows the types of services offered by the co-operatives, the number of 
services offered by a co-operative, the number of co-operatives offering a 
particular service and the percentage of co-operatives offering that service. 
The table shows that member welfare is the most predominant service offered by 
the co-operatives to their members. About 90 percent of the co-operatives 
provided such a service. The service involved mainly financial aid to individual 
members in the event of illness. It also included donations at funerals of relatives 
of the co-operative members. These were services which showed up in the 
income and expenditure accounts of the co-operatives. 
Another predominant service offered by the co-operatives was mutual aid and 
self help. The objective of the co-operatives for providing this service was to 
create an avenue for individual members to provide assistance to one another in 
times of need. We observed during the field work that the co-operatives served 
as a vehicle through which members could address their social problems 
together. For instance, in the grain millers co-operatives the management would 
assign other members to manage the corn mills of other members whenever they 
were indisposed. 
The provision of physical plant facilities also attracted 68 per cent of the co- 
operatives. Although most of the co-operatives in this study were service co- 
operatives and were not directly involved in productive activities, their members' 
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economic activities demanded that the co-operatives should aid in finding 
workshops for them. For instance, for the taxi drivers, salt winners and the rattan 
weavers co-operatives, a major part of their tasks was to find a location for their 
members. 
Next in the range of services offered by the co-operatives was access to public 
services. Among the co-operatives which offered this service was the Rattan 
Weavers, Grain Millers and the Herbalist Co-operatives. The management of 
these societies pointed out that the activities of their members had received little 
attention by the institutions of the formal sectors of the Ghanaian economy. 
Hence, their societies acted as representative organs for their members. The 
duties of the co-operatives were to lobby governmental and development 
agencies to give greater attention and more recognition to their activities. In 
addition, the tasks of these societies were to act as conduits through which banks 
can offer loans to the individual members. 
The least in the number of services offered by the co-operatives were 
development and training, credit facilities and education. For example, the only 
co-operative which showed interest in education was the block makers co- 
operatives. Their objective was to provide new members with training in block 
making and the management of the individual enterprises. 
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6.12 The Types of Services Offered by the Co-operatives 
A major objective of this chapter is to find out the extent to which the services of 
the co-operatives are related to their different participatory schemes. In order to 
investigate this relationship, this section will first of all investigate the types of 
services offered by the co-operatives. This will enable us to examine how 
differences in the participatory schemes in the co-operatives are related to their 
objectives. 
To determine the primary orientations of the services offered by the co-operatives 
to their members, we counted the number of services offered by each of the co- 
operatives. The services were further classified as mutual benefit (affective and 
normative) and rational economic services. The respective percentages of the 
two categories of services offered by a co-operative were also calculated. Table 
6.3 presents information on the number of services and the percentages devoted 
to the mutual benefit and rational economic services in each of the co-operatives. 
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Table 6.3 
Primary orientations of the Services of the Co-operatives 
Rational Economic Mutual Benefit 
No. of %of No. of %of 
Co-operatives Services Services Services Services 
1. Gin Distillers 2 50 2 50 
2. Taxi Drivers 1 17 5 83 
3. Rattan Weavers 4 67 2 33 
4. Grain Milling 2 50 2 50 'Y' 
5. Block Makers 2 40 3 60 
6. Gin Distillers 0 0 2 100 
7. Herbalists 4 44 5 
8. Salt Winners 2 25 6 75 
9. Electrical Wcrkers 4 50 4 50 
10. Electrical Workers 4 50 4 so 
11. Taxi Drivers 1 17 5 83 
12. Taxi Drivers 1 17 5 83 
13. Taxi Drivers 1 17 5 83 
14. Gin Distillers 0. 0 2 100 
15. Gin Distillers 0 0 1 100 
16. Textiles 1 20 4 80 
17. Gin Distillers 1 33 2 67 
18. Gin Distillers 1 33 2 67 
19. Gin DisdIers 0 0 2 100 
20. Gin Distillers 0 0 1 100 
21. Gin Distillers 1 33 2 67 
22. Gh Distiller; 1 33 2 67 
23. Electrical workers 3 33 6 67 
24 lock makers 2 so 2 so 
25. Grain Mll: ers 2 50 2 50 
26. Taxi Dfivers 1 2.0 4 80 
27. Taxi Drivers 1 33 2 67 
28. Taxi Drivers 1 25 3 75 
29. Taxi Drivers 1 25 3 75 
30, Taxi Drivers 1 20 4 80 
31. Taxi Drivers 1 4 4 80 
Total 2.4 34.9 3.8 65.1 
.1 11 
.6 
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In general, one can hardly perceive any differences in the service orientations of 
the co-operatives. The co-operatives are more preoccupied with mutual benefit 
activities than rational economic services. An aggregate of the percentage of 
services devoted to the mutual benefit and utilitarian services was 60.4 percent 
and 39.6 percent, respectively. 
The major differences between the co-operatives, however, come from the 
varying degrees in which the different category of services have been offered. 
For instance, the grain milling, block makers and Herbalist may be described 
as "partisan" co-operatives. This is because they seek to provide both 
utilitarian or material services and mutual benefit services in almost equal 
propo ion. 
13 
Another group of co-operatives may also be described as pure normative. 
These include the salt winners, gin distillers, taxi drivers co-operatives. About 
75 percent of the services of these co-operatives has been devoted to the 
provision of mutual benefit services. The only co-operatives which seek to offer 
more utilitarian services than mutual benefit are the rattan weavers. 
The question may be asked why the co-operatives offered more mutual benefit 
services than the Utilitarian. One of the reasons for the provision of such 
13 According to Knoke/Isak, an organization may be described as "partisan" when it provides both services. 
This is characteristic of professional societies which seek to attract members by offering material services 
and at the same time appealing to the "traditions and standards" of the profession. See D. Knoke/W. Isak,, 
op. cit. 
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services comes from socio-cultural factors. The predominance of the mutual 
benefit services can be traced to the traditional paternalistic attitudes in the 
Ghanaian society. This attitude places more emphasis on welfare of the family 
members in the extended family system. 
For instance, studies in Ghana and other African countries have also revealed 
similar preferences for such mutual benefit incentives. In his studies of 
management style in Ghana, Damachi has pointed out that "top management in 
Ghana are over concerned with the welfare of the worker to the extent that there 
is the tendency to control him even outside work place. 04 
According to Damachi, the worker is regarded as "a member of the extended 
family system (that is, the organisation) and he is made to feel so by the warmth 
and security management tries to provide in the work place. "15 He calls this 
"paternalistic authoritadan" management style. Damachi suggests that this type 
of managerial authority has social cultural elements in it. This is because it is 
based on the African extended family system and gives no room for subordinates 
to have individual initiative. 
Other reasons for the combination of mutual benefit and utilitarian services may 
come from the nature of the circumstances under which the co-operatives were 
established. In chapter 2, we found out that the reasons for the formation of most 
14 U. G. Damachi, Theories of Management and the Executive in the Developing World, London, 1978. 
is Ibid. 
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co-operatives were to remedy certain socio-economic problems in their 
respective sectors. 
For instance, the salt winning co-operatives were formed to retain the Songhor 
Lagoon from private enterprises and bring harmony into the community. Having 
experienced the lack of accountability and democratic management from their 
mother unions, the taxi drivers established a co-operative which would not only 
provide them with taxi ranks, but will also readily respond to needs. Hence, the 
creation of certain management structures to cater for specific social needs of the 
members. 
The activities of the pure utilitarian co-operatives; the rattan weavers, may be 
seen as part of an attempt to solve some of the problems faced by small-scale 
industries in Ghana. Small-scale industries in developing countries face 
problems such as lack of access to public facilities, inadequate finance and 
acquisition of capital. 
16 The solution to these problems is reflected in the types of 
services offered by the rattan weavers. Its services included provision of a 
location for members to work together, acting as a representative organ for the 
society in dealing with developmental institutions and exploration of marketing 
channels. 
16G 
'Andrae, op. cit. 
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6.13 Types of Services and Participatory Schemes in the Co-operatives 
Our discussions in section 6.12 suggest that the services of the co-operatives are 
oriented to a combination of rational economic and mutual benefit factors. In this 
section, we shall examine how the different types of co-operatives and their 
participatory schemes are designed to promote the types of services offered by 
them 
Table 6.4 provides information on the service orientations of the different types of 
co-operatives. The table gives information on the number of services offered by 
the types of co-operatives and their industry groups. These services are 
dichotomized into utilitarian and mutual benefit services. The information in the 
table is derived from data in table 6.3. The data in table 6.4 represent the 
average number and percentages of services offered by the co-operatives 
industry groups. 
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Table 6.4 Types of Co-operatives and their 
Services 
Table 6.4 the Types of Co-operatives and their Services 
RadonatEconon-dc Mutual Benefit 
Co-operatives Ndof Plucent No of Pcrccnt of 
Services of Services Services Services 
Gin Distillers 0.6 18 1.8 82 
Taxi Drivers 1 20 4 80 
Mtan Weavers 4 67 2 33 
Grain Millers 2 so 2 50 
Block Makers 2 45 2.5 55 
Herbalists 4 44 5 56 
Salt Winners 2 35 6 75 
Electrical Workers 3.8 44.3 4.7 55.7 
Tie and Dye 1 20 4 so 
ýervice Co-ops 
_ 
1.8 35 3.2 65 
_ 
Worker Co-ops 3.8 44.2 4.85 55.2 
_Averaýe 
Total 2.8 39.6 4.2 60.4 
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The table shows that the services of the worker co-operatives are quite similar to 
those of some of the auxiliary co-operatives. For instance, the grain millers and 
block makers have similar orientations as the herbalists. The types of services 
offered by these co-operatives are also reflected on their participatory structures. 
In the herbalist and the gin distillers co-operatives, the structuring of activities 
lays emphasis on the development of its administrative component. 
Another indication of the development of participatory schemes to promote 
particular services is also demonstrated by the taxi driver co-operatives. In these 
co-operatives, special organizational roles have been created to cater for the 
welfare of the members and maintain discipline among them. This is seen in the 
introduction of such roles as chief driver and welfare officers. 
The organization of the salt winners co-operatives has also been designed to 
promote the activities of their members and the community at large. Each 
primary society represents one village, and in turn their management committees 
have formed a local union to represent the whole community of villages. The 
establishment of this link with the community enables the co-operatives to offer 
their services to the members and the community at large. This includes the 
funding of development projects by the local co-operative union through the 
respective primary co-operatives. 
Most of the co-operatives do not show any form of division of labour or role 
specialization for us to attribute their structural changes to a particular service. 
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For instance, the electrical worker co-operatives do not have any established 
committees. The only identifiable role position in their organization was the 
President of the society. We would presume that if any special roles or structures 
existed, then they would be part of the informal processes found in smaller 
organisations. 
This section has sought to examine the primary tasks and services provided by 
the co-operatives to their members. The main objective of such investigation was 
to find explanations for the existence of the different structural combination found 
in the participatory schemes in the co-operatives. 
We must, however, be careful of over generalizations about the services in all 
co-operatives. It is possible that some of the services offered to members do not 
come from the "basic charge" of the management. As Dulfer has pointed out, it is 
possible that in some co-operatives, members may not be able to express their 
interest clearly. 17 This may lead the management committees to adopt their own 
objectives and provide such services as they may desire. 
6.2 Membership Size and Structural Development in Co-operatives 
The size of organizations (measured in terms of the number of employees) has 
generated a considerable amount of interest among organizational theorists. It is 
asserted that growth in the sizes of organizations lead to a greater division of 
17 See E. Dulfer, Betriebswirtschaftlehre der ... op. cit. 
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labour and role specialization. Furthermore, increases in the size of 
organizations are associated with the formalization of their activities. 18 
In the study of co-operatives, similar assumptions have been made about the 
relations between their sizes and their participative schemes. For instance, 
Furstenberg has stated that increases in the size of a co-operative lead to greater 
division of labour and role specialization. "9 According to him, the creation of 
more roles gives individual members more chances to participate in the decision 
making processes within a co-operative. 
However, some co-operative theorists have also pointed out that increases in the 
size of membership can bring about structural problems in the co-operatives. 
They have suggested that increases in the size of a co-operative can affect the 
level of member participation. They point out that a greater division of labour in 
the participatory schemes will lead to new forms of authority systems as well as 
the creation of status differences in the co-operatives. This will create vertical 
conflicts between the membership group and the co-operative management. 20 
18 See D. S. Pugh et. al., Contextual of. op. cit. 
'9F. Furstenberg, Probleme der Mitglieder Partizipation auf verschiedenen genossenschaftlichen 
Entwicklungsstufen, in E. Dulfer and W. Hamm (eds. ), Die Genossenschaften zwischen 
Mitgliederpartizipation, Verbundbildung und Burokratietendenz. In fact, a survey of the co-operative 
literature does not make any distinction between the effects of size of members on the participatory 
schemes in the different types of co-operatives, namely the worker and the service co-operatives. See for 
instance, E. Dulfer, Betriebswirtschaftsiehre der .... op. cit. 
20 E. Dulfer, Betriebswirtschatslehre der-op. cit. 
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The effect of membership size on structural developments and the participation of 
co-operative, members in decision making is best summed up by Hoffman. 21 
"At the lowest level, all contributions necessary for the functioning of the 
organization are made equally by the participants involved. The higher 
levels represent phases of development in the course of which the active 
involvement of the participants is constantly reduced, while at the same time, 
a staff of officials emerges that progressively takes over all activities. One 
after the other, administration, management, decision making and executive 
functions are placed in their hands, though not necessarily in the order given. 
At the top most level, we have a further development of this official staff into 
top level official entrusted with the management and decision making and a 
host of minor executives. The remainder of the parlicipants meantime remain 
an apathetic and only partially interested client-group, are now merely 
expected to furnish financial contributions. " 
In a study of the relationship between the size of a co-operative and its structure, 
Evers pointed out that from the size of 4 to 50 structure changes from informal to 
a formal one. 22 He suggests that there are no mediating points existing along the 
continuum where an organization shifts from an informal to formal structure. He 
argues that in a smaller organization, the need for specifying the definition of 
formal relationship is less. He suggested, for instance, the following changes: 
21 See A. A. Bodenstedt, op. cit. In addition, research studies on Human relations and employee morale has 
shown that growth in organization size and its resultant increases in the division of labor 
brings with it 
reductions in informal interactions in groups and also leads to increase in group conflict. This consequently 
reduces members' satisfaction and motivation. Hence, in development theory and practice, there 
has been a 
call for the establishment of small socio-cconomic groups for the development of co-operatives. 
For 
literature on this issue, see for instance, A. D. Jedlicka, Organization for Rural Development, New York. 
1977 
22 F. T. Evers, J. M. Bohlen and R. D. Warren, The relationship of selected size and structural indicators in 
economic organisations, Administrative Science Quarterly, 1976. 
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a. Co-operatives with less than 10 members would require less co- 
ordination, hence no structural changes, 
b. Sizes between 10-25 have horizontal changes, and 
C. Sizes above 25 -have both horizontal and vertical structural 
changes occuniing. 
Table 6.5 illustrates the relationship between membership size and structural 
development in the co-operatives. 
Table 6.5 Membership Size and Structural Development in the 
Co-operatives 
Below 10 10-25 26-50 51-100 >100 
Structural variables n=2 n=1 I n=4 n=5 n=9 
1. Size of the Management Committee 0 7 7 9.4 11 
2. Form of representation 1 2 2 2 2 
3. Management Committee meetings 5 3.1 2.5 3.4 3.1 
4. Membership Group meetings 5 1.9 1 1.6 1.2 
5. Role Specialization 0 3.7 4 6.6 7.3 
6. Size of the Administrative Component 0 1.5 1.5 1.6 1 
7. No. of hired Labour 0 1.0 0.7 0.7 0 
8. Per cent of Hired Labour 0 47.7 
9. Decision rules 11 9.7 9.5 10.2 9.6 
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It can be observed that as size increases, there are also steady changes in the 
size of the management committees together with role specialization. Firstly, co- 
operatives with a size of less than ten do not have any management committee. 
From a membership size of more than ten, the co-operative is able to maintain a 
management committee and introduce division of labour in its activities. 
There is, however, a contradictory behaviour by the variables, meetings group 
meetings and management committee meetings. As membership size increases, 
the scores of these variables experience some decreases. For instance, 
meetings occur once in a fortnight in a co-operative with membership size below 
ten. At the same time, it becomes easier for the membership group also to meet 
almost as often as the management committee. 
The rest of the variables show quite inconsistent behaviour. Formalization which 
most research studies indicate that it is associated with the size of an 
organization, does not show any considerable changes as size increases. 
Similarly, the number and percentage of hired labour do not have any consistent 
relationship with changes in membership size. 
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6.3. Use of Technology in the Co-operatives 
Technology, according to Pugh, is the "sequence of physical techniques used by 
the work flow of the organization even if the physical techniques used by the work 
flow of the organization involve ink and pen. v, 23 This definition, therefore, covers 
patterns of operations and equipment used in organisations. 24 
Studies in organization democracy point out that the effect of technology on the 
schemes of participation depends on the extent to which work processes in the 
organization are controlled by technology. A major assumption is that a more 
complex technology will create better conditions for self-management. However, 
this will require a higher level of education and skills. 
To assess the impact of technology on the participatory schemes in the co- 
operatives, data was collected to estimate the level of sophistication of the 
equipment used in the co-operatives. The different levels of sophistication were: 
a) Hand tools, 
b) Powered machines and tools 
C) Simple-cycle Automatics and Self feeding machines 
Automatics that repeat cycles and carry out routine instructions 
without aid by operators, and 
23D. S. Pugh et AL The C'"t"t Of, *, -OP* Oit, 
24Scc Lawrence B. Mohr, "Organisational 
Technology and organization structure, Administrative Science Quarterly, March 1972, pp 444- 
459, H. E. Aldrich, Technology and organization structure: A reexamination of the findings of the Aston 
Group, Administrative Science Quarterly, March 1972. pp 26-43.1 
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e) Self-measuring and Adjustment by Feed back or self correcting 
machines. 
The information on technology was collected during visits to the work sites of the 
co-operatives. The information collected came from sixteen co-operatives. The 
sixteen co-operatives included; the salt winners co-operatives, the electrical 
workers and herbalists co-operatives, the rattan weavers, and four of the gin 
distillers co-operatives. The reason for our inability to obtain information on all 
the co-operatives was because most of the co-operatives were auxiliary co- 
operatives and did not have a joint production workshop. The workers co- 
operatives were the only ones with joint production workshops and were also the 
only co-operatives where members worked together as a team. 
In the distillers co-operatives richer members afforded the opportunity for other 
members to use their distillery for a fee. We observed from such co-operatives 
that the family unit provided labour force for the individual members. In addition, 
the activities of such family groups were independent from other members. 
The technology used in the co-operatives was manual. For instance, in the 
distillers co-operatives locally made barrels, pots bottles and traditional fire 
earthen wave fire places were the major technology we observed. The work 
tools of the salt winners included shovels, hoes and pick axes. 
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The four worker co-operatives, however, used more sophisticated tools as 
powered machines. For instance, the Herbalist co-operatives used Bunsen 
burners along with electrical stores to prepare their medicines. The electrical 
workers also used some electrical appliances in addition to some manual tools. 
Though the joint use of technology was so minimal in the majority of the co- 
operatives to permit any meaningful analysis, some interesting observations were 
made on their impact on the type of co-operatives. It was observed that the 
nature of the operations and production processes in co-operatives and their type 
of technology formed the major bases for joint activities in the co-operatives. 
For instance, the production process adopted by the Herbalists involved various 
stages of activities such as, the harvesting of the herb, boiling of the herb, and 
controlled experiments to check their toxicity. The technology and process of 
manufacturing required not only the co-operation of the members, but also some 
special skills. 
In the electrical co-operatives where members obtained contracts to service 
refrigerators and electrical appliances, the use of different tools and the different 
facets of the nature of work also required some kind of co-operation among 
members. 
The descriptions of the technology and production activities in the co-operatives 
as given above, indicate two distinct patterns of relationship between technology 
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and the organization of the co-operatives. We observed during the survey that 
the production prqClesses of the workers co-operatives involved soma kind of 
'it, moaem production techniqUes and special skills. In add ion, th. air production 
activities involved the use of formalized processes and sorne documentation. On 
the other hand, the technology and the production acti\, ities of the service co- 
operatives were based on existing traditional social struclures. These findings 
suggest that the type of lechnology and production form,,:; mpy be an important 
factor in the choice of the type of co-operatives. We must caution about over 
generalization of these findings, in view of the number of co-operatives we 
studied and the absence of data for any meaningful analysis. 
6.4 Influence of Socio-Cultural Factors on the Co-operatives 
it was a major assumption of this study that the participatory schemes in the co- 
operZitives would be shaped not only by their structural properties and contextual 
variables, but cilso by the socio-cultural and We institutioniF I environt-dent in which 
they operate in Ghana. The aim of this section is to find, out how participatory 
schemes in the co-operatives reflect elements of the socio-cultural and the 
institutional envircnf-nent in Ghana. To investigate this, it is first essential to 
idemify the socio-culiurai and institutional elements of the environment. 
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6.41 CiAT-J. -ai Specific Factors and Non Cultural Factors in 
tions Or anizaL 
Of recent, managernent theorists have sought to devellop Jifferent approaches to 
assesý, the ir npact of socio-cultural factors on orqn; lýsmion. One of the 
approaches adopted by them has involved the differenfi'lion of cultural specific 
factols from non cultural factors in organisation. This has been done in the light 
of two major arguments, ihe cultural specific and cultural Iree arguments. 
The central idea of the cultural specific argument po nts out that rules and 
controls of agencies in the socio-cultural environment wi4l make organisational 
structures isomorphic with the structures of the externa agencies. The cultural 
specific aýqLllne-rt further points out that for organisations to succeed in their 
environments, th-cy must not only design their s1ructures to spit their 
environments, Uut mUst a! so arrange their rewards to raflect the aspirations of 
their and society at large 25 
According to Blunt, the major socio-cultural and institutir-nal elements which can 
shape organi,; atioil structures include: 
26 
a. Governmental regulations or legal requirements operating within 
a nafl: c; nal environment. 
b. The beliefs, norms and values (implicit Whire) of organisation 
owners and founder. 
C. The beliels, i-turms and values (iMpliCit CUltLIfe. )'cf employees of 
AS, Ivice, R. M, "Bumamr, 5 and Society in Ghana, London, 1975. Aswn, ý-,, - argument has also 
No, oWed by imdudism! theoW. Iley have sngnWd tat oMMMW z re Wmatic 
enament" of the 
hignudoml environnimUs in uhich they upuate. WAs is Immse My become 
isomorphic %%. itll the emmeriN of their environments. They point out that isuinx-phism takes place 
Men q oMnnisaion niattlied with its environment through t, --chn cý. l ond ,: xchange 
imerdependwo proceduies. See j. W. Meyem and B. Ruwan, histimtionali,; ed -)qgwtisation, 
I onwil 
Arvetures as American joLli-nal of Ceremony. Vol Z: -') i: )3 
40 - 363). 
26. p. -1 - 3, Biurt, Grg. ýPisati-,, Ti týory and Management, London, 198- 
1 OCI 
all levels of the organisation. 
In contrast to the cultural specific argument, the cultural free theory suggests that 
"there is a consistency of relationships between variables of organization context 
and of organisational structure and this will hold for all work organisations in all 
societies. P, 27 This relationship is associated with the growth in organisation size, 
division of labour and role specialisation as well as the formalisation of activities. 
The management literature suggests that increases in organisation size 
(measured by the number of employees) influence division of labour and 
formalisation (the degree to which rules, procedures, instructions and information 
in general appear in a written form). 28 The cultural specific and cultural free 
arguments discussed above provide us with a basis for the identification of 
cultural specific factors in the co-operatives. 
6.42 Cultural Specific Factors in the Co-operatives 
The cultural specific thesis suggests that organisational structures will be 
influenced by socio-cultural institutional elements such as social forms of 
ownership, social values, procedures, rules and technologies of existing 
agencies. We have already given examples of the influence of the socio-cultural 
and institutional environment in different parts of this study. In this section, we 
shall bring together these examples. We shall then determine whether the 
27S ee D. J. Hickson et al, op. cit. 
29D 
. 
S. Pugh. et al Dimensions of ... op. cit. 
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participatory schemes identified in the previous chapter relate to the cultural 
factors or the non cultural factors. 
The preference for a loose federated system of co-operatives adopted by the 
service co-operatives is quite a reflection of socio-cultural elements on the 
participatory schemes in the co-operatives. Our observations of some of the 
individual member enterprises indicated that members preferred to maintain the 
ownership and control they had over their enterprises. This may be attributed to 
the nature of social organisations in Ghana. Evidence suggests that the 
organisation of work and ownership of indigenous enterprises are associated with 
the extended family system or "abusua". The organisation of work is controlled 
by the family head and labour or apprenticeship is derived mostly from kith and 
29 kin. 
The effect of social forms of ownership on co-operatives has also been reported 
by Miracle in his study of agricultural co-operatives in Ghana. The study 
indicated that the protection of the traditional extended family system made 
collective farming in Ghana impossible. 
30 
In Ghana, most farming lands are owned by the extended family system. 
---------- 
29For a detailed description of the organisation of agricultural and industrial activities in Ghana, see 
for instance, A. W. Browne, Craft Industry and Rural Employment in Ghana. Case Studies from 
Ashanti Region, Lancaster Polytechnic, Ph. D. Thesis. 1978. P. Hill, Migrant Cocoa Farmers 
of Southern Ghana, Cambridge. 
1963. On the problems of modem organisations and cultural 
practices in developing societies, see 
Onyemelukwe C., Men and Management in Contemporary Africa, 
London. Rý M. Price, Society and Bureaucracy in Ghana, London, 1975. 
30p. M. Miracle and A. Steven, Agricultural Co-operatives and Quasi Co-operatives in Ghana, 1951-1966, 
Land Tenure Centre, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1968. 
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Individual members of the family are, however, allowed to manage their own 
farms as economic units and enjoy their usufruct. However, tradition forbids 
them from selling their farms to strangers without the knowledge of the extended 
family members. 
31 
The influence of the traditional forms of organisation, social values and people's 
expectations may further be linked to the choice of services and authority 
relationships in the co-operatives. It was pointed out earlier in this chapter that 
mutual benefit services or services predominated the service co-operatives 
offered to their members. 
The extension of the extended family system or the paternalistic management 
style is most pronounced in the participatory schemes in the Taxi Drivers Co- 
operatives. As we pointed out in Chapter 5, in these co-operatives the 
managerial roles have been structured to reflect the traditional roles structures in 
their occupation. 
The cultural effects on the co-operatives mentioned above, come from the 
traditional or informal economies in Ghana. Contrary to evidence from previous 
research has reported, the formal sector and its modern institutions appeared to 
have a more conflicting relationship with the co-operatives than the traditional 
se ors. 
32 
3 'For details Of the Land Tenure System in Ghana see for instance, W. Birmingham, 1. Neustadt and 
E. N. Ornaboe. A Study of Contemporary Ghana, Vol. 1, London, 1996. 
32 see for instance, Studies 
from R- Dore op. cit. N. T. Uphoff and M. J. Easmon op. cit. 
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It appeared during the field work that the modern institutions such as banks and 
governmental agencies and the private sectors had little interest in the activities 
of the co-operatives. For instance, the members of the worker co-operatives 
pointed out that private enterprises were not very keen to grant contracts to them 
when they mentioned that they were co-operative members. Furthermore, 
members reported their inability to secure bank loans for their development. " 
The informal sector can therefore be seen as a pillar of support for the co- 
operatives. It has not only provided the raw materials and markets for the 
produce of the co-operatives, but also has given a basis for solidarity and 
cohesion in the co-operatives. This was most prominent among the Salt winning 
co-operatives which use the whole village communities around the Songhor 
Lagoon as an organisational base. 
Our discussions above has given examples of the influence of the socio-cultural 
and institutional environment on the participatory schemes in the co-operatives. 
One can also observe the influence of the cultural free factors on the participatory 
schemes in the co-operatives. Of a great deal of interest to this study is the 
association of managerial roles to the size of the co-operatives as was observed 
earlier in this chapter. We pointed out that the co-operatives which have been 
able to create extra organisation roles other than the minimum stipulated in the 
bye-laws have also larger membership sizes. This observation was made on the 
33 Rowena Lawson has also reported similar experiences with fan-ners in Ghana. She reported that 
their inability to secure bank loans was due to the condescend inta) attitudes of the bank off ices to farmers. 
Rowena Lawson, Agricultural Entrepreneurs of Upper Income African, A Report to ESCOR, University 
of overseas Development, England, 1977. 
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relationship between role specialisation and lager membership sizes in the Taxi 
Driver co-operatives. This follows the same pattern of relations between the size 
of organisation, division of labour and role specialisation posited by the cultural 
free theorists. 
The discussions above suggest that it is possible for both socio-cultural and 
institutional elements of the environment and cultural free factors as size of a co- 
operative to influence participatory schemes. Especially, our findings on the 
participatory schemes in the taxi drivers co-operatives support this presumption. 
Our findings suggest that traditional social values mediate between size and the 
managerial roles in the taxi drivers co-operatives. Specifically, this is 
demonstrated by the creation of special roles, such as the welfare officer, in the 
taxi co-operatives to enable them direct the operations of co-operatives to serve 
members' interests. 
The position adopted here will be that both the cultural free theory and the 
cultural specific theory are both important for the understanding of differences 
between the schemes of participation in the co-operatives. This is because both 
theories help indicate the conditions that give rise to different participatory 
schemes in the co-operatives. 
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SUMMARY 
The major task of this chapter was to investigate the organization conditions or 
the circumstances in which the co-operatives operate and assess the extent to 
which those conditions affect the them. Hence, the chapter considered the 
contextual variables: the services and tasks of the co-operatives and two physical 
attributes of organizations, which, are size and technology. We also examine the 
influence of the socio-cultural and institutional environment on the co-operatives. 
The services offered by a co-operative to its members were considered as the 
raison d'6tre of its existence. Hence, it was assumed that participatory schemes 
in the co-operatives will be designed in such a way as to enable it deliver those 
services. Our observations in the chapter showed that the predominant services 
offered by the co-operatives to their members were related to mutual benefit 
incentives. 
The size of the membership group gave clear indications on its impact on the 
participatory schemes in the co-operatives. As the size of the co-operatives 
increased, there was a corresponding increase in the dimension of labour and 
role specialization. 
In our view, there was a harmonious relationship between the co-operatives and 
their environment. This is the result of the adoption of structural forms in 
response to the given socio-economic and cultural environments in Ghana. This 
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is quite in contrast with the earlier approaches adopted by sociologists. Most of 
their studies have only sought to point out conflicting situations between the 
characteristics of the co-operatives and existing social structures in developing 
countries. 
From the above observations, the following conclusions can be drawn on the 
impact of organisational conditions on the participatory schemes in the co- 
operatives: 
1. The services offered by the co-operatives to the members reflect the 
socio-cultural and economic situations in which the co-operatives operate. 
2. The participatory schemes in the co-operatives reflect the type of tasks 
and services offered to the members. For instance, the nature of division 
of labour and role specialization in the management structures suggest 
attempts to design structures to suit the type of services offered. 
3. The structuring of activities in the co-operatives are associated with the 
size of the co-operatives. Smaller co-operatives tend to have stable 
features while larger co-operatives demonstrate greater division of labour 
and role specialization in the management. 
4. our study of technology showed that, in general, co-operatives use 
manual tools. However, we observed that the type of production 
activities is associated with type of co-operatives. For instance, 
production activities of the workers co-operatives were related to 
modern production methods. Whereas activities in the service 
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co-operatives were based on traditional methods. 
5. In our investigations into the impact of the elements of the socio-cultural 
and institutional environment on the co-operatives, we found their 
influence most pronounced in the participatory schemes of the taxi drivers 
co-operatives. These co-operatives have developed role structures, 
authority systems and services that reflect existing social norms and 
values in Ghana. There was also substantial evidence to suggest that the 
adoption of these traditional values were enabled by size of the co- 
operatives. 
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Chapter 7 
PATTERNS OF ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE 
CO-OPERATIVES 
In the previous three chapters of this study, we examined the various ways in 
which self-management takes place in the co-operatives. This was done by 
investigating the patterns of control in the co-operatives, the structural and 
contextual variables of the co-operatives. 
The patterns of control in the co-operatives indicated the distribution of control 
among the decision making bodies in the co-operatives. Four different patterns 
of control were identified, namely: the management controlled, the membership 
group controlled, the democratic and the inactive co-operatives. The contextual 
variables also described the organisational conditions in which the co-operatives 
operated. 
Our investigation of the relationships between the patterns of control, the 
structural and the contextual variables led to these findings. We found that 
participatory schemes in the co-operatives can be structured in different ways. 
That is, underlying the different patterns of control in the co-operatives, we 
identified also different combinations of the structural variables. This provided us 
with the evidence that structural properties of participatory schemes influence the 
patterns of control in the co-operatives. In addition, our investigations into the 
contextual variables suggested that the organisational conditions under which the 
co-operatives operate accounted for the differences in the structural properties of 
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the participatory schemes. 
The findings of the previous chapters outlined above raise further questions for 
the study. One may ask whether the different patterns of control and their 
participatory schemes suggest specific patterns of organisational development in 
the co-operatives. This question is being asked because empirical evidence has 
shown that although co-operatives have similar principles and ideals, they tend to 
adopt different patterns of organisational development. It has been observed 
that this is due to a combination of factors such as technology, markets and 
socio-econornic and political systems. 
For instance, recent developments in the market economies of western Europe 
have seen technological and economic forces set new imperatives for the 
development of co-operatives. This has come from increasing competition, 
changes in consumer behaviour and the. emergence of large-scale corporate 
enterprises. Some co-operative theorists have pointed out that for the co- 
operatives to survive in such economies, they have to develop different 
management philosophies and structures to meet the challenges of the 
environments in which they operate. 
' 
In this chapter, we shall seek to establish the patterns of organisational 
development in the co-operatives. We shall also be concerned with the 
See for instance, M. J. Mellor et al, Workers Co-operatives in theory and Practice, the Open University 
Press, Milton Keynes, 1976. 
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implications of the patterns organisational development has on member 
participation and control in the co-operatives. In order to conduct a fruitful 
investigation into the two tasks set out for this chapter above, the next section will 
bring together the structural features of the different patterns of control discussed 
in the different parts of this study. 
7.1 Patterns of Control and their Structural and Contextual Variables 
In our discussions above, we pointed out that it was necessary to bring together 
the features of the different patterns of control we identified in the various parts of 
this study. This is to provide the basis from which we can identify the patterns of 
organisational development in the co-operatives. Firstly, we need to remind 
ourselves of the reasons for using the different patterns of control in the co- 
operatives as a basis for identifying patterns of organisational development in the 
co-operatives. 
For a comparative study of co-operatives, we assumed that control in 
co-operatives is associated with organisational attributes as division of labour, 
role specialisation and hierarchy of authority. Hence, we assumed that a certain 
pattern of control in a co-operative will be associated with a particular 
combination of structural variables. 
In table 7.1, we have the different patterns of co-operatives and their structural 
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variables. In addition, we have included the contextual variables associated with 
the organisational characteristics of the co-operatives. These contextual 
variables include membership size, technology, services of the co-operatives and 
the ages of the co-opetatives. The measurement of these variables has been 
provided elsewhere in this study (see for instance Appendix 1). Table 7.1 
presents aggregated scores of the different variables computed for each pattern 
of control. The scores of the variables was derived from Appendices 5&8. 
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Table 7.1 The Patterns of Control and their Structural and Conte), lual Variables 
Structural Factors 
Derfiocratic 
Ca-ops 
n-6 
Management 
Committee 
Controlled 
Co-ops 
n-14 
Membership 
Group 
Controlled 
Co-ops 
n-5 
IniZlive 
Co-op! 
A. Tbe Accountability Structure 
Size of the Management Committee 7.6 10 4.2 7 
Form of Representation 2 2- 1.6 2- 
Role of Specialization 3.8 6.9 2.0 3.6 
Management Committee Meetings 3.6 3.0 4.0 2.3 
Membership Group Meetings 2.8 1.5 2.6 0.9 
B. 7lic Administrative Component 
Size of the Administrative Component 1- 15 1.8 1.5 
Number of Hired Labour 0 0.5 0.6 1.2 
Percent of Hired Labour 0 40.7 20.0 83.3 
C. Decision Rules 9.2 9.4 11.0 10.0 
D. Contextual variables 
Size 72 148.6 2 YA 271 
Age 5.3 5.6 21.4 20.3 
Service (Mutual Benefits) 53.2 74.1 10 94.5 
Service (Rational Economic) 46.2 25.9 60.2 5.. 5 
Technology 1.2 1.1 1.4 1.0 
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From the table, the following profiles can be obtained for the different patterns of 
co-operatives: 
The Management Controlled Co-operatives 
These are co-operatives in which the greatest amount of control was exercised 
by the management committee. They also demonstrate greater division of labour 
and role specialisation in both their management structures and administrative 
components. The co-operatives also employ both direct and indirect forms of 
participation in decision making. However, the frequency of meetings held by the 
management committees is more than that of the general body of members. 
This suggests that indirect participation is the predominant form of participation 
within decision making in these co-operatives. 
The management controlled co-operatives are mostly service co-operatives. 
They include taxi drivers (10), the salt winners (1), the Herbalists (1), gin distillers 
The Herbalists co-operatives represent the only worker co-operatives in 
these co-operatives. In these co-operatives, 75 per cent of their services are 
devoted to mutual benefit tasks and services. 
The Membership Group Controlled Co-operatives. 
In these co-operatives, the membership group exercised a greater amount of 
control than the other decision making bodies. These co-operatives had little role 
specialisation and their management committees indicated the basic minimum 
membership size of seven required for the establishment of co-operatives. Also 
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there has been no attempt to increase the administrative staff beyond the 
employment of a secretary. 
A distinctive feature of these co-operatives is the greater number of decision 
rules used by them. We explained earlier that this was due to the nature of the 
activities of the these co-operatives. Unlike most of the other co-operatives, the 
activities of these co-operatives are associated with modern production facilities. 
These activities also required skilled labour to perform them. Furthermore, the 
nature of activities of these co-operatives required the use of formal written rules. 
The Democratic Co-operatives 
These represent co-operatives where the exercise of control has been fairly 
distributed among the decision making bodies. That is, the differences between 
the amount of control exercised by the management committee and the 
membership group are less than the influence score of one. The democratic co- 
operatives have lower scores for role specialisation and division of labour. The 
only identifiable roles in these co-operatives are those of the president and the 
treasurer. 
The democratic co-operatives include the following: rattan weavers (1), grain 
millers (1), block makers (2), electrical workers (1), and the tie and die co- 
operatives(l). 
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The Inactive Co-operatives 
These are co-operatives in which the decision making bodies have little influence 
over the activities in the co-operatives. In such co-operatives, there was very 
little evidence of joint decision making. This suggests a greater independence of 
individual members over the affairs of their enterprises. 
7.2 Organizational Development in the Co-operatives 
Section 7.1 of this chapter has provided us with a profile of the different patterns 
of control in the co-operatives. These features indicate that underlying each 
pattern of control, there is a certain constellation of structural and contextual 
factors. In this section, we shall first of all seek to determine the existence of any 
patterns of organisational development from the profiles of the co-operatives 
given in the previous section. 
In order to determine the patterns of organisational development in the co- 
operatives, we shall take, as our point of departure, the classical model of co- 
operative organisation. We shall then examine the extent to which the various 
structural combinations underlying each pattern of control differ from those of the 
ideal model. Below, we present an outline of the classical ideal model of co- 
operatives and the structural features of the different patterns of control observed 
in this study. 
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The Ideal Classical Model of Co-operatives 
The ideal classical model of co-operatives represents the organisational blue 
print for the establishment of co-operatives. As we observed in chapter three of 
this study, the classical ideal model derives its organisational character from a 
system of rules and prescriptions in the national regulations and the model co- 
operative bye-laws for co-operatives in Ghana. The model bye-laws consider the 
co-operative principles and ideals as a means for attaining self-management in 
co-operatives. 1 The bye-laws provide for a formal division of labour and role 
specialisation in co-operatives. They also stipulate the modes of participation in 
decision making and the rules for decision making in co-operatives. 
A summary of the structural dimensions of the classical model and the different 
patterns of control are in shown in Table 7.2. 
For details of the scif-management system in the ideal classical model see Chapter 3 
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Table 7.2 suggests some major structural factors which provide the basis for the 
determination of trends in the organisational development of the co-operatives. 
Three patterns of organisational development can be identified. We shall call 
them Types 1,11, and 111, for the purposes of classification. 
Type I 
This group of co-operatives demonstrate structural features close to those of the 
ideal classical model. The co-operatives in this group are the democratic and 
member controlled co-operatives. The average scores of their structural factors 
are just the minimum levels of structural factors required to establish a co- 
operative society. For instance, the average size of their management 
committees is seven. In some of these co-operatives, the size of the 
management falls below the minimum of seven. The division of labour and role 
specialisation in these co-operatives are based on the tripartite roles of president, 
treasurer and vice treasurer. Similarly, their administrative component does not 
show any kind of development. The only administrative staff in these co- 
operatives is the secretary of the societies. An outstanding feature of these co- 
operatives is the higher frequency of meetings by the management committees 
and the membership groups. 
Type 
This group of co-operatives consists of only the inactive co-operatives. Though 
these co-operatives maintain the necessary structures for the establishment of 
co-operatives, there are very few areas where joint decision making occurred. 
208 
For instance, the members rarely held meetings and joint activities among 
member barely existed. Moreover, the decision making bodies exercised little 
control over the affairs of the co-operatives. Our observations during the field 
work suggest that these co-operatives were almost moribund. 
Type III 
The third type of co-operatives show some striking structural developments that 
go beyond the basic structures of the ideal classical model. The structural 
development of these co-operatives is characterised by higher levels of division 
of labour and role specialisation. The co-operatives also use the indirect form of 
participation. Furthermore, these co-6peratives have also designed extra rules to 
specifically regulate their activities. 
The participatory schemes in these co-operatives suggest an organisation form 
designed to suit the special activities of the co-operatives. This was seen in the 
taxi drivers and the distillers co-operatives. These two types of co-operatives 
suggest two distinct patterns of organisational structure. In the distillers co- 
operatives there is a trend toward bureaucratisation . This is indicated by 
increases in the administrative component. In the taxi drivers co-operatives, 
there is rather an expansion in the management structure. This has occurred 
through the creation of new role structures and the establishment of sub- 
committees to undertake various tasks. 
We have in this section shown some trends in the patterns of organisational 
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development in the co-operatives. One can observe that much of the structural 
changes have occurred amongst the service co-operatives. They have shown 
diversified ways in which co-operative organisations can be structured. Do the 
patterns of organisational development fall into any of the development patterns 
observed in co-operatives elsewhere? And what the implications do the different 
patterns of organisational development outlined above have on the self- 
management in the co-operatives? 
7.3 Patterns of Organizational DeveloPment in the Worker and Service 
Co-operatives 
In determining the patterns of organisational development in the co-operatives, 
no consideration was given to the two types of co-operatives we identified in this 
study. That is, the worker and the service co-operatives. However, empirical 
evidence suggests that the patterns of organisational developments in the two 
types of co-operatives differ. In addition, the structural development in the two 
types of co-operatives has different implications for member participation and 
control in the co-operatives. Therefore, in this section, we shall investigate how 
the organisational developments observed earlier in this chapter differ in the 
worker and service co-operatives. 
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7.31 Organizational Development and Self-Management Problems in 
the Worker Co-operatives 
In the worker co-operatives, organisational development stems from, for 
instance, growth in the size of the co-operatives. As we pointed out in chapter 
six, the growth in the size of the worker co-operative leads to division of labour 
and allocation of roles. These structural chang*es in turn can increase 
hierarchical differentiation in the co-operatives. In this case, indirect form of 
participation in decision making becomes the major means of access to decision 
making. 
Furhtermore, it feared that skilled workers in worker co-operatives will entrench 
themselves in the managerial positions. This would not have been problematic if 
those in representative positions were to work in the interest of members. 
Evidence suggests that members who dominate managerial positions tend to 
follow their own interests. When this happens, then self-management in the co- 
operatives is obstructed. 
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Upset has indicated that this is a particular problem with democratic 
organisations as trade unions, professional societies, business organisations and 
3 
co-operatives. An apt description of this problem is provided by Robert Michels' 
"iron law of oligarchy". He describes this in the following terms, 
It is organisation which gA/es birth to the dominion of the elected over the electors, of the 
mandataries over mandators, of the delegates over the delegators. Mo says 
organisation says oligarchy. 4 
Empirical evidence suggests that organisational development in the worker co- 
operatives can lead to their degeneration. According to Cornforth, degeneration 
occurs in the worker co-operatives when they " fail in the long-run as democratic 
businesses". 5 Comfort has indicated three types of degeneration in the worker 
co-operatives. They include: 6 
a. Constitutional degeneration, where a worker co-operative reverts to 
a capitalist form of organisation through the exclusion of most of 
the members from the rights of ownership and control. 
b. Goal degeneration. This occurs when the priorities of the co- 
operatives are lost for the pursuit of capitalist goals. 
C. Organisational degeneration. This involves the concentration of 
power in the hands of a few members, owing to their skills and 
position in the co-operatives. Here, the co-operative develops a 
3 S. M. Lipset, M. A. Trow and J. S. Coleman, Union Democracy, The Free Press, Glencoe 111,1956. 
4 Robert Michels, Political Parties, Glencoe, 111, Free Press, 1949 
5 C. Comforth et al, op. cit. 
6 Ibid. 
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managerial hierarchy and division of labour similar to a capitalist 
organisation. 
The three electrical co-operatives did not show any indications of these 
managerial problem. As was described in chapter five earlier, activities in these 
co-operatives were informal and there were no adherence to any strict rules. We 
also stated that the members of the electrical co-operatives had no scheduled 
meetings. Issues arising out of their operations were casually discussed and 
eventual decisions taken. Such discussions took place at least once every week. 
This is in spite of the fact that these co-operatives had the one of highest 
number of decision rules we identified in the co-operatives. 
In fact, the electrical workers co-operatives can be likened to Whitt's account of 
collectivist-democratic organisations in the United States. According to her, the 
collectivist-democratic organisations reject rational bureaucratic justifications for 
authority. Authority resides not in the individual, but in the collective group as a 
whole. She describes their decision making processes as a "consensus 
process.... in which all members participate in the collective formulation of 
problems and negotiations of decisions". 
The possibility of organisational degeneration may, however, come from the 
Herbalists co-operatives. The structural development of the Herbalists co- 
7 Cornforth et a], op. cit. 
8See J. Rotschild-Whitt, The Collectivist organisation, An Alternative to Rational 
Bureaucratic Models. America Sociological Review, Vol. 44 p 509-127,1979. 
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operatives suggested some trends toward organisational degeneration. 
Participation in decision making was based on the representative form and 
control over the affairs of the co-operative was concentrated in the management 
committee. In addition, the society had a relatively large administrative 
component. 
During visits to the society to collect data, we observed that the management of 
the dispensary of the society engaged the full-time attention of the management 
committee, especially the President of the society. The president of the society 
administered the drugs at the dispensary and he was also involved in the 
research and development activities of the co-operatives, The rest of the 
members of the co-operative, however, only took part in the harvesting and the 
preparation of the herbs for medicine production. This level of involvement in the 
activities of the co-operatives by the general body of members suggests that the 
management of the herbalists co-operatives is concentrated in the hands of 
management committee. 
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7.32 Organizational Development and Management Problems in the 
Service Co-operatives. 
In the service co-operatives, Dulfer has also identified three patterns of 
organisational development. These are: 
a. The traditional co-operatives or the executive operating co- 
operatives. This represents the classical or ideal type co-operatives 
in which absolute power is concentrated in the general body of 
members. 
b. The market linkage co-operatives mark the first stage in the 
development of the ideal co-operatives model due to market 
demands. The co-operative enterprise may be forced to liquidate 
or restructure itself. In restructuring itself the co-operative may 
engage in non membership trading and employ specialist 
personnel to manage its affairs. The co-operative then becomes a 
quasi autonomous enterprise and a complementary organisation to 
the members. 
C. The integrated co-operatives seek to integrate the members' 
enterprises into their structure. Though members may own their 
own business, the central management designs similar plans and 
activities for all the members. 
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A further development of the service co-operatives comes from their complete 
transformation into worker co-operatives. Dulfer suggests that where a multi- 
purpose service co-operatives seek more integration of membership activities, it 
finally becomes worker or collective co-operatives. 9 
The service co-operatives showed considerable differences in their patterns of 
control and participatory schemes. The deviations from the ideal classical model 
of co-operatives we found in the service co-operatives provide a useful basis to 
identify patterns of organisational development in them. 
In the service co-operatives, democratic controlled and membership group 
controlled co-operatives showed similar patterns in their organisational 
development. Their participatory schemes were close to the ideal classical 
model of co-operatives. These co-operatives had smaller membership sizes, 
held frequent meetings for both the membership group and the management 
committees. In general, they bore similar characteristics as Dulfer's traditional 
co-operatives. In such co-operatives the membership group had absolute control 
over the affairs of the co-operatives and there were no problems of self- 
management. These group of co-operatives included the grain millers, the tie and 
dye, the rattan weavers. 
E. Dulfer, Betriebswirtschaftslehre der..... op. cit. 
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The structural characteristics of the inactive co-operatives, the co-operatives in 
which the decision making bodies exercised little control, indicated co-operatives 
at the brink of disintegration. There was practically no form of joint social activity 
in the co-operatives. 
The structural characteristics of the management controlled service co-operatives 
provide a more useful basis for assessing the patterns of organisational 
development in the co-operatives. This is seen, in particular, in the ten taxi 
drivers co-operatives and the two gin distiller co-operatives. The outstanding 
features of the taxi driver co-operatives include the creation of extra managerial 
roles for the provision of special services for their members. These roles, as we 
pointed out elsewhere in the study, are derived from traditional role structure in 
that occupation. In the gin distillers co-operatives, there is an increase in the size 
of the administrative component and considerable use of hired labour. These 
two different service co-operatives, in fact, appeared to be more structured than 
the others. 
From their structural characteristics, it is possible to identify different patterns of 
organisational development between the gin distillers and the taxi drivers co- 
operatives. While the taxi drives were more adaptive to the socio-cultural and 
institutional environment in Ghana, the gin distillers have quite rigid structure 
which appeared to be more independent of the members. During our data 
collection, we observed that the gin distillers co-operatives are more appendages 
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to their regional union. This shows considerable independence from their 
members. For instance, the Regional Union and the National Association of 
Distillers were able to send directives to the Secretaries for the implementation of 
certain policies. 
To understand the implications of these organisational developments on member 
participation and control in the service co-operatives mentioned above, we also 
studied audit and inspection reports of the co-operatives. A major concern 
expressed in the reports was with the expenditure in the co-operatives. 
Expenditure in the co-operatives bore no official receipts and there appeared to 
be a considerable degree of corruption in the co-operatives. We relate this 
dysfunctional behaviour to the absence of inadequate control mechanisms in the 
co-operatives. In the membership group controlled and the democratic co- 
operatives, the frequent meetings by both the management committees and the 
membership group acted as a check on the management of the co-operatives. 
In the gin distillers co-operatives especially, members are able to exert their 
control over the co-operatives only during the annual general meetings. The 
virtual absence of any authority to supervise the management committees during 
the long operational period is not conducive to self -management in the co- 
operatives. Here, there is the need for the establishment an organisational 
infrastructure to ensure participation and control in the co-operatives.. According 
to Heller, organisational infrastructure is "the presence of mechanisms as 
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technology, communication channels and information to facilitate the participation 
of organisation members in decision making. 10 
SUMMARY 
The major objective of this chapter was to identify patterns of organisational 
development in the co-operatives and their implications on self-management in 
the co-operatives. This was done by identifying the extent to which the four 
patterns of co-operatives, the management controlled co-operatives, ' the 
democratic co-operatives, the membership group controlled co-operatives and 
the inactive co-operatives differed from the ideal classical model of co-operatives. 
From that point of view, we identified three types of co-operatives. They were; 
Type 1: The democratic and the membership group controlled 
co-operatives. These co-operatives still maintained the basic 
characteristics of the ideal classical co-operatives. This was 
indicated by very low structu(ing of activities in the 
co-operatives. 
Type ll: This type of co-operatives were the inactive co-operatives. They 
were described as almost moribund because there is very little 
evidence to show any joint activity or joint decision making 
among the members. 
Type III: These co-operatives were the management controlled ones. 
'('F. Heller, op. Cit. 
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They were fourteen service co-operatives and one worker 
co-operatives. They were characterised by higher scores in 
their structural variables. 
Problems of self-management were found in the type three co-operatives. These 
were mainly the management controlled co-operatives. We observed that the 
absence of any control mechanisms have given the management committee in 
the distillers co-operative considerable autonomy in the use the societies' funds 
without any restrictions. 
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Chapter 8 
CONCLUSIONS 
The focus of this study was on self-management in industrial co-operatives in 
Ghana. To study self-management in the co-operatives, we investigated member 
participation and control in the co-operatives and the extent to which these are 
related to the participatory schemes in the co-operatives. The reason for this 
approach comes from a basic assumption in the co-operative theory that self- 
management in the co-operatives can be maintained through member 
participation in decision making and control over its affairs. 
Previous studies on co-operatives in developing countries have suggested that 
low member participation and control in co-operatives stem from problems of 
implementing the principles and ideals of co-operatives. These studies, coming 
from mainly sociological and anthropological studies, have argued that the 
principles and ideals of co-operatives are difficult to implement in developing 
countries because they are incompatible with the traditional social structures in 
those societies. 
A central argument of this study was that the problem of member participation 
and control in co-operatives should not be attributed solely to the differences 
between the co-operatives and the existing socio-cultural and institutional 
elernents in developing societies. The study pointed out that participation and 
control are also related to organizational attributes as division of labour, role 
specialization and hierarchy of authority. The study, therefore, suggested that the 
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degree of member participation and control over the affairs of the co-operatives 
will therefore be determined by the participatory schemes in the co-operatives. 
The Research Design 
Co-operatives differ in diverse ways, and in order to conduct an empirical study 
on them, it was necessary to develop a conceptual scheme. The conceptual 
scheme was to help establish common features of the co-operatives, as well as 
the differences between them. 
To this end, the accountability structure in co-operatives serves as a major 
framework for this study. The accountability structure is the hierarchical structure 
of co-operatives in which the membership group has the highest authority. 
Hence, it describes the pattern of authority relationship in the participatory 
schemes in co-operatives. 
A rnajor assumption of this study was that self-management in co-operatives will 
differ in terms of th(ý structuring of activities in the accountability structure. This 
refers to its forms of participation in decision rules. It was also assumed that the 
structuring of activities will be contingent on the circumstances under which the 
co-operatives operate. For instance, the size of their membership group, 
technology, service and tasks and the external environment. 
The comparative method was adopted not only to test our hypothesis, but also to 
provide a basis for indicating the conditions determining the differences or 
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similarities in the schemes of participation in co-operatives. The comparative 
method deals with the evaluation of variations in organization design, 
management practices, employee attitudes and behaviour in different 
organizations. 
Population and Sample 
A sample of 31 co-operatives was drawn from 79 industrial producers and service 
co-operatives in the Greater Accra Region in Ghana. The sample of co- 
operatives covered nine economic sectors. It also included four worker co- 
operatives and 27 service co-operatives. 
Method of Data Collection 
Data was collected on four classes of variables. These variables were: 
a. Variables describing the organization conditions in which 
the co-operatives operate, e. g. size, technology. 
b. Properties of the participatory schemes in co-operatives. 
C. Degree of member participation and control. 
d. External relations of the co-operatives. 
The major respondents were the members of the management committees, and 
in some instances, ordinary members of the co-operatives. Information was also 
obtained from officers of the Department Of Co-operatives and from documents. 
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Furthermore, the researcher's own observations of activities in the co-operatives 
constituted a major source of information for the study. 
Method of Investigation 
The analysis of the research data was done at the organizational level. At the 
organizational level, we examined the distribution of control among decision 
making bodies and properties of the participatory schemes in the co-operatives. 
The method of investigation comprised four stages. 
In the first stage, we examined the nature of self-management in the co- 
operatives. This was done by examining the degree of member participation in 
decision making in the co-operatives. Participation in decision making was 
conceived of as the exercise of control over the affairs of the co-operatives by 
their members. The measure of control was done by asking the management 
committees about the extent to which they perceived each of the decision making 
bodies in their co-operatives to have influence over decision issues in their co- 
operatives. Documentary evidence and the researcher's own evaluation were 
also used to evaluate the exercise of control in the co-operatives. 
The second stage of the analysis had two tasks. Firstly, we investigated the 
properties of the participatory schemes in the co-operatives. Secondly, we related 
these to the different patterns of control in the co-operatives. The investigation 
into the properties of the participatory schemes in the co-operatives was to 
provide an empirical description of the participatory schemes in the co- 
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operatives. It identified three major dimensions along which co-operatives differ. 
These included the nature of the accountability structure, administrative 
component and the use of decision rules. 
In the third stage of the analysis, the study examined the organizational 
conditions in which the co-operatives operated. The study examined the extent to 
which the services of the co-operatives, size of the membership group and 
technology explained variations in the properties if the participatory schemes in 
the co-operatives. Furthermore, we examined the extent to which the co- 
operatives reflected elements of the socio-cultural and institutional environment in 
Ghana. 
The final stage of the analysis considered two tasks. It sought firstly, to 
investigate the patterns of organizational development in the co-operatives. 
Secondly, we examined the extent to which the patterns of organizational 
development affect self-management in the different types of co-operatives. 
The Research Findings 
The study of member participation and control in the co-operatives showed that 
the different decision making bodies exercised control mostly in different ways. 
The membership group exercised greater control mostly over administrative and 
institutional matters such as election of officers. The management committee on 
the whole exercised control over economic and market related issues. 
225 
From the distribution of control among the various decision making bodies, four 
patterns of control were identified. These were: 
a. Democratic co-operatives: co-operatives with a fairer or 
equal distribution of control among the decision making 
bodes. 
b. Membership group controlled co-operatives: co-operatives 
in which the membership group exercised the greatest 
amount of control. 
C. Management committee controlled co-operatives: co- 
operatives in which the management committee exercised 
greatest amount of control 
d. The inactive co-operatives: these are co-operatives in 
which the decision making bodies exercised little control 
over the activities of the co-operatives. 
The distribution of the co-operatives in terms of the different patterns of control 
cuts across different industry groups. That is, the different industry sectors of the 
co-operatives could not easily be identified with a particular pattern of control. 
There was no indication that the type of co-operatives was associated with the 
patterns of control. For instance, among the worker co-operatives, two were 
classified as membership group controlled, one as management committee 
controlled and the other as democratic co-operative. 
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Similarities in the participatory schemes occurred mostly in the following areas: 
The predominant form of participation in decision making was indirect 
participation through elected representation. Formalization of activities showed 
considerable similarities, especially, in decision issues involving administrative 
and institutional matters. We explained that this was because all co-operatives in 
Ghana required to adhere to the same national regulations for their 
establishment. 
Considerable differences could be found in the division of labour, role 
specialization and the number of meetings held by the co-operatives. Most of 
these differences, however, occurred among the service co-operatives. For 
instance, while the gin distillers co-operatives exhibited some functional 
differentiation in their administrative component, the taxi drivers co-operatives 
had created special roles in the management structures. 
Sorne distinct differences can also be found between the service and the worker 
co-operatives. Altogether, the worker co-operatives showed some uniform 
behaviour. The size of their management committee was smaller and there was 
little role specialization. The service co-operatives showed a higher levels in the 
structuring activities. 
To help clarify the reason for the adoption of particular combination of structural 
factors in the co-operatives, we also examined the organization conditions in 
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which they operated. This involved the study of the following variables: services 
offered by the co-operatives, the size of the membership group, technology and 
external relations of the co-operatives. 
The services offered by co-operatives to their members were considered as the 
raision d'etre of their existence. Hence, it was assumed that participatory 
schemes in the co-operatives would be designed in such a way as to enable 
them to deliver those services. The most predominant services offered by the co- 
operatives were of mutual benefit in orientation. That is, services related to broad 
social values and motivational well-being of the co-operative members. 
We observed that role specialization and division of labour were associated with 
some of the services offered by some of the co-operatives. For instance, the taxi 
drivers co-operative have created organizational roles to reflect the type of 
mutual benefit services offered by thern. They had created sub-committees 
whose functions were to provide facilities for the promotion of their members' 
welfare. 
The size of the membership group gave clear indication of its impact on the 
organization structure of the co-operatives. As the size of the co-operatives 
increased, there was a correspondent increase in the division of labour and role 
specialization on the co-operatives. This provided us with some explanations of 
how the larger co-operatives were able to create extra organizational roles in 
contrast to the smaller ones. 
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The effect of technology on schemes of participation depends on the extent to 
which work processes in the organization are controlled by technology. Except for 
the collective co-operatives, very little evidence of this in the co-operatives 
became available. This made it quite impossible for any meaningful analysis to 
be made on the impact of technology in the co-operatives. 
However, a number of interesting observations was made on its relationship with 
the organization of the co-operatives. It was observed that co-operatives whose 
member enterprises were based on the traditional forms of family enterprises in 
Ghana were the service co-operatives. It was suggested that this form of social 
ownership prevented the individual members from engaging in a collective 
ownership of assets as in collective co-operatives. Technology in collective co- 
operatives, on the other hand, were observed to be more related to modern 
forms of production processes in which formal written rules were used. This in 
turn offered some explanations to the high degree of formalization observed in 
the collective co-operatives. 
The participatory schemes in the co-operatives are also a reflection of some 
elements of the socio-cultural and institutional elements in the Ghanaian society. 
For instance, the organization of the service co-operatives as a loosely federated 
system of individual member enterprises is to guarantee the autonomy of the 
existing traditional social organization of which individual member's enterprises 
were a part. 
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The over concern of the co-operatives over the welfare of members rather than 
the provision of material incentives gives indications of the intrusion of the 
paternalistic ideals of the extended family system into the co-operatives. 
Furthermore, the managerial roles in the Taxi Drivers co-operatives were 
patterned along the lines of traditional role structures in that occupation. 
The co-operatives did not only exhibit these cultural specific factors in their 
structures, they also demonstrated some behavioral tendencies characteristic of 
most formal organizations. This was shown by the relationship that existed 
between increases in their size and their division of labour and specialization. 
The research findings outlined above describe alternative participatory schemes 
in the co-operatives. The question now is, do - they indicate any patterns of 
organizational development in the co-operatives? Our findings suggested three 
patterns of organizational development in the co-operatives. 
The first type of co-operatives are those co-operatives which have conformed to 
the basic characteristics of the ideal classical model of co-operatives. These are 
the Democratic and Membership group controlled co-operatives. These were 
described as similar to the ideal classical model because of the low levels of the 
structuring of activities and their low complexity. These co-operatives consisted of 
workers and service co-operatives. 
The second type of co-operatives were described as moribund co-operatives. 
These were described so, because they gave every indication of being at the 
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point of disintegration. There was virtually no joint activity among members, and 
their management committee had no control over the activities of the co- 
operatives. These were mostly the gin distillers co-operatives. 
The third type of co-operatives had striking structuring developments which went 
beyond the prescriptions of ideal classical model. Their organizational 
developments were characterized by greater division of labour and role 
specialization in both their accountability and administrative components 
Summing up the findings of the research, the following conclusions can be 
reached: 
1. Self-management in Co-operatives can occur in different 
ways. This can be illustrated by the different patterns of 
control in co-operatives. That is, the distribution of control 
among different decision making groups. 
2. The fundamental determinants of the patterns of control 
are the different combination of structural variables that 
characterize participatory schemes in the co-operatives. 
Hence, co-operatives may vary along the following 
dimensions: the extent of division of labour and role 
specialisation, the size of their administrative components, 
the use of direct and/or indirect forms of participation and 
the frequency of meetings. These suggest that the ability 
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of certain groups or individuals to influence or control the 
affairs of a co-operatives organization comes from the 
domains of power created by the structuring of activities. 
3. The patterns of organizational development in the co- 
operatives are contingent on the objectives and services of 
the co-operatives. The co-operatives are designed to 
assume the characters of benevolent societies to secure 
the welfare of their members. In many instances, they 
become only representative organs for the small-scale 
business entrepreneurs. This is part of their efforts to 
reach the formal economies and have access to resources, 
especially modern technology and finance which are in the 
strangle hold of the modern sector in Ghana. As self-help 
organizations they are also perceived as means to 
transform existing traditional production forms into modern 
industrial workshops. Hence, the co-operatives may be 
seen as organization solution to minimize the problems of 
small scale businesses in Ghana. 
, 4. The participatory schemes in the co-operatives are a 
reflection of cultural specific and cultural free factors. The 
size of the management committee, division of labour and 
role specialization and centralization of control is indicative 
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of growth patterns in similar organizations found 
elsewhere. On the other hand, the socio-cultural factors of 
the co-operatives act as mediating factors between the 
impact of size on the organizational development of the co- 
operatives. 
Significance of the Research Findings 
The research has attempted to provide explanations of the relationships between 
self-management and participatory schemes in co-operatives. Our particular 
contribution to theories on co-operative development is our ability to go beyond 
the narrow conceptualization of co-operatives in terms of the ideal classical 
model of co-operatives and point out the existence of alternative participatory 
schemes. This allowed us to point out that self-management in co-operatives is 
also related to internal organizational factors. 
Another contribution to the theories on co-operative development was the ability 
of our research design to indicate the conditions that give rise to different 
participatory schemes in co-operatives. This also helped to explain why 
participatory schemes in co-operatives may differ. 
The social scientific significance of the study cannot be confined to only its 
theoretical development. It must also be seen in terms of its methodological 
development. The research has demonstrated the possibilities of the extension of 
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modern management theories to the study of small-scale enterprises in the 
informal economies in developing countries. This was done by the 
conceptualization of the organization structures of co-operatives in different 
dimensions as was done in the Aston Group studies. ' 
Limitations of the Study 
In spite of the quite interesting results of the study, a number of methodological 
problems may put some limitations on the validity of the research findings. 
Firstly, the genera liza bility of the research findings to other co-operatives in 
Ghana or elsewhere may be questioned on the grounds of the representatives of 
the sample. The sample of 31 co-operatives cannot be said to be representative 
of the number of co-operatives in Ghana. Furthermore, the method of data 
collection for certain types of information may raise some concerns for the 
validity of the research findings. In measuring control in the co-operatives, we 
restricted ourselves to the ratings of the members of the management 
committees and the researchers own ratings. This approach may not be able to 
cover the totality of events relating to control in the co-operatives. It will therefore 
miss out a considerable amount of information. 
'See Pugh at -d, Dimension of .. op cit. 
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However, the approach we adopted had sought to obtain an adequate 
f 
representation of the universe of activities in the co-operatives by the choice of a 
larger number of decision issues. The validity of the measures of control was also 
improved by our use of questions that focused on a considerable number of 
issues in the co-operatives instead of asking global questions. 
The selection of the structural variables was derived from our theoretical 
understanding of factors expected to affect self-management in democratic 
organizations. Research has indicated a variety of factors that other researchers 
can equally affect participation and control in organization. Hence, it is possible 
that other researchers using other factors and more sophisticated statistical 
techniques can arrive at different findings on their effect on participation. 
In spite of the limitations on the validity of the research, our results in general did 
confirms the hypothesized relationships between the research variables. This 
suggests the adequacy of the research methods adopted to bring empirical 
evidence to bear upon our research problem. Furthermore, the external validity of 
the research is ascertained by the positive results obtained by testing empirically 
accepted hypothesis in organization theory about the relationship between 
structural variables and the contextual variables. 
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